[RFC PATCH v2 6/8] selftests/landlock: Test consistency of errors for TCP actions
Mikhail Ivanov
ivanov.mikhail1 at huawei-partners.com
Thu Oct 17 11:04:52 UTC 2024
Add tcp_errors_consistency fixture for TCP errors consistency tests.
Add 6 test suits for this fixture to configure tested address family of
socket (ipv4 or ipv6), sandboxed mode and whether TCP action is allowed
in a sandboxed mode.
Add tests which validate errors consistency provided by Landlock for
bind(2) and connect(2) restrictable TCP actions.
Add sys_bind(), sys_connect() helpers for convenient checks of bind(2)
and connect(2). Add set_ipv4_tcp_address(), set_ipv6_tcp_address()
helpers.
Add CONFIG_LSM="landlock" option in config. Some LSMs (e.g. SElinux)
can be loaded before Landlock and return inconsistent error code for
bind(2) and connect(2) calls.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1 at huawei-partners.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 329 +++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
index a8982da4acbd..52988e8a56cc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
CONFIG_INET=y
CONFIG_IPV6=y
CONFIG_KEYS=y
+CONFIG_LSM="landlock"
CONFIG_MPTCP=y
CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6=y
CONFIG_NET=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index d9de0ee49ebc..30b29bf10bdc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -36,6 +36,22 @@ enum sandbox_type {
TCP_SANDBOX,
};
+static void set_ipv4_tcp_address(const struct service_fixture *const srv,
+ struct sockaddr_in *ipv4_addr)
+{
+ ipv4_addr->sin_family = srv->protocol.domain;
+ ipv4_addr->sin_port = htons(srv->port);
+ ipv4_addr->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+}
+
+static void set_ipv6_tcp_address(const struct service_fixture *const srv,
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *ipv6_addr)
+{
+ ipv6_addr->sin6_family = srv->protocol.domain;
+ ipv6_addr->sin6_port = htons(srv->port);
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &ipv6_addr->sin6_addr);
+}
+
static int set_service(struct service_fixture *const srv,
const struct protocol_variant prot,
const unsigned short index)
@@ -56,15 +72,11 @@ static int set_service(struct service_fixture *const srv,
switch (prot.domain) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
- srv->ipv4_addr.sin_family = prot.domain;
- srv->ipv4_addr.sin_port = htons(srv->port);
- srv->ipv4_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+ set_ipv4_tcp_address(srv, &srv->ipv4_addr);
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
- srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_family = prot.domain;
- srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_port = htons(srv->port);
- inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_addr);
+ set_ipv6_tcp_address(srv, &srv->ipv6_addr);
return 0;
case AF_UNIX:
@@ -181,6 +193,17 @@ static uint16_t get_binded_port(int socket_fd,
}
}
+static int sys_bind(const int sock_fd, const struct sockaddr *addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = bind(sock_fd, addr, addrlen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int bind_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
const struct service_fixture *const srv,
const socklen_t addrlen)
@@ -217,6 +240,17 @@ static int bind_variant(const int sock_fd,
return bind_variant_addrlen(sock_fd, srv, get_addrlen(srv, false));
}
+static int sys_connect(const int sock_fd, const struct sockaddr *addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = connect(sock_fd, addr, addrlen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int connect_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
const struct service_fixture *const srv,
const socklen_t addrlen)
@@ -923,6 +957,289 @@ TEST_F(protocol, connect_unspec)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
}
+FIXTURE(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+ struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
+ struct sockaddr *inval_addr_p0;
+ socklen_t addrlen_min;
+
+ struct sockaddr_in inval_ipv4_addr;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 inval_ipv6_addr;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+ const enum sandbox_type sandbox;
+ const int domain;
+ bool allowed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, no_sandbox_with_ipv4) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .sandbox = NO_SANDBOX,
+ .domain = AF_INET,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, no_sandbox_with_ipv6) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .sandbox = NO_SANDBOX,
+ .domain = AF_INET6,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, denied_with_ipv4) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+ .domain = AF_INET,
+ .allowed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, allowed_with_ipv4) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+ .domain = AF_INET,
+ .allowed = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, denied_with_ipv6) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+ .domain = AF_INET6,
+ .allowed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tcp_errors_consistency, allowed_with_ipv6) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .sandbox = TCP_SANDBOX,
+ .domain = AF_INET6,
+ .allowed = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+ const struct protocol_variant tcp_prot = {
+ .domain = variant->domain,
+ .type = SOCK_STREAM,
+ };
+
+ disable_caps(_metadata);
+
+ set_service(&self->srv0, tcp_prot, 0);
+ set_service(&self->srv1, tcp_prot, 1);
+
+ if (variant->domain == AF_INET) {
+ set_ipv4_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &self->inval_ipv4_addr);
+ self->inval_ipv4_addr.sin_family = AF_INET6;
+
+ self->inval_addr_p0 = (struct sockaddr *)&self->inval_ipv4_addr;
+ self->addrlen_min = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ } else {
+ set_ipv6_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &self->inval_ipv6_addr);
+ self->inval_ipv6_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET;
+
+ self->inval_addr_p0 = (struct sockaddr *)&self->inval_ipv6_addr;
+ self->addrlen_min = SIN6_LEN_RFC2133;
+ }
+
+ setup_loopback(_metadata);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(tcp_errors_consistency)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validates that Landlock provides errors consistency for bind(2) operation
+ * (not restricted, allowed and denied).
+ *
+ * Error consistency implies that in sandboxed process, bind(2) returns the same
+ * errors and in the same order (assuming multiple errors) as during normal
+ * execution.
+ */
+TEST_F(tcp_errors_consistency, bind)
+{
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ if (variant->allowed) {
+ const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_p0 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = self->srv0.port,
+ };
+
+ /* Allows bind for the first port. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+ &tcp_bind_p0, 0));
+ }
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+ int sock_fd;
+
+ sock_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sock_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Tries to bind socket to address with invalid sa_family value
+ * (AF_INET for ipv6 socket and AF_INET6 for ipv4 socket).
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT,
+ sys_bind(sock_fd, self->inval_addr_p0, self->addrlen_min));
+
+ if (variant->domain == AF_INET) {
+ struct sockaddr_in ipv4_unspec_addr;
+
+ set_ipv4_tcp_address(&self->srv0, &ipv4_unspec_addr);
+ ipv4_unspec_addr.sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ /*
+ * Ipv4 bind(2) accepts AF_UNSPEC family in address only if address is
+ * INADDR_ANY. Otherwise, returns -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT,
+ sys_bind(sock_fd,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&ipv4_unspec_addr,
+ self->addrlen_min));
+ }
+
+ /* Tries to bind with too small addrlen (Cf. inet_bind_sk). */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_bind(sock_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+ self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sock_fd));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validates that Landlock provides errors consistency for connect(2) operation
+ * (not restricted, allowed and denied).
+ *
+ * Error consistency implies that in sandboxed process, connect(2) returns the
+ * same errors and in the same order (assuming multiple errors) as during normal
+ * execution.
+ */
+TEST_F(tcp_errors_consistency, connect)
+{
+ int nonblock_p0_fd;
+
+ nonblock_p0_fd = socket(variant->domain,
+ SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, nonblock_p0_fd);
+
+ /* Tries to connect nonblocking socket before establishing ruleset. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EINPROGRESS, connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_connect_p1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->srv1.port,
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows connect for the second port. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+ &tcp_connect_p1, 0));
+
+ if (variant->allowed) {
+ const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_connect_p0 = {
+ .allowed_access =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->srv0.port,
+ };
+
+ /* Allows connect for the first port. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+ &tcp_connect_p0, 0));
+ }
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+ int client_p0_fd, client_p1_fd, server_p0_fd, server_p1_fd;
+
+ client_p0_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, client_p0_fd);
+ /*
+ * Tries to connect socket to address with invalid sa_family value
+ * (AF_INET for ipv6 socket and AF_INET6 for ipv4 socket).
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EAFNOSUPPORT, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+ self->addrlen_min));
+
+ /* Tries to connect with too small addrlen. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+ self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+ /* Creates socket listening on zero port. */
+ server_p0_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, server_p0_fd);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(server_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(server_p0_fd, backlog));
+ /* Tries to connect listening socket. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EISCONN, sys_connect(server_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+ self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+ /* Creates socket listening on first port. */
+ server_p1_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv1);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, server_p1_fd);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(server_p1_fd, &self->srv1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(server_p1_fd, backlog));
+
+ client_p1_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv1);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, client_p1_fd);
+
+ /* Connects to server_p1_fd. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(client_p1_fd, &self->srv1));
+ /* Tries to connect already connected socket. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EISCONN, sys_connect(client_p1_fd, self->inval_addr_p0,
+ self->addrlen_min - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * connect(2) is called upon nonblocking socket and previous connection
+ * attempt was closed by RST packet. Landlock cannot provide error
+ * consistency in this case (Cf. check_tcp_connect_consistency_and_get_port()).
+ */
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES,
+ connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-ECONNREFUSED,
+ connect_variant(nonblock_p0_fd, &self->srv0));
+ }
+
+ /* Tries to connect with zero as addrlen. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, sys_connect(client_p0_fd, self->inval_addr_p0, 0));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(client_p1_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(server_p1_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(server_p0_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(client_p0_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(nonblock_p0_fd));
+}
+
FIXTURE(ipv4)
{
struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
--
2.34.1
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