[PATCH] tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not exist

Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Wed Sep 25 11:01:52 UTC 2024


Alfred Agrell found that TOMOYO cannot handle execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
inside chroot environment where /dev and /proc are not mounted, for
commit 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") missed
that TOMOYO tries to canonicalize argv[0] when the filename fed to the
executed program as argv[0] is supplied using potentially nonexistent
pathname.

Since "/dev/fd/<fd>" already lost symlink information used for obtaining
that <fd>, it is too late to reconstruct symlink's pathname. Although
<filename> part of "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>" might not be canonicalized,
TOMOYO cannot use tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() when /dev is not mounted.

Therefore, fallback to tomoyo_realpath_from_path() when
tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() failed. This change makes TOMOYO unable to
utilize argv[0] for controlling domain transitions for multi-call binaries
(e.g. busybox), but this change would be better than failing to handle
execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) inside chroot environment.

Reported-by: Alfred Agrell <blubban at gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1082001
Fixes: 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
Alfred, what do you think? That commit mentioned

  This does however mean that execution of a script in a /proc-less
  environment won't work

. Are you expecting that execution of non-scripts in a /dev-less and
/proc-less environment work? I guess that majority of programs depend
on /dev and /proc being mounted even inside chroot environment. But
if you have programs intended to be executed in a /dev-less and
/proc-less chroot environment, this patch should fix this problem...

 security/tomoyo/domain.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 90b53500a236..272e8474d15f 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -723,10 +723,14 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	ee->r.obj = &ee->obj;
 	ee->obj.path1 = bprm->file->f_path;
 	/* Get symlink's pathname of program. */
-	retval = -ENOENT;
 	exename.name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name);
-	if (!exename.name)
-		goto out;
+	if (!exename.name) {
+		/* Fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not exist. */
+		retval = -ENOMEM;
+		exename.name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&bprm->file->f_path);
+		if (!exename.name)
+			goto out;
+	}
 	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&exename);
 retry:
 	/* Check 'aggregator' directive. */
-- 
2.43.5





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