[PATCH v3 0/4] Introducing Hornet LSM
KP Singh
kpsingh at kernel.org
Mon May 19 23:42:06 UTC 2025
> > > > > > No. New hook is not needed.
[...]
> > > > >
> > > > > It would be good for you to explain how the existing LSM hook is sufficient
> > > > > to authorize the loading of a BPF program using the signature validation
> > > > > state determined in the BPF verifier.
> > > >
> > > > I already explained:
> > > > .. a job of trivial LSM:
> > > > if (prog_attr doesn't have signature &&
> > > > (task == .. || task is under certain cgroup || whatever))
> > > > disallow.
> > >
> > > I read that earlier reply as an example that covers a sample use case,
> > > I didn't realize you were asserting that was the only approach you
> > > were considering. Perhaps that was the source of confusion earlier,
> > > we may disagree, but I don't intentionally "twist" words; not only is
> > > that rude, it's just stupid in public, archived discussions.
> > >
> > > As I mentioned previously, we really need to see an explicit yes/no
> > > flag from the BPF verifier to indicate that the signature on the BPF
> > > program has been validated. It really should be as simple as adding a
> > > bool to bpf_prog_aux which the BPF verifier sets to true upon
> > > successful signature validation, and then an LSM can use this flag as
> > > input to an access control decision in a hook placed after the
> > > verifier. Are you objecting to the addition of a flag in the
> > > bpf_prog_aux struct (or some other struct tightly coupled to the BPF
> > > program), the LSM hook after the verifier, or both? It would also be
> > > helpful if you can elaborate on the technical reasons behind these
> > > objections.
> >
> > Neither the aux field, nor the hook are required because:
> >
> > * If the signature is passed, it will be enforced, there are no
> > "runtime aspects" that need to be configurable here.
> > * What the LSM can specify a policy for is when a signature is not
> > passed, for this, it does not need an aux field or a signature or the
> > new hook, existing hooks are sufficient.
> >
>
> What about wanting to create a policy that requires signatures under certain
> situations and allowing the lack of a signature under others? How is that
> implemented with the existing hooks?
> As I understand it, all the existing hooks know (would know) is that _if_ there
> is a signature _then_ it will be enforced. There is no way to know _whether_
> there is a signature.
>
The signature is passed in bpf_attr and if there is a signature the
LSM's job is done.
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.14.7/source/kernel/bpf/syscall.c#L5771
It will be enforced.
- KP
> An example policy I can think of is that most users (with CAP_BPF) must submit
> signed programs but some users are exempted. Would that policy be able to be
> made with the current hooks?
>
> > - KP
> >
> > >
> > > --
> > > paul-moore.com
> >
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