Module signing and post-quantum crypto public key algorithms

Stefan Berger stefanb at linux.ibm.com
Fri Nov 7 19:19:23 UTC 2025



On 11/7/25 5:03 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Stefan Berger <stefanb at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 6/16/25 1:27 PM, Simo Sorce wrote:
>>> Of course we can decide to hedge *all bets* and move to a composed
>>> signature (both a classic and a PQ one), in which case I would suggest
>>> looking into signatures that use ML-DSA-87 + Ed448 or ML-DSA-87 + P-521
>>> ,ideally disjoint, with a kernel policy that can decide which (or both)
>>> needs to be valid/checked so that the policy can be changed quickly via
>>> configuration if any of the signature is broken.
>>
>> FYI: based on this implementation of ML-DSA-44/65/87
>>
>> https://github.com/IBM/mlca/tree/main/qsc/crystals
> 
> The problem with that is that the Apache-2 licence is incompatible with GPLv2.
> Now, it might be possible to persuade IBM to dual-license their code.

Correct. It was supposed to become GPLv2 + Apache 2.

> 
> David
> 
> 




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