[PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko at kernel.org
Tue Jun 4 22:33:32 UTC 2024
On Tue Jun 4, 2024 at 9:41 PM EEST, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
>
> On 6/4/24 13:23, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri May 31, 2024 at 3:35 AM EEST, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >>
>
> >>>
> >>> - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
> >>> - if (rc) {
> >>> - /* old form */
> >>> + key = tpm2_key_decode(payload->blob, payload->blob_len);
> >>> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> >>> + /* Get the error code and reset the pointer to the key: */
> >>> + rc = PTR_ERR(key);
> >>> + key = NULL;
> >>> +
> >>> + if (rc == -ENOMEM)
> >>> + return -ENOMEM;
> >>> +
> >>> + /* A sanity check, as only -EBADMSG or -ENOMEM are expected: */
> >>> + if (rc != -EBADMSG)
> >>> + pr_err("tpm2_key_decode(): spurious error code %d\n", rc);
> >>
> >> tpm2_key_decode seems simple enough that it only returns key, -ENOMEM or
> >> EBADMSG.
> >
> > So what is your suggestion here?
>
> You can remove the check resuling in pr_err().
OK, I think so too. Just had to (sanity) check.
>
> >
> > The reasoning here is that asymmetric keys use -EBADMSG not only as
> > error but also iterator, when probing which can load a specific key.
> >
BR, Jarkko
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