[PATCH v7 1/4] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Fri Jul 26 08:07:38 UTC 2024
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 10:15:19PM -0600, Tahera Fahimi wrote:
> The patch introduces a new "scoped" attribute to the
> landlock_ruleset_attr that can specify "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET"
> to scope abstract unix sockets from connecting to a process outside of
> the same landlock domain.
>
> This patch implement two hooks, "unix_stream_connect" and "unix_may_send" to
> enforce this restriction.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera at gmail.com>
>
> -------
> v7:
> - Using socket's file credentials for both connected(STREAM) and
> non-connected(DGRAM) sockets.
> - Adding "domain_sock_scope" instead of the domain scoping mechanism used in
> ptrace ensures that if a server's domain is accessible from the client's
> domain (where the client is more privileged than the server), the client
> can connect to the server in all edge cases.
> - Removing debug codes.
> v6:
> - Removing curr_ruleset from landlock_hierarchy, and switching back to use
> the same domain scoping as ptrace.
> - code clean up.
> v5:
> - Renaming "LANDLOCK_*_ACCESS_SCOPE" to "LANDLOCK_*_SCOPE"
> - Adding curr_ruleset to hierarachy_ruleset structure to have access from
> landlock_hierarchy to its respective landlock_ruleset.
> - Using curr_ruleset to check if a domain is scoped while walking in the
> hierarchy of domains.
> - Modifying inline comments.
> V4:
> - Rebased on Günther's Patch:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610082115.1693267-1-gnoack@google.com/
> so there is no need for "LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_SCOPE", then it is removed.
> - Adding get_scope_accesses function to check all scoped access masks in a ruleset.
> - Using file's FD credentials instead of credentials stored in peer_cred
> for datagram sockets. (see discussion in [1])
> - Modifying inline comments.
> V3:
> - Improving commit description.
> - Introducing "scoped" attribute to landlock_ruleset_attr for IPC scoping
> purpose, and adding related functions.
> - Changing structure of ruleset based on "scoped".
> - Removing rcu lock and using unix_sk lock instead.
> - Introducing scoping for datagram sockets in unix_may_send.
> V2:
> - Removing wrapper functions
>
> [1]https://lore.kernel.org/outreachy/Zmi8Ydz4Z6tYtpY1@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/T/#m8cdf33180d86c7ec22932e2eb4ef7dd4fc94c792
> -------
>
> Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera at gmail.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 29 +++++++++
> security/landlock/limits.h | 3 +
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 7 ++-
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 23 ++++++-
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 14 +++--
> security/landlock/task.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 6 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 68625e728f43..9cd881673434 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
> * rule explicitly allow them.
> */
> __u64 handled_access_net;
> + /**
> + * @scoped: Bitmask of scopes (cf. `Scope flags`_)
> + * restricting a Landlock domain from accessing outside
> + * resources(e.g. IPCs).
> + */
> + __u64 scoped;
> };
>
> /*
> @@ -266,4 +272,27 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
> /* clang-format on */
> +
> +/**
> + * DOC: scope
> + *
> + * .scoped attribute handles a set of restrictions on kernel IPCs through
> + * the following flags.
If you look at the generated documentation (once this doc is properly
included), you'll see that this line ends in the Network flags section.
> + *
> + * Scope flags
> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~
> + *
> + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process from a set of IPC
> + * actions. Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain
> + * to forbid connections to resources outside the domain.
> + *
> + * IPCs with scoped actions:
There is a formating issue here.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process
> + * from connecting to an abstract unix socket created by a process
> + * outside the related Landlock domain (e.g. a parent domain or a
> + * non-sandboxed process).
> + */
> +/* clang-format off */
> +#define LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET (1ULL << 0)
> +/* clang-format on*/
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
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