[PATCH v3 12/23] landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Fri Nov 22 14:33:42 UTC 2024
Fix a logical issue that could have been visible if the source or the
destination of a rename/link action was allowed for either the source or
the destination but not both. However, this logical bug is unreachable
because either:
- the rename/link action is allowed by the access rights tied to the
same mount point (without relying on access rights in a parent mount
point) and the access request is allowed (i.e. allow_parent1 and
allow_parent2 are true in current_check_refer_path),
- or a common rule in a parent mount point updates the access check for
the source and the destination (cf. is_access_to_paths_allowed).
See the following layout1.refer_part_mount_tree_is_allowed test that
work with and without this fix.
This fix does not impact current code but it is required for the audit
support.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack at google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241122143353.59367-13-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v2:
- New patch.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 171012efb559..ddadc465581e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -567,6 +567,12 @@ static void test_no_more_access(struct kunit *const test)
#undef NMA_TRUE
#undef NMA_FALSE
+static bool is_layer_masks_allowed(
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
+{
+ return !memchr_inv(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
+}
+
/*
* Removes @layer_masks accesses that are not requested.
*
@@ -584,7 +590,8 @@ scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
for_each_clear_bit(access_bit, &access_req, ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks))
(*layer_masks)[access_bit] = 0;
- return !memchr_inv(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
+
+ return is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
@@ -773,9 +780,14 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1 || !layer_masks_parent1))
return false;
+ allowed_parent1 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent1);
+
if (unlikely(layer_masks_parent2)) {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dentry_child1))
return false;
+
+ allowed_parent2 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent2);
+
/*
* For a double request, first check for potential privilege
* escalation by looking at domain handled accesses (which are
--
2.47.0
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