[PATCH bpf-next v10 5/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
KP Singh
kpsingh at kernel.org
Tue May 7 22:10:45 UTC 2024
BPF LSM hooks have side-effects (even when a default value is returned),
as some hooks end up behaving differently due to the very presence of
the hook.
The static keys guarding the BPF LSM hooks are disabled by default and
enabled only when a BPF program is attached implementing the hook
logic. This avoids the issue of the side-effects and also the minor
overhead associated with the empty callback.
security_file_ioctl:
0xffffffff818f0e30 <+0>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0e34 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xffffffff818f0e39 <+9>: push %rbp
0xffffffff818f0e3a <+10>: push %r14
0xffffffff818f0e3c <+12>: push %rbx
0xffffffff818f0e3d <+13>: mov %rdx,%rbx
0xffffffff818f0e40 <+16>: mov %esi,%ebp
0xffffffff818f0e42 <+18>: mov %rdi,%r14
0xffffffff818f0e45 <+21>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e57 <security_file_ioctl+39>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key enabled for SELinux
0xffffffff818f0e47 <+23>: xchg %ax,%ax
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key disabled for BPF. This gets patched when a BPF LSM program
is attached
0xffffffff818f0e49 <+25>: xor %eax,%eax
0xffffffff818f0e4b <+27>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff818f0e4d <+29>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff818f0e4e <+30>: pop %r14
0xffffffff818f0e50 <+32>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff818f0e51 <+33>: cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk>
0xffffffff818f0e57 <+39>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0e5b <+43>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xffffffff818f0e5e <+46>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xffffffff818f0e60 <+48>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xffffffff818f0e63 <+51>: call 0xffffffff819033c0 <selinux_file_ioctl>
0xffffffff818f0e68 <+56>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff818f0e6a <+58>: jne 0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
0xffffffff818f0e6c <+60>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e47 <security_file_ioctl+23>
0xffffffff818f0e6e <+62>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0e72 <+66>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xffffffff818f0e75 <+69>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xffffffff818f0e77 <+71>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xffffffff818f0e7a <+74>: call 0xffffffff8141e3b0 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
0xffffffff818f0e7f <+79>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff818f0e81 <+81>: jne 0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
0xffffffff818f0e83 <+83>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e49 <security_file_ioctl+25>
0xffffffff818f0e85 <+85>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0e89 <+89>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xffffffff818f0e8c <+92>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xffffffff818f0e8e <+94>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xffffffff818f0e91 <+97>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff818f0e92 <+98>: pop %r14
0xffffffff818f0e94 <+100>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff818f0e95 <+101>: ret
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/bpf/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 5db244308c92..4bd1d47bb9dc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -110,11 +110,14 @@ struct lsm_id {
* @scalls: The beginning of the array of static calls assigned to this hook.
* @hook: The callback for the hook.
* @lsm: The name of the lsm that owns this hook.
+ * @default_state: The state of the LSM hook when initialized. If set to false,
+ * the static key guarding the hook will be set to disabled.
*/
struct security_hook_list {
struct lsm_static_call *scalls;
union security_list_options hook;
const struct lsm_id *lsmid;
+ bool default_enabled;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -164,7 +167,15 @@ static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, HOOK) \
{ \
.scalls = static_calls_table.NAME, \
- .hook = { .NAME = HOOK } \
+ .hook = { .NAME = HOOK }, \
+ .default_enabled = true \
+ }
+
+#define LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, HOOK) \
+ { \
+ .scalls = static_calls_table.NAME, \
+ .hook = { .NAME = HOOK }, \
+ .default_enabled = false \
}
extern char *lsm_names;
@@ -206,4 +217,17 @@ extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[];
extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
extern struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+int security_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int security_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
index db7599c59c78..5758c5681023 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -521,6 +521,21 @@ static enum bpf_tramp_prog_type bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(struct bpf_prog *prog)
}
}
+static int bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(struct bpf_trampoline *tr,
+ enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind)
+{
+ struct bpf_tramp_link *link;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(link, &tr->progs_hlist[kind], tramp_hlist) {
+ if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return security_toggle_hook(tr->func.addr, found);
+}
+
static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
{
enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
@@ -560,11 +575,22 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_tr
hlist_add_head(&link->tramp_hlist, &tr->progs_hlist[kind]);
tr->progs_cnt[kind]++;
- err = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
- if (err) {
- hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
- tr->progs_cnt[kind]--;
+
+ if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
+ err = bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind);
+ if (err)
+ goto cleanup;
}
+
+ err = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
+ if (err)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
+ tr->progs_cnt[kind]--;
return err;
}
@@ -593,6 +619,12 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_
}
hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
tr->progs_cnt[kind]--;
+
+ if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
+ err = bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind);
+ WARN(err, "BUG: unable to toggle BPF LSM hook");
+ }
+
return bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
}
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index 57b9ffd53c98..ed864f7430a3 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
#undef LSM_HOOK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 491b807a8a63..b3a92a67f325 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -407,7 +407,8 @@ static void __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl)
__static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline,
hl->hook.lsm_func_addr);
scall->hl = hl;
- static_branch_enable(scall->active);
+ if (hl->default_enabled)
+ static_branch_enable(scall->active);
return;
}
scall++;
@@ -885,6 +886,36 @@ int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * security_toggle_hook - Toggle the state of the LSM hook.
+ * @hook_addr: The address of the hook to be toggled.
+ * @state: Whether to enable for disable the hook.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the address is not found.
+ */
+int security_toggle_hook(void *hook_addr, bool state)
+{
+ struct lsm_static_call *scalls = ((void *)&static_calls_table);
+ unsigned long num_entries =
+ (sizeof(static_calls_table) / sizeof(struct lsm_static_call));
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+ if (!scalls[i].hl)
+ continue;
+
+ if (scalls[i].hl->hook.lsm_func_addr != hook_addr)
+ continue;
+
+ if (state)
+ static_branch_enable(scalls[i].active);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(scalls[i].active);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
--
2.45.0.rc1.225.g2a3ae87e7f-goog
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