[RFC PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce a new hook: security_kernel_module_load
Serge E. Hallyn
serge at hallyn.com
Wed May 21 22:03:49 UTC 2025
On Wed, May 21, 2025 at 04:01:05PM +0200, Simon THOBY wrote:
> Introduce a new hook to allow LSMs to decide whether to block the load
> of a kernel module.
>
> Two hooks already exist:
> - kernel_module_request is called when the kernel itself (not userspace)
> request the load of a module, e.g. because a device was detected.
> - security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE) is called when userspace calls
> init_module/finit_module, but lack information about the module because
> its headers have not been loaded into kernel space, let alone parsed.
> This may not be sufficient for some LSMs.
>
> This new hook is similar to security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE),
> but called after the module signature and header are verified, and only
> takes the module name for now.
>
> Signed-off-by: Simon THOBY <git at nightmared.fr>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/module.h | 1 +
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> kernel/module/main.c | 4 ++++
> security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index bf3bbac4e02a..51c5212d8bb6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getlsmprop, const struct cred *c,
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_load, const char *kmod_name)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description)
> diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
> index 8050f77c3b64..b6b8d6f7f599 100644
> --- a/include/linux/module.h
> +++ b/include/linux/module.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct modversion_info {
> char name[MODULE_NAME_LEN];
> };
>
> +struct load_info;
> struct module;
> struct exception_table_entry;
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index cc9b54d95d22..e175b2cc8caf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop);
> int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
> int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
> int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> +int security_kernel_module_load(const char *kmod_name);
> int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
> int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_load_data_id id,
> @@ -1255,6 +1256,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline int security_kernel_module_load(const char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c
> index a2859dc3eea6..12a1a5f4d823 100644
> --- a/kernel/module/main.c
> +++ b/kernel/module/main.c
> @@ -3228,6 +3228,10 @@ static int early_mod_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
> return -EPERM;
> }
>
> + err = security_kernel_module_load(info->name);
Would it be more useful to pass in the whole info struct?
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> err = rewrite_section_headers(info, flags);
> if (err)
> return err;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index fb57e8fddd91..b9430499c332 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -3336,6 +3336,20 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_kernel_module_load() - Check if loading a module is allowed
> + * @kmod_name: name of the kernel module being loaded
> + *
> + * This method is called when the userspace called init_module/finit_module
> + * with a valid module
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if successful.
> + */
> +int security_kernel_module_load(const char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_load, kmod_name);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace
> * @file: file
> --
> 2.49.0
>
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