[PATCH] tpm: Check non-nullity of chip->auth
Stefan Berger
stefanb at linux.ibm.com
Mon Jul 1 19:21:06 UTC 2024
On 7/1/24 13:07, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> All exported functions lack the check for non-nullity of chip->auth. Add
> the guard for each.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/9f86a167074d9b522311715c567f1c19b88e3ad4.camel@kernel.org/
> Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb at linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel at vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 907ac9956a78..d833db20531a 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> u32 len;
> struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
>
> + if (!auth)
> + return;
> +
> /*
> * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
> * before computing the HMAC
> @@ -449,6 +452,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> struct sha256_state sctx;
>
> + if (!auth)
> + return;
> +
> /* save the command code in BE format */
> auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
>
> @@ -639,6 +645,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> int slot;
>
> + if (!auth)
> + return;
> +
> slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4;
> if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
> dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
> @@ -705,6 +714,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal);
> int parm_len, len, i, handles;
>
> + if (!auth)
> + return rc;
> +
> if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
> WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
> goto out;
> @@ -824,8 +836,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response);
> */
> void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> {
> - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle);
> - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth));
> + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> +
> + if (!auth)
> + return;
> +
> + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
> + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
>
> @@ -907,6 +924,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> int rc;
> u32 null_key;
>
> + if (!auth) {
> + pr_warn_once("%s: encryption is not active\n", __func__);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
It looks like you got all of the chip->auth tested:
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb at linux.ibm.com>
As I mentioned in the other email (1), it does not solve the problem on
ppc64.
1:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/656b319fc58683e399323b880722434467cf20f2.camel@kernel.org/T/#m88892cb6f9cf8fdef875dcdd0ed3eccac1d28190
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