[PATCH] KEYS: trusted_tpm2: Only check options->keyhandle for ASN.1
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko at kernel.org
Sat May 25 12:36:33 UTC 2024
tpm2_load_cmd incorrectly checks options->keyhandle also for the legacy
format, as also implied by the inline comment. Check options->keyhandle
when ASN.1 is loaded.
Cc: James Bottomey <James.Bottomley at HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 8b7dd73d94c1..4f8207bf52a7 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -400,12 +400,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* old form */
blob = payload->blob;
payload->old_format = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
- if (!options->keyhandle)
- return -EINVAL;
-
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
if (payload->blob_len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.45.1
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