[PATCH v4 6/6] landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Fri Sep 13 15:07:16 UTC 2024
On Fri, Sep 06, 2024 at 03:30:08PM -0600, Tahera Fahimi wrote:
> Improving Landlock ABI version 6 to support signal scoping with
> LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera at gmail.com>
> ---
> v3:
> - update date
> ---
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index c3b87755e98d..c694e9fe36fc 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> .scoped =
> - LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
> + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
> + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL,
> };
>
> Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
> @@ -123,7 +124,8 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
> ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
> case 5:
> /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET for ABI < 6 */
> - ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
> + ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
> + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL);
> }
>
> This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
> @@ -320,11 +322,15 @@ explicitly scoped for a set of actions by specifying it on a ruleset.
> For example, if a sandboxed process should not be able to
> :manpage:`connect(2)` to a non-sandboxed process through abstract
> :manpage:`unix(7)` sockets, we can specify such restriction with
> -``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``.
> +``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``. Moreover, if a sandboxed
> +process should not be able to send a signal to a non-sandboxed process,
> +we can specify this restriction with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL``.
>
> A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process when its
> domain is not scoped. If a process's domain is scoped, it can only
> connect to sockets created by processes in the same scoped domain.
> +Moreover, If a process is scoped to send signal to a non-scoped process,
> +it can only send signals to processes in the same scoped domain.
>
> A connected datagram socket behaves like a stream socket when its domain
> is scoped, meaning if the domain is scoped after the socket is connected
> @@ -575,12 +581,14 @@ earlier ABI.
> Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of
> :manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right.
>
> -Abstract UNIX sockets Restriction (ABI < 6)
> ---------------------------------------------
> +Abstract Unix sockets and Signal Restriction (ABI < 6)
> +-------------------------------------------------------
I created a dedicated section instead of merging both.
>
> +<<<<<<< current
I fixed that.
> With ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict connection to an abstract
> -Unix socket through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``, thanks to
> -the ``scoped`` ruleset attribute.
> +:manpage:`unix(7)` socket through
> +``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET`` and sending signal through
> +``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL``, thanks to the ``scoped`` ruleset attribute.
I cleaned up this fix that should be part of the other series.
>
> .. _kernel_support:
>
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
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