[PATCH RFC V10 4/7] KVM: guest_memfd: Use guest mem inodes instead of anonymous inodes
David Hildenbrand
david at redhat.com
Mon Aug 11 15:33:54 UTC 2025
On 11.08.25 11:06, Shivank Garg wrote:
> From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng at google.com>
>
> guest_memfd's inode represents memory the guest_memfd is
> providing. guest_memfd's file represents a struct kvm's view of that
> memory.
>
> Using a custom inode allows customization of the inode teardown
> process via callbacks. For example, ->evict_inode() allows
> customization of the truncation process on file close, and
> ->destroy_inode() and ->free_inode() allow customization of the inode
> freeing process.
>
> Customizing the truncation process allows flexibility in management of
> guest_memfd memory and customization of the inode freeing process
> allows proper cleanup of memory metadata stored on the inode.
>
> Memory metadata is more appropriately stored on the inode (as opposed
> to the file), since the metadata is for the memory and is not unique
> to a specific binding and struct kvm.
>
> Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng at google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg at amd.com>
> ---
[...]
>
> static int kvm_gmem_migrate_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
> @@ -463,11 +503,71 @@ bool __weak kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm)
> return true;
> }
>
> +static struct inode *kvm_gmem_inode_make_secure_inode(const char *name,
> + loff_t size, u64 flags)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode;
> +
> + inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(kvm_gmem_mnt->mnt_sb, name, NULL);
> + if (IS_ERR(inode))
> + return inode;
> +
> + inode->i_private = (void *)(unsigned long)flags;
> + inode->i_op = &kvm_gmem_iops;
> + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &kvm_gmem_aops;
> + inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
> + inode->i_size = size;
> + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
> + mapping_set_inaccessible(inode->i_mapping);
> + /* Unmovable mappings are supposed to be marked unevictable as well. */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!mapping_unevictable(inode->i_mapping));
> +
> + return inode;
> +}
> +
> +static struct file *kvm_gmem_inode_create_getfile(void *priv, loff_t size,
> + u64 flags)
> +{
> + static const char *name = "[kvm-gmem]";
> + struct inode *inode;
> + struct file *file;
> + int err;
> +
> + err = -ENOENT;
Maybe add a comment here when the module reference will get
dropped. And maybe we should just switch to fops_get() + fops_put?
/* __fput() will take care of fops_put(). */
if (!fops_get(&kvm_gmem_fops))
goto err;
> +
> + inode = kvm_gmem_inode_make_secure_inode(name, size, flags);
> + if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(inode);
> + goto err_put_module;
> + }
> +
> + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, kvm_gmem_mnt, name, O_RDWR,
> + &kvm_gmem_fops);
> + if (IS_ERR(file)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(file);
> + goto err_put_inode;
> + }
> +
> + file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
> + file->private_data = priv;
> +
> +out:
> + return file;
> +
> +err_put_inode:
> + iput(inode);
> +err_put_module:
> + module_put(kvm_gmem_fops.owner);
fops_put(&kvm_gmem_fops);
?
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david at redhat.com>
--
Cheers,
David / dhildenb
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