[RFC PATCH v1 6/9] selftests/landlock: Test listening without explicit bind restriction
Mikhail Ivanov
ivanov.mikhail1 at huawei-partners.com
Sun Jul 28 00:25:59 UTC 2024
Test scenarios where listen(2) call without explicit bind(2) is allowed
and forbidden.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1 at huawei-partners.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index a8385f1373f6..1a4c4d1cabc2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -1842,6 +1842,89 @@ TEST_F(port_specific, bind_connect_zero)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
}
+TEST_F(port_specific, listen_without_bind_allowed)
+{
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP
+ };
+ const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_listen_zero = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP,
+ .port = 0,
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow listening without explicit bind
+ * (cf. landlock_net_port_attr).
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+ &tcp_listen_zero, 0));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+ int listen_fd, connect_fd;
+ __u64 port;
+
+ listen_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
+
+ connect_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, connect_fd);
+ /*
+ * Allow listen(2) to select a random port for the socket,
+ * since bind(2) wasn't called.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, listen_variant(listen_fd, backlog));
+
+ /* Connects on the binded port. */
+ port = get_binded_port(listen_fd, &variant->prot);
+ EXPECT_NE(0, port);
+ set_port(&self->srv0, port);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, connect_variant(connect_fd, &self->srv0));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(connect_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(listen_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F(port_specific, listen_without_bind_denied)
+{
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Deny listening. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+ int listen_fd, ret;
+
+ listen_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
+
+ /* Checks that listening without explicit binding is prohibited. */
+ ret = listen_variant(listen_fd, backlog);
+ if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
+ /* Denied by Landlock. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+}
+
TEST_F(port_specific, port_1023)
{
int bind_fd, connect_fd, ret;
--
2.34.1
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