[PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Sun, Dec 07, 2025 at 03:33:17PM +0900, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2025-12-05 at 02:49 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 05, 2025 at 01:20:30AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Fri, Dec 05, 2025 at 12:31:27AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > tpm2_load_cmd() and tpm2_unseal_cmd() use the same parent, and
> > > > calls to
> > > > tpm_buf_append_name() cause the exact same TPM2_ReadPublic
> > > > command to be
> > > > sent to the chip, causing unnecessary traffic.
> > > > 
> > > > 1. Export tpm2_read_public in order to make it callable from
> > > > 'trusted_tpm2'.
> > > > 2. Re-orchestrate tpm2_seal_trusted() and tpm2_unseal_trusted()
> > > > in order to
> > > >    halve the name resolutions required:
> > > > 2a. Move tpm2_read_public() calls into trusted_tpm2.
> > > > 2b. Pass TPM name to tpm_buf_append_name().
> > > > 2c. Rework tpm_buf_append_name() to use the pre-resolved name.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
> > > 
> > > If ASN.1 blob would contain also name of the parent then zero
> > > tpm2_read_public() calls would be required i.e., the main
> > > bottleneck here inherits from the limitations of the file format
> > > itself.
> > 
> > Along the lines of attached patch.
> 
> Well firstly [6] is already being taken by the creation data proposal,
> so this would introduce an incompatibility between the kernel and the
> spec, but secondly, if you want something like this in the spec before
> it goes to the IETF you really need to propose it now.

What is the mailing list for the working group, or is this still
unclear as of today?

> 
> The problem with this particular addition is that it would be Linux
> Kernel specific.  All the current TSSs already do a cached read public
> under the covers when they add the session wrappings so the user facing
> API they expose has nowhere to insert (or easily extract) a name field
> and thus TSS based implementations would have no incentive to either
> output or consume this field.  That's not to say the standard can't
> have additions for crazy or niche use cases (that's what the rsaParent
> flag is: a one off to support a niche SUSE use case) but it would be
> hard to persuade user implementations to do this so the kernel would
> have to interoperate with the case where it didn't exist anyway.

It is just matter of conditionally calling tpm2_read_public(). Not
a big deal.

> 
> The standard use today is with permanent handles for parents, where the
> parent is created on the fly, so the name is actually returned from
> TPM2_CreatePrimary for this use case.  It should be a simple matter to
> bring the kernel implementation up to doing this as well.

Intercepting TPM2_CreatePrimary does not provide full coverage, as
it does not address persistent keys, which kernel interface does
support.

> 
> Regards,
> 
> James
>   
> 

BR, Jarkko