[PATCH 2/6] landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET
Justin Suess
utilityemal77 at gmail.com
Sun Dec 28 16:37:50 UTC 2025
On 12/28/25 07:45, Tingmao Wang wrote:
> Extend the existing abstract UNIX socket scoping to pathname sockets as
> well. Basically all of the logic is reused between the two types, just
> that pathname sockets scoping are controlled by another bit, and has its
> own audit request type (since the current one is named
> "abstract_unix_socket").
>
>
> Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/51
> Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang <m at maowtm.org>
> ---
>
> There is an argument that there should only really be one audit request
> type for both sockets, since the only difference is whether path= is
> followed by a normal path, or by a hex string starting with 00. But I'm
> not sure if we can change this at this point, so I have created a new
> request type.
>
> security/landlock/audit.c | 4 +++
> security/landlock/audit.h | 1 +
> security/landlock/task.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
> index e899995f1fd5..0626cc553ab0 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/audit.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
> @@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
> WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
> return "scope.abstract_unix_socket";
>
> + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET:
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
> + return "scope.pathname_unix_socket";
> +
> case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
> return "scope.signal";
> diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
> index 92428b7fc4d8..1c9ce8588102 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/audit.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ enum landlock_request_type {
> LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
> LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
> LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
> + LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET,
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
> index 6dfcc1860d6e..9fbb0ada440b 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/task.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/task.c
> @@ -233,57 +233,84 @@ static bool domain_is_scoped(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
> return false;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * sock_is_scoped - Check if socket connect or send should be restricted
> + * based on scope controls.
> + *
> + * @other: The server socket.
> + * @domain: The client domain.
> + * @scope: The relevant scope bit to check (i.e. pathname or abstract).
> + *
> + * Returns: True if connect should be restricted, false otherwise.
> + */
> static bool sock_is_scoped(struct sock *const other,
> - const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> + access_mask_t scope)
> {
> const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_other;
>
> /* The credentials will not change. */
> lockdep_assert_held(&unix_sk(other)->lock);
> dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain;
> - return domain_is_scoped(domain, dom_other,
> - LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET);
> + return domain_is_scoped(domain, dom_other, scope);
> }
>
> -static bool is_abstract_socket(struct sock *const sock)
> +static bool sock_addr_is_abstract(const struct unix_address *const addr)
Nit: From the name sock_addr_is_abstract, it's unclear without reading
the parameter that this function only works with unix sockets, when
socket is an overloaded term that can refer to other kinds of sockets
(e.g tcp/udp/raw).
Maybe is_unix_sock_addr_abstract? or unix_sock_addr_is_abstract?
>
> {
> - struct unix_address *addr = unix_sk(sock)->addr;
> -
> - if (!addr)
> - return false;
> -
> - if (addr->len >= offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 &&
> + if (addr && addr->len >= offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 &&
> addr->name->sun_path[0] == '\0')
> return true;
>
> return false;
> }
>
> +/* Allow us to quickly test if the current domain scopes any form of socket */
> static const struct access_masks unix_scope = {
> - .scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
> + .scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
> + LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET,
> };
>
> +/*
> + * UNIX sockets can have three types of addresses: pathname (a filesystem path),
> + * unnamed (not bound to an address), and abstract (sun_path[0] is '\0').
> + * Unnamed sockets include those created with socketpair() and unbound sockets.
> + * We do not restrict unnamed sockets since they have no address to identify.
> + */
> static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock,
> struct sock *const other,
> struct sock *const newsk)
> {
> size_t handle_layer;
> + access_mask_t scope;
> + enum landlock_request_type request_type;
> const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
> landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), unix_scope,
> &handle_layer);
> + const struct unix_address *addr;
>
> /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
> if (!subject)
> return 0;
>
> - if (!is_abstract_socket(other))
> + addr = unix_sk(other)->addr;
> + /* Unnamed sockets are not restricted. */
> + if (!addr)
> return 0;
>
> - if (!sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain))
> + if (sock_addr_is_abstract(addr)) {
> + scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + request_type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + } else {
> + /* Pathname socket. */
> + scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + request_type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + }
> +
> + if (!sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain, scope))
> return 0;
>
> landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
> - .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
> + .type = request_type,
> .audit = {
> .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
> .u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
> @@ -299,9 +326,12 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
> struct socket *const other)
> {
> size_t handle_layer;
> + access_mask_t scope;
> + enum landlock_request_type request_type;
> const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
> landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), unix_scope,
> &handle_layer);
> + const struct unix_address *addr;
>
> if (!subject)
> return 0;
> @@ -313,14 +343,24 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
> if (unix_peer(sock->sk) == other->sk)
> return 0;
>
> - if (!is_abstract_socket(other->sk))
> + addr = unix_sk(other->sk)->addr;
> + /* Unnamed sockets are not restricted. */
> + if (!addr)
> return 0;
>
> - if (!sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain))
> + if (sock_addr_is_abstract(addr)) {
> + scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + request_type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + } else {
> + scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + request_type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + }
> +
> + if (!sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain, scope))
> return 0;
>
> landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
> - .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
> + .type = request_type,
> .audit = {
> .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
> .u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
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