[PATCH v2 2/3] landlock.7: Move over documentation for ABI version 6
Günther Noack
gnoack at google.com
Mon Mar 3 16:24:45 UTC 2025
Hello Alejandro!
For context, in this patch set, we have three commits:
* 1/3 and 2/3 copy documentation from the kernel side unmodified.
* 3/3 revises a section about Landlock's "scoped" restriction features.
I thought it would be easier to discuss with the "copy" and "rewrite" parts
separate, but actually, as you also noticed, 3/3 does rewrite large chunks of
the 2/3 commit along the way, and it is probably not worth correcting much of
that wording any more.
Would you prefer if I squashed commits 2/3 and 3/3 into one?
On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 10:23:47PM +0100, Alejandro Colomar wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 26, 2025 at 10:29:11PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> > With this ABI version, Landlock can restrict outgoing interactions with
> > higher-privileged Landlock domains through Abstract Unix Domain sockets and
> > signals.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack at google.com>
> > ---
> > man/man7/landlock.7 | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/man/man7/landlock.7 b/man/man7/landlock.7
> > index 11f76b072..30dbac73d 100644
> > --- a/man/man7/landlock.7
> > +++ b/man/man7/landlock.7
> > @@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock ABI.
> > .SS Network flags
> > These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process
> > to a set of network actions.
> > -This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4.
> > +.P
> > +This is supported since Landlock ABI version 4.
> > .P
> > The following access rights apply to TCP port numbers:
> > .TP
> > @@ -258,6 +259,24 @@ Bind a TCP socket to a local port.
> > .B LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
> > Connect an active TCP socket to a remote port.
> > .\"
> > +.SS Scope flags
> > +These flags enable to isolate a sandboxed process from a set of IPC actions.
>
> s/to isolate/isolating/
>
> AFAIU, to be able to use an infinitive with enable/allow you need a
> direct object in the sentence. If there's no direct object, you need a
> gerund.
Thanks, this is useful. Changed it to infinitive for now.
FWIW, the same phrases exist on the kernel side as well, unfortunately.
> > +Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain
> > +to forbid connections to resources outside the domain.
> > +.P
> > +This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6.
>
> I'm wondering if we should have this as a parenthetical next to the
> title, like we usually do with "(since Linux X.Y)". Don't do it for
> now, but please consider it for when you have some time. I'm not saying
> you should do it though, just that you consider it, and tell me if you
> agree or not.
I added it to my notes for further revisions,
I think this would indeed be more appropriate in the man pages.
Is it possible to set the paranthetical without bold as well,
even in a .SS subsection header?
> > +.P
> > +The following scopes exist:
> > +.TP
> > +.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
> > +Restrict a sandboxed process from connecting to an abstract UNIX socket
> > +created by a process outside the related Landlock domain
> > +(e.g., a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process).
> > +.TP
> > +.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
> > +Restrict a sandboxed process from sending a signal
> > +to another process outside the domain.
> > +.\"
> > .SS Layers of file path access rights
> > Each time a thread enforces a ruleset on itself,
> > it updates its Landlock domain with a new layer of policy.
> > @@ -334,6 +353,51 @@ and related syscalls on a target process,
> > a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
> > which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
> > .\"
> > +.SS IPC scoping
> > +Similar to the implicit
> > +.BR "Ptrace restrictions" ,
> > +we may want to further restrict interactions between sandboxes.
> > +Each Landlock domain can be explicitly scoped for a set of actions
> > +by specifying it on a ruleset.
> > +For example, if a sandboxed process should not be able to
> > +.BR connect (2)
> > +to a non-sandboxed process through abstract
> > +.BR unix (7)
> > +sockets,
> > +we can specify such a restriction with
> > +.BR LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET .
> > +Moreover, if a sandboxed process should not be able
> > +to send a signal to a non-sandboxed process,
> > +we can specify this restriction with
> > +.BR LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL .
> > +.P
> > +A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process
> > +when its domain is not scoped.
>
> Does "its" refer to the sandboxed one or to the non-snadboxed one?
It refers to the sandboxed process.
This correction would be overwritten in the following commit.
I don't think it's worth fixing any more.
> > +If a process's domain is scoped,
> > +it can only connect to sockets created by processes in the same scope.
> > +Moreover,
> > +If a process is scoped to send signal
>
> Is this a typo? s/signal/&s/
It is a typo, copied from kernel documentation. Oops.
This correction is overwritten in the following commit.
> > to a non-scoped process,
>
> Should we use plural here?
This correction is overwritten in the following commit.
> > +it can only send signals to processes in the same scope.
> > +.P
> > +A connected datagram socket behaves like a stream socket
> > +when its domain is scoped,
> > +meaning if the domain is scoped after the socket is connected,
> > +it can still
> > +.BR send (2)
> > +data just like a stream socket.
> > +However, in the same scenario,
> > +a non-connected datagram socket cannot send data (with
> > +.BR sendto (2))
> > +outside its scope.
> > +.P
> > +A process with a scoped domain can inherit a socket
> > +created by a non-scoped process.
> > +The process cannot connect to this socket since it has a scoped domain.
> > +.P
> > +IPC scoping does not support exceptions, so if a domain is scoped,
>
> Please break after the first ',' too.
Done.
> > +no rules can be added to allow access to resources or processes
>
> Please break after the second 'to'.
Done.
> > +outside of the scope.
Thanks for the review,
—Günther
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