[PATCH v2 3/7] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
Roberto Sassu
roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
Wed Jan 15 10:51:22 UTC 2025
On 1/14/2025 3:20 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2024-11-28 at 11:06 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>>
>> IMA stores a pointer of the ima_iint_cache structure, containing integrity
>> metadata, in the inode security blob. However, check and assignment of this
>> pointer is not atomic, and it might happen that two tasks both see that the
>> iint pointer is NULL and try to set it, causing a memory leak.
>>
>> Ensure that the iint check and assignment is guarded, by adding a lockdep
>> assertion in ima_inode_get().
>
> -> is guarded by the ima_iint_cache_lock mutex, ...
By the iint_lock mutex...
>> Consequently, guard the remaining ima_inode_get() calls, in
>> ima_post_create_tmpfile() and ima_post_path_mknod(), to avoid the lockdep
>> warnings.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>> ---
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 2 ++
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
>> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
>> index dcc32483d29f..fca9db293c79 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
>> @@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
>> if (!iint_lock)
>> return NULL;
>>
>> + lockdep_assert_held(&iint_lock->mutex);
>> +
>
> lockdep_assert_held() doesn't actually "ensure" the lock is held, but emits a warning
> when the lock is not held (if debugging is enabled). Semantically "ensure" gives the
> impression of enforcing.
I agree. I would replace ensure with detect.
Thanks
Roberto
> Mimi
>
>> iint = iint_lock->iint;
>> if (iint)
>> return iint;
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> index 05cfb04cd02b..1e474ff6a777 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> @@ -705,14 +705,19 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>> if (!must_appraise)
>> return;
>>
>> + ima_iint_lock(inode);
>> +
>> /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
>> iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
>> - if (!iint)
>> + if (!iint) {
>> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
>> return;
>> + }
>>
>> /* needed for writing the security xattrs */
>> set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
>> iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
>> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -737,13 +742,18 @@ static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>> struct dentry *dentry)
>> if (!must_appraise)
>> return;
>>
>> + ima_iint_lock(inode);
>> +
>> /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
>> iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
>> - if (!iint)
>> + if (!iint) {
>> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
>> return;
>> + }
>>
>> /* needed for re-opening empty files */
>> iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
>> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
>> }
>>
>> /**
>
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