[RFC] vfs: security: Parse dev_name before calling security_sb_mount
Christian Brauner
brauner at kernel.org
Fri Jul 11 09:36:22 UTC 2025
On Thu, Jul 10, 2025 at 05:00:18PM +0000, Song Liu wrote:
>
>
> > On Jul 10, 2025, at 4:46 AM, Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org> wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> >> Right now, we have security_sb_mount and security_move_mount, for
> >> syscall “mount” and “move_mount” respectively. This is confusing
> >> because we can also do move mount with syscall “mount”. How about
> >> we create 5 different security hooks:
> >>
> >> security_bind_mount
> >> security_new_mount
> >> security_reconfigure_mount
> >> security_remount
> >> security_change_type_mount
> >>
> >> and remove security_sb_mount. After this, we will have 6 hooks for
> >> each type of mount (the 5 above plus security_move_mount).
> >
> > I've multiple times pointed out that the current mount security hooks
> > aren't working and basically everything in the new mount api is
> > unsupervised from an LSM perspective.
>
> To make sure I understand the comment. By “new mount api”, do you mean
> the code path under do_new_mount()?
fsopen()
fsconfig()
fsmount()
open_tree()
open_tree_attr()
move_mount()
statmount()
listmount()
I think that's all.
>
> > My recommendation is make a list of all the currently supported
> > security_*() hooks in the mount code (I certainly don't have them in my
> > head). Figure out what each of them allow to mediate effectively and how
> > the callchains are related.
> >
> > Then make a proposal how to replace them with something that a) doesn't
> > cause regressions which is probably something that the LSMs care about
> > and b) that covers the new mount API sufficiently to be properly
> > mediated.
> >
> > I'll happily review proposals. Fwiw, I'm pretty sure that this is
> > something that Mickael is interested in as well.
>
> So we will consider a proper redesign of LSM hooks for mount syscalls,
> but we do not want incremental improvements like this one. Do I get
> the direction right?
If incremental is workable then I think so yes. But it would be great to
get a consistent picture of what people want/need.
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