[PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Introduce path iterator
Jan Kara
jack at suse.cz
Tue Jun 3 09:46:22 UTC 2025
On Fri 30-05-25 16:20:39, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Thu, May 29, 2025 at 10:05:59AM -0700, Song Liu wrote:
> > On Thu, May 29, 2025 at 9:57 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> > <alexei.starovoitov at gmail.com> wrote:
> > [...]
> > > >
> > > > How about we describe this as:
> > > >
> > > > Introduce a path iterator, which safely (no crash) walks a struct path.
> > > > Without malicious parallel modifications, the walk is guaranteed to
> > > > terminate. The sequence of dentries maybe surprising in presence
> > > > of parallel directory or mount tree modifications and the iteration may
> > > > not ever finish in face of parallel malicious directory tree manipulations.
> > >
> > > Hold on. If it's really the case then is the landlock susceptible
> > > to this type of attack already ?
> > > landlock may infinitely loop in the kernel ?
> >
> > I think this only happens if the attacker can modify the mount or
> > directory tree as fast as the walk, which is probably impossible
> > in reality.
>
> Yes, so this is not an infinite loop but an infinite race between the
> kernel and a very fast malicious user space process with an infinite
> number of available nested writable directories, that would also require
> a filesystem (and a kernel) supporting infinite pathname length.
Well, you definitely don't need infinite pathname length. Example:
Have a dir hierarchy like:
A
/ \
B C
|
D
Start iterating from A/B/D, you climb up to A/B. In parallel atacker does:
mv A/B/ A/C/; mkdir A/B
Now by following parent you get to A/C. In parallel attaker does:
mv A/C/ A/B/; mkdir A/C
And now you are essentially where you've started so this can repeat
forever.
As others wrote this particular timing might be hard enough to hit for it
to not be a practical attack but I would not bet much on somebody not being
able to invent some variant that works, in particular with BPF iterator.
Honza
--
Jan Kara <jack at suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
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