[PATCH v7 1/4] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction
Tahera Fahimi
fahimitahera at gmail.com
Thu Jul 18 04:15:19 UTC 2024
The patch introduces a new "scoped" attribute to the
landlock_ruleset_attr that can specify "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET"
to scope abstract unix sockets from connecting to a process outside of
the same landlock domain.
This patch implement two hooks, "unix_stream_connect" and "unix_may_send" to
enforce this restriction.
Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera at gmail.com>
-------
v7:
- Using socket's file credentials for both connected(STREAM) and
non-connected(DGRAM) sockets.
- Adding "domain_sock_scope" instead of the domain scoping mechanism used in
ptrace ensures that if a server's domain is accessible from the client's
domain (where the client is more privileged than the server), the client
can connect to the server in all edge cases.
- Removing debug codes.
v6:
- Removing curr_ruleset from landlock_hierarchy, and switching back to use
the same domain scoping as ptrace.
- code clean up.
v5:
- Renaming "LANDLOCK_*_ACCESS_SCOPE" to "LANDLOCK_*_SCOPE"
- Adding curr_ruleset to hierarachy_ruleset structure to have access from
landlock_hierarchy to its respective landlock_ruleset.
- Using curr_ruleset to check if a domain is scoped while walking in the
hierarchy of domains.
- Modifying inline comments.
V4:
- Rebased on Günther's Patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610082115.1693267-1-gnoack@google.com/
so there is no need for "LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_SCOPE", then it is removed.
- Adding get_scope_accesses function to check all scoped access masks in a ruleset.
- Using file's FD credentials instead of credentials stored in peer_cred
for datagram sockets. (see discussion in [1])
- Modifying inline comments.
V3:
- Improving commit description.
- Introducing "scoped" attribute to landlock_ruleset_attr for IPC scoping
purpose, and adding related functions.
- Changing structure of ruleset based on "scoped".
- Removing rcu lock and using unix_sk lock instead.
- Introducing scoping for datagram sockets in unix_may_send.
V2:
- Removing wrapper functions
[1]https://lore.kernel.org/outreachy/Zmi8Ydz4Z6tYtpY1@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/T/#m8cdf33180d86c7ec22932e2eb4ef7dd4fc94c792
-------
Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera at gmail.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 29 +++++++++
security/landlock/limits.h | 3 +
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 7 ++-
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 23 ++++++-
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 14 +++--
security/landlock/task.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 68625e728f43..9cd881673434 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
* rule explicitly allow them.
*/
__u64 handled_access_net;
+ /**
+ * @scoped: Bitmask of scopes (cf. `Scope flags`_)
+ * restricting a Landlock domain from accessing outside
+ * resources(e.g. IPCs).
+ */
+ __u64 scoped;
};
/*
@@ -266,4 +272,27 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
/* clang-format on */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: scope
+ *
+ * .scoped attribute handles a set of restrictions on kernel IPCs through
+ * the following flags.
+ *
+ * Scope flags
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process from a set of IPC
+ * actions. Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain
+ * to forbid connections to resources outside the domain.
+ *
+ * IPCs with scoped actions:
+ * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process
+ * from connecting to an abstract unix socket created by a process
+ * outside the related Landlock domain (e.g. a parent domain or a
+ * non-sandboxed process).
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET (1ULL << 0)
+/* clang-format on*/
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index 4eb643077a2a..eb01d0fb2165 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE ((LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE << 1) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
/* clang-format on */
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 6ff232f58618..a93bdbf52fff 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -52,12 +52,13 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
struct landlock_ruleset *
landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
- const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
+ const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
+ const access_mask_t scope_mask)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
/* Informs about useless ruleset. */
- if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
+ if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask && !scope_mask)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
if (net_access_mask)
landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
+ if (scope_mask)
+ landlock_add_scope_mask(new_ruleset, scope_mask, 0);
return new_ruleset;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index 0f1b5b4c8f6b..c749fa0b3ecd 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ typedef u16 access_mask_t;
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
+/* Makes sure all scoped rights can be stored*/
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE);
/* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
struct access_masks {
access_mask_t fs : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
access_mask_t net : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
+ access_mask_t scoped : LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE;
};
typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
@@ -233,7 +236,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
struct landlock_ruleset *
landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
- const access_mask_t access_mask_net);
+ const access_mask_t access_mask_net,
+ const access_mask_t scope_mask);
void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
@@ -280,6 +284,16 @@ landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net |= net_mask;
}
+static inline void
+landlock_add_scope_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const access_mask_t scope_mask, const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ access_mask_t scoped_mask = scope_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(scope_mask != scoped_mask);
+ ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].scoped |= scoped_mask;
+}
+
static inline access_mask_t
landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
const u16 layer_level)
@@ -303,6 +317,13 @@ landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net;
}
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_scope_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].scoped;
+}
+
bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
const access_mask_t access_request,
layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 03b470f5a85a..799a50f11d79 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -97,8 +97,9 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
*/
ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
+ ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.scoped);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 16);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 24);
path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
.write = fop_dummy_write,
};
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 5
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 6
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
* Possible returned errors are:
*
* - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
- * - %EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or too small @size;
+ * - %EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or uknown scope, or too small @size;
* - %E2BIG or %EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
* - %ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs.
*/
@@ -213,9 +214,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Checks IPC scoping content (and 32-bits cast). */
+ if ((ruleset_attr.scoped | LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE) != LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs,
- ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net,
+ ruleset_attr.scoped);
if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 849f5123610b..597d89e54aae 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
@@ -108,9 +110,119 @@ static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent)
return task_ptrace(parent, current);
}
+static int walk_and_check(const struct landlock_ruleset *const child,
+ struct landlock_hierarchy **walker, int i, int j,
+ bool check)
+{
+ if (!child || i < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ while (i < j && *walker) {
+ if (check && landlock_get_scope_mask(child, j))
+ return -1;
+ *walker = (*walker)->parent;
+ j--;
+ }
+ if (!*walker)
+ pr_warn_once("inconsistency in landlock hierarchy and layers");
+ return j;
+}
+
+/**
+ * domain_sock_scope - Checks if client domain is scoped in the same
+ * domain as server.
+ *
+ * @client: Connecting socket domain.
+ * @server: Listening socket domain.
+ *
+ * Checks if the @client domain is scoped, then the server should be
+ * in the same domain to connect. If not, @client can connect to @server.
+ */
+static bool domain_sock_scope(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const server)
+{
+ size_t l1, l2;
+ int scope_layer;
+ struct landlock_hierarchy *cli_walker, *srv_walker;
+
+ if (!client)
+ return true;
+
+ l1 = client->num_layers - 1;
+ cli_walker = client->hierarchy;
+ if (server) {
+ l2 = server->num_layers - 1;
+ srv_walker = server->hierarchy;
+ } else
+ l2 = 0;
+
+ if (l1 > l2)
+ scope_layer = walk_and_check(client, &cli_walker, l2, l1, true);
+ else if (l2 > l1)
+ scope_layer =
+ walk_and_check(server, &srv_walker, l1, l2, false);
+ else
+ scope_layer = l1;
+
+ if (scope_layer == -1)
+ return false;
+
+ while (scope_layer >= 0 && cli_walker) {
+ if (landlock_get_scope_mask(client, scope_layer) &
+ LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET) {
+ if (!server)
+ return false;
+
+ if (srv_walker == cli_walker)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+ }
+ cli_walker = cli_walker->parent;
+ srv_walker = srv_walker->parent;
+ scope_layer--;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool sock_is_scoped(struct sock *const other)
+{
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_other;
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+ landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+ /* the credentials will not change */
+ lockdep_assert_held(&unix_sk(other)->lock);
+ dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain;
+
+ /* other is scoped, they connect if they are in the same domain */
+ return domain_sock_scope(dom, dom_other);
+}
+
+static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock,
+ struct sock *const other,
+ struct sock *const newsk)
+{
+ if (sock_is_scoped(other))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
+ struct socket *const other)
+{
+ if (sock_is_scoped(other->sk))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, hook_unix_stream_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, hook_unix_may_send),
};
__init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void)
--
2.34.1
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list