[RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis
sergeh at kernel.org
sergeh at kernel.org
Thu Oct 24 19:57:21 UTC 2024
On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 07:25:21PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > On Oct 22, 2024, at 8:25 PM, sergeh at kernel.org wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 09:55:11AM -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >>
> >> +The Clavis LSM contains a system keyring call .clavis. It contains a single
> >
> > s/call/called/
>
> I will change that, thanks.
>
> >> +asymmetric key that is used to validate anything added to it. This key can
> >> +be added during boot and must be a preexisting system kernel key. If the
> >> +``clavis=`` boot parameter is not used, any asymmetric key the user owns
> >
> > Who is "the user", and precisely what does "owns' mean here? Is it just
> > restating that it must be a key already in one of the builtin or secondary
> > or platform keyrings?
>
> In the case where Clavis was not provided a key id during boot, root can
> add a single public key to the .clavis keyring anytime afterwards. This
> key does not need to be in any of the system keyrings. Once the key is
> added, the Clavis LSM is enabled. The root user must also own the private
> key, since this is required to do the ACL signing. I will try to clarify this better
Ooh, I see. Own it as in be able to sign things with it. Of course. Thanks.
> in the documentation.
>
> I wouldn't expect this to be the typical way Clavis would be used. I would
Right, I wasn't asking because I would want to use it that way, but
because it feels potentially dangerous :)
> also be interested in any feedback if enabling the Clavis LSM this way
> following boot should be removed. If this were removed, Clavis could
> only be enabled when using the boot parameter.
Yeah I don't know enough to give good guidance here. I do worry about
UKIs enforcing only the built-in signed kernel command line and so preventing
a user from appending their own clavis= entry. Not knowing how this
will end up getting deployed, I'm not sure which is the more important
issue.
> > And this is done by simply loading it into the clavis keyring, right?
>
> Correct.
>
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