[PATCH 1/3] tpm: Disable TCG_TPM2_HMAC by default

Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko at kernel.org
Mon May 27 15:34:03 UTC 2024


On Mon May 27, 2024 at 6:12 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon May 27, 2024 at 6:01 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon May 27, 2024 at 5:51 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Thu May 23, 2024 at 10:59 AM EEST, Vitor Soares wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 2024-05-22 at 19:11 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > On Wed May 22, 2024 at 5:58 PM EEST, Vitor Soares wrote:
> > > > > > I did run with ftrace, but need some more time to go through it.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Here the step I did:
> > > > > > kernel config:
> > > > > >   CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
> > > > > >   CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > ftrace:
> > > > > >   # set filters
> > > > > >   echo tpm* > set_ftrace_filter
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >   # set tracer
> > > > > >   echo function_graph > current_tracer
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >   # take the sample
> > > > > >   echo 1 > tracing_on; time modprobe tpm_tis_spi; echo 0 > tracing_on
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > regards,
> > > > > > Vitor Soares
> > > > > 
> > > > > I'm now compiling distro kernel (OpenSUSE) for NUC7 with v6.10 contents.
> > > > > 
> > > > > After I have that setup, I'll develop a perf test either with perf or
> > > > > bpftrace. I'll come back with the possible CONFIG_* that should be in
> > > > > place in your kernel. Might take up until next week as I have some
> > > > > conference stuff to prepare but I try to have stuff ready early next
> > > > > week.
> > > > > 
> > > > > No need to rush with this as long as possible patches go to rc2 or rc3.
> > > > > Let's do a proper analysis instead.
> > > > > 
> > > > > In the meantime you could check if you get perf and/or bpftrace to 
> > > > > your image that use to boot up your device. Preferably both but
> > > > > please inform about this.
> > > > > 
> > > >
> > > > I already have perf running, for the bpftrace I might not be able to help.
> > >
> > > The interesting function to look at with/without hmac is probably
> > > tpm2_get_random().
> > >
> > > I attached a patch that removes hmac shenigans out of tpm2_get_random()
> > > for the sake of proper comparative testing.
> >
> > Other thing that we need to measure is to split the cost into
> > two parts:
> >
> > 1. Handshake, i.e. setting up and shutdowning a session.
> > 2. Transaction, payload TPM command.
> >
> > This could be done by setting up couple of kprobes_events:
> >
> >   payload_event: tpm2_get_random() etc.
> >   hmac_event: tpm2_start_auth_session(), tpm2_end_auth_session() etc.
> >
> > And just summing up the time for a boot to get a cost for hmac.
> >
> > I'd use bootconfig for this:
> >
> > https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.9/trace/boottime-trace.html
> >
> > So I've made up plans how measure the incident but not sure when I
> > have time to pro-actively work on a benchmark (thus sharing details).
> >
> > So I think with just proper bootconfig wtih no other tools uses this
> > can be measured.
>
>
> I'll disable this for anything else than X86_64 by default, and put
> such patch to my next pull request.
>
> Someone needs to do the perf analysis properly based on the above
> descriptions. I cannot commit my time to promise them to get the
> perf regressions fixed by time. I can only commit on limiting the
> feature ;-)
>
> It is thus better be conservative and reconsider opt-in post 6.10.
> X86_64 is safeplay because even in that 2018 NUC7 based on Celeron,
> hmac is just fine.

While looking at code I started to wanted what was the reasoning
for adding *undocumented* "TPM2_OA_TMPL" in include/linux/tpm.h.
It should really be in tpm2-sessions.c and named something like
TPM2_NULL_KEY_OA or similar.

Obfuscation *on purpose* by definition... Since I see such spots (liked
e.g. tpm_buf_parameters() to name another instance) sprinkled, I've
pretty much locked in the decision to limit hmac to x86_64. It is right
thing to do given not so great maturity level.

Whatever on x86_64 I'm confident we can fix for sure any issue but
cannot make such analysis on other platforms.

BR, Jarkko



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