[PATCH 0/3] BPF signature verification

[Blaise Boscaccy]

KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> writes:

> On Sat, May 31, 2025 at 12:14 AM Blaise Boscaccy
> <bboscaccy at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>
>> KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> writes:
>>
>> > On Fri, May 30, 2025 at 11:19 PM Blaise Boscaccy
>> > <bboscaccy at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> writes:
>> >>
>> >
>> > [...]
>> >
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> And that isn't at odds with the kernel being able to do it nor is it
>> >> with what I posted.
>> >>
>> >> > If your build environment that signs the BPF program is compromised
>> >> > and can inject arbitrary code, then signing does not help.  Can you
>> >> > explain what a supply chain attack would look like here?
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> Most people here can read C code. The number of people that can read
>> >> ebpf assembly metaprogramming code is much smaller. Compromising clang
>> >> is one thing, compromising libbpf is another. Your proposal increases
>> >> the attack surface with no observable benefit. If I was going to leave a
>> >> hard-to-find backdoor into ring0, gen.c would be a fun place to explore
>> >> doing it. Module and UEFI signature verification code doesn't live
>> >> inside of GCC or Clang as set of meta-instructions that get emitted, and
>> >> there are very good reasons for that.
>> >>
>> >> Further, since the signature verification code is unique for each and
>> >> every program it needs to be verified/proved/tested for each and every
>> >> program. Additionally, since all these checks are being forced outside
>> >> of the kernel proper, with the insistence of keeping the LSM layer in
>> >> the dark of the ultimate result, the only way to test that a program
>> >> will fail if the map is corrupted is to physically corrupt each and
>> >> every program and test that individually. That isn't "elegant" nor "user
>> >> friendly" in any way, shape or form.
>> >>
>> >> >> subsystem.  Additionally, it is impossible to verify the code
>> >> >> performing the signature verification, as it is uniquely regenerated
>> >> >
>> >> > The LSM needs to ensure that it allows trusted LOADER programs i.e.
>> >> > with signatures and potentially trusted signed user-space binaries
>> >> > with unsigned or delegated signing (this will be needed for Cilium and
>> >> > bpftrace that dynamically generate BPF programs), that's a more
>> >> > important aspect of the LSM policy from a BPF perspective.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> I would like to be able to sign my programs please and have the kernel
>> >> verify it was done correctly. Why are you insisting that I *don't* do
>> >> that?  I'm yet to see any technical objection to doing that. Do you have
>> >> one that you'd like to share at this point?
>> >
>> > The kernel allows a trusted loader that's signed with your private
>> > key, that runs in the kernel context to delegate the verification.
>> > This pattern of a trusted / delegated loader is going to be required
>> > for many of the BPF use-cases that are out there (Cilium, bpftrace)
>> > that dynamically generate eBPF programs.
>> >
>> > The technical objection is that:
>> >
>> > * It does not align with most BPF use-cases out there as most
>> > use-cases need a trusted loader.
>>
>> No, it's definitely a use case. It's trivial to support both a trusted
>> loader and a signature over the hash chain of supplied assets.
>>
>> > * Locks us into a UAPI, whereas a signed LOADER allows us to
>> > incrementally build signing for all use-cases without compromising the
>> > security properties.
>> >
>>
>> Your proposal locks us into a UAPI as well. There is no way to make to
>> do this via UAPI without making a UAPI design choice.
>>
>> > BPF's philosophy is that of flexibility and not locking the users into
>> > a rigid in-kernel implementation and UAPI.
>> >
>>
>> Then why are you locking us into a rigid
>> only-signing-the-loader-is-allowed implementation?
>
> I explained this before, the delegated / trusted loader is needed by
> many BPF use-cases. A UAPI is forever, thus the lock-in.
>

Again, I'm not following. What is technically wrong with supporting both
signing a loader only and allowing for the signature of multiple
passed-in assets? It's trivial to support both and any path forward will
force a UAPI lock-in.

Do you simply feel that it isn't a valid use case and therefore we
shouldn't be allowed to do it?

> - KP
>
>>
>> > - KP
>> >
>> >>
>> >> > MAP_EXCLUSIVE is missing and is required which prevents maps from
>> >> > being accessed by other programs as explained in the proposal.
>> >> >
>> >> > Please hold off on further iterations, I am working on a series and
>> >> > will share these patches based on the design that was proposed.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> So the premise here seems to be that people should only be allowed to
>> >> sign trusted loaders, and that trusted loaders must additionally be
>> >> authored by you, correct?
>> >>
>> >> When can we expect to see your patchset posted?
>> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> for every program.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 2. Timing of Signature Check
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This patchset moves the signature check to a point before
>> >> >> security_bpf_prog_load is invoked, due to an unresolved discussion
>> >> >> here:
>> >> >
>> >> > This is fine and what I had in mind, signature verification does not
>> >> > need to happen in the verifier and the existing hooks are good enough.
>> >> > I did not reply to Paul's comment since this is a fairly trivial
>> >> > detail and would be obvious in the implementation that the verifier is
>> >> > not the right place to check the signature anyways as the instruction
>> >> > buffer is only stable pre-verification.
>> >> >
>> >> >> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTj3=ZXgrYMNA+G64zsOyZO+78uDs1g=kh91=GR5KypYg@mail.gmail.com/
>> >> >> This change allows the LSM subsystem to be informed of the signature
>> >> >> verification result—if it occurred—and the method used, all without
>> >> >> introducing a new hook. It improves visibility and auditability,
>> >> >> reducing the “trust me, friend” aspect of the original design.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 11:50 PM Blaise Boscaccy
>> >> > <bboscaccy at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> As suggested or mandated by KP Singh
>> >> >> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CACYkzJ6VQUExfyt0=-FmXz46GHJh3d=FXh5j4KfexcEFbHV-vg@mail.gmail.com/,
>> >> >> this patchset proposes and implements an alternative hash-chain
>> >> >> algorithm for signature verification of BPF programs.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This design diverges in two key ways:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 1. Signature Strategy
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Two different signature strategies are
>> >> >> implemented. One verifies only the signature of the loader program in
>> >> >> the kernel, as described in the link above. The other verifies the
>> >> >> program’s maps in-kernel via a hash chain.  The original design
>> >> >> required loader programs to be “self-aborting” and embedded the
>> >> >> terminal hash verification logic as metaprogramming code generation
>> >> >> routines inside libbpf. While this patchset supports that scheme, it
>> >> >> is considered undesirable in certain environments due to the potential
>> >> >> for supply-chain attack vectors and the lack of visibility for the LSM
>> >> >> subsystem.  Additionally, it is impossible to verify the code
>> >> >> performing the signature verification, as it is uniquely regenerated
>> >> >> for every program.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 2. Timing of Signature Check
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This patchset moves the signature check to a point before
>> >> >> security_bpf_prog_load is invoked, due to an unresolved discussion
>> >> >> here:
>> >> >> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTj3=ZXgrYMNA+G64zsOyZO+78uDs1g=kh91=GR5KypYg@mail.gmail.com/
>> >> >> This change allows the LSM subsystem to be informed of the signature
>> >> >> verification result—if it occurred—and the method used, all without
>> >> >> introducing a new hook. It improves visibility and auditability,
>> >> >> reducing the “trust me, friend” aspect of the original design.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Blaise Boscaccy (3):
>> >> >>   bpf: Add bpf_check_signature
>> >> >>   bpf: Support light-skeleton signatures in autogenerated code
>> >> >>   bpftool: Allow signing of light-skeleton programs
>> >> >>
>> >> >>  include/linux/bpf.h            |   2 +
>> >> >>  include/linux/verification.h   |   1 +
>> >> >>  include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |   4 +
>> >> >>  kernel/bpf/arraymap.c          |  11 +-
>> >> >>  kernel/bpf/syscall.c           | 123 +++++++++++++++++++-
>> >> >>  tools/bpf/bpftool/Makefile     |   4 +-
>> >> >>  tools/bpf/bpftool/common.c     | 204 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> >> >>  tools/bpf/bpftool/gen.c        |  66 ++++++++++-
>> >> >>  tools/bpf/bpftool/main.c       |  24 +++-
>> >> >>  tools/bpf/bpftool/main.h       |  23 ++++
>> >> >>  tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |   4 +
>> >> >>  tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h         |   4 +
>> >> >>  tools/lib/bpf/skel_internal.h  |  28 ++++-
>> >> >>  13 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>> >> >>
>> >> >> --
>> >> >> 2.48.1
>> >> >>