[PATCH v2 05/10] mm/util: Fix possible race condition in kstrdup()

Andrew Morton akpm at linux-foundation.org
Thu Jun 13 21:14:35 UTC 2024


On Thu, 13 Jun 2024 10:30:39 +0800 Yafang Shao <laoar.shao at gmail.com> wrote:

> In kstrdup(), it is critical to ensure that the dest string is always
> NUL-terminated. However, potential race condidtion can occur between a
> writer and a reader.
> 
> Consider the following scenario involving task->comm:
> 
>     reader                    writer
> 
>   len = strlen(s) + 1;
>                              strlcpy(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm));
>   memcpy(buf, s, len);
> 
> In this case, there is a race condition between the reader and the
> writer. The reader calculate the length of the string `s` based on the
> old value of task->comm. However, during the memcpy(), the string `s`
> might be updated by the writer to a new value of task->comm.
> 
> If the new task->comm is larger than the old one, the `buf` might not be
> NUL-terminated. This can lead to undefined behavior and potential
> security vulnerabilities.
> 
> Let's fix it by explicitly adding a NUL-terminator.

The concept sounds a little strange.  If some code takes a copy of a
string while some other code is altering it, yes, the result will be a
mess.  This is why get_task_comm() exists, and why it uses locking.

I get that "your copy is a mess" is less serious than "your string
isn't null-terminated" but still.  Whichever outcome we get, the
calling code is buggy and should be fixed.

Are there any other problematic scenarios we're defending against here?

>
> --- a/mm/util.c
> +++ b/mm/util.c
> @@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp)
>  
>  	len = strlen(s) + 1;
>  	buf = kmalloc_track_caller(len, gfp);
> -	if (buf)
> +	if (buf) {
>  		memcpy(buf, s, len);
> +		buf[len - 1] = '\0';
> +	}
>  	return buf;
>  }

Now I'll start receiving patches to remove this again.  Let's have a
code comment please.

And kstrdup() is now looking awfully similar to kstrndup().  Perhaps
there's a way to reduce duplication?



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