[RFC PATCH 1/3] landlock: walk parent dir without taking references
Tingmao Wang
m at maowtm.org
Wed Jun 4 00:45:43 UTC 2025
This commit replaces dget_parent with a direct read of d_parent. By
holding rcu read lock we should be safe in terms of not reading freed
memory, but this is still problematic due to move+unlink, as will be shown
with the test in the next commit.
Note that follow_up is still used when walking up a mountpoint.
Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang <m at maowtm.org>
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 6fee7c20f64d..923737412cfa 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
* Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
*/
static const struct landlock_rule *
-find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+find_rule_rcu(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
const struct dentry *const dentry)
{
const struct landlock_rule *rule;
@@ -375,10 +375,10 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
return NULL;
inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- rcu_read_lock();
+ if (unlikely(!inode))
+ return NULL;
id.key.object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
- rcu_read_unlock();
return rule;
}
@@ -809,9 +809,11 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
is_dom_check = false;
}
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) {
landlock_unmask_layers(
- find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
+ find_rule_rcu(domain, dentry_child1),
landlock_init_layer_masks(
domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
&_layer_masks_child1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
@@ -821,7 +823,7 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
}
if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) {
landlock_unmask_layers(
- find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
+ find_rule_rcu(domain, dentry_child2),
landlock_init_layer_masks(
domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
&_layer_masks_child2, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
@@ -831,7 +833,6 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
}
walker_path = *path;
- path_get(&walker_path);
/*
* We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
* restriction.
@@ -880,7 +881,7 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
break;
}
- rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
+ rule = find_rule_rcu(domain, walker_path.dentry);
allowed_parent1 = allowed_parent1 ||
landlock_unmask_layers(
rule, access_masked_parent1,
@@ -897,10 +898,14 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
break;
jump_up:
if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
+ /* follow_up gets the parent and puts the passed in path */
+ path_get(&walker_path);
if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
+ path_put(&walker_path);
/* Ignores hidden mount points. */
goto jump_up;
} else {
+ path_put(&walker_path);
/*
* Stops at the real root. Denies access
* because not all layers have granted access.
@@ -920,11 +925,11 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
}
break;
}
- parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
- dput(walker_path.dentry);
+ parent_dentry = walker_path.dentry->d_parent;
walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
}
- path_put(&walker_path);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (!allowed_parent1) {
log_request_parent1->type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS;
@@ -1045,12 +1050,11 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(
layer_masks_dom,
LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
- dget(dir);
- while (true) {
- struct dentry *parent_dentry;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ while (true) {
/* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */
- if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir), access_dom,
+ if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule_rcu(domain, dir), access_dom,
layer_masks_dom,
ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_dom))) {
/*
@@ -1065,11 +1069,11 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(
if (dir == mnt_root || WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ROOT(dir)))
break;
- parent_dentry = dget_parent(dir);
- dput(dir);
- dir = parent_dentry;
+ dir = dir->d_parent;
}
- dput(dir);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
return ret;
}
--
2.49.0
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