[RFC][PATCH 6/8] ima: Use digest cache for measurement
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Fri Mar 8 16:08:06 UTC 2024
Hi Roberto,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 3fc48214850a..48a09747ae7a 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -222,7 +222,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const
> struct cred *cred,
> bool violation_check;
> enum hash_algo hash_algo;
> unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
> - u64 verif_mask = 0;
> + u64 verif_mask = 0, *verif_mask_ptr, policy_mask = 0, allow_mask = 0;
> + struct digest_cache *digest_cache = NULL, *found_cache;
> + digest_cache_found_t found;
>
> if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
> return 0;
> @@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const
> struct cred *cred,
> */
> action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
> mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
> - &allowed_algos, NULL);
> + &allowed_algos, &policy_mask);
> violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
> func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
> (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
> @@ -364,10 +366,34 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const
> struct cred *cred,
> if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
> pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
>
> + /*
> + * For now we don't support nested verification with digest caches.
I haven't reviewed the digest_cache LSM patch set yet. What does 'nested' mean
in this context? Why mention it here?
> + * Since we allow IMA policy rules without func=, we have to enforce
> + * this restriction here.
> + */
> + if (rc == 0 && policy_mask && func != DIGEST_LIST_CHECK)
> + digest_cache = digest_cache_get(file_dentry(file));
So whether or not a DIGEST_LIST_CHECK policy rule even exists,
digest_cache_get() will be called. Similarly, even if a digest_cache list
hasn't been measured or appraised, digest_cache_get() will be called.
Basically every file in policy will check the digest_cache.
> +
> + if (digest_cache) {
> + found = digest_cache_lookup(file_dentry(file), digest_cache,
> + iint->ima_hash->digest,
> + iint->ima_hash->algo);
> + /* AND what is allowed by the policy, and what IMA verified. */
> + if (found) {
> + found_cache = digest_cache_from_found_t(found);
> + verif_mask_ptr = digest_cache_verif_get(found_cache,
> + "ima");
Instead of using "verif_{set,get}' consider using '{set,get}_usage', where usage
here means measure or appraise.
> + if (verif_mask_ptr)
> + allow_mask = policy_mask & *verif_mask_ptr;
> + }
> +
> + digest_cache_put(digest_cache);
> + }
> +
I'm wondering if it makes sense to create IMA wrappers for each of the
digest_cache functions - checking the digest_cache for the hash, setting the
digest_cache permitted usage, etc - and put all of them in a separate
ima_digest_cache.c file. The file would only be included in the Makefile if
digest_cache is configured.
In this file you could define a static local global variable to detect whether
the digest_cache is ready to be used. Only after successfully measuring and
appraising a digest_cache list, based on policy, set the variable.
> if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
> ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
> xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
> - template_desc);
> + template_desc, allow_mask);
'allowed_usage'?
> if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
> rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
> if (rc != -EPERM) {
thanks,
Mimi
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list