[PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes
Christian Brauner
brauner at kernel.org
Tue Mar 5 10:32:04 UTC 2024
On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 02:12:26AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 10:58:25AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > Since the write handler for /proc/<pid>/mem does raise FOLL_FORCE
> > unconditionally it likely would implicitly. But I'm not familiar enough
> > with FOLL_FORCE to say for sure.
>
> I should phrase the question better. :) Is the supervisor writing into
> read-only regions of the child process?
Hm... I suspect we don't. Let's take two concrete examples so you can
tell me.
Incus intercepts the sysinfo() syscall. It prepares a struct sysinfo
with cgroup aware values for the supervised process and then does:
unix.Pwrite(siov.memFd, &sysinfo, sizeof(struct sysinfo), seccomp_data.args[0]))
It also intercepts some bpf system calls attaching bpf programs for the
caller. If that fails we update the log buffer for the supervised
process:
union bpf_attr attr = {}, new_attr = {};
// read struct bpf_attr from mem_fd
ret = pread(mem_fd, &attr, attr_len, req->data.args[1]);
if (ret < 0)
return -errno;
// Do stuff with attr. Stuff fails. Update log buffer for supervised process:
if ((new_attr.log_size) > 0 && (pwrite(mem_fd, new_attr.log_buf, new_attr.log_size, attr.log_buf) != new_attr.log_size))
But I'm not sure if there are other use-cases that would require this.
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list