[GIT PULL] BPF token for v6.8
Andrii Nakryiko
andrii.nakryiko at gmail.com
Fri Jan 19 15:31:06 UTC 2024
On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 9:00 PM Andrii Nakryiko <andrii at kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Linus,
>
> This is BPF token patches freshly rebased onto latest bpf/master with feedback
> received on last revision addressed and changes applied to appropriate patches.
> Plus a few more selftests are added around LSM and BPF token interactions.
>
> This time I'm sending them as a dedicated PR. Please let me know if you are OK
> pull them directly now, or whether I should target it for the next merge
> window. If the latter is decided, would it be OK to land these patches into
> bpf-next tree and then include them in a usual bpf-next PR batch? Keeping
> these patches conflict-free for entire next dev cycle might be challenging,
> given somewhat wide kernel and libbpf changes. Thanks!
And that already happened, unfortunately. There was an interplay
between libbpf refactoring in these patches and latest bpf/master
changes, which used parts of internal libbpf "infrastructure" code. We
must have some Makefile integration bug somewhere, as I did build
kernel and selftests after rebasing on latest bpf/master, but it
didn't catch the issue. Either way, my bad, I'll be doing `make clean`
before submitting future PRs, sorry about this.
Long story short, I fixed up build breakages in corresponding patches
in this series that do refactor relevant pieces. I force pushed
for-linus tag and bpf-token branch, and so hashes changed a bit and
now the following part of PR would look like this:
The following changes since commit 736b5545d39ca59d4332a60e56cc8a1a5e264a8e:
Merge tag 'net-6.8-rc1' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net (2024-01-18
17:33:50 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git tags/for-linus
for you to fetch changes up to cf5e8dc4a8e902c29a493350e2f4b2ff0c8028fb:
selftests/bpf: incorporate LSM policy to token-based tests
(2024-01-19 07:16:49 -0800)
Please let me know if I should just go for bpf-next and next dev
cycle, or should resend PR, or if you can pull from force-updated Git
branch as is. Sorry again for the churn!
>
> The following changes since commit 736b5545d39ca59d4332a60e56cc8a1a5e264a8e:
>
> Merge tag 'net-6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net (2024-01-18 17:33:50 -0800)
>
> are available in the Git repository at:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git tags/for-linus
>
> for you to fetch changes up to df4ffe6e674b8421230276238a0107966b85e044:
>
> selftests/bpf: incorporate LSM policy to token-based tests (2024-01-18 20:39:48 -0800)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> BPF token
>
> This PR is a combination of three BPF token-related patch sets ([0],
> [1], [2]) with fixes ([3]) to kernel-side token_fd passing APIs incorporated
> into relevant patches, bpf_token_capable() changes requested by
> Christian Brauner, and necessary libbpf and BPF selftests side adjustments.
>
> This patch set introduces an ability to delegate a subset of BPF subsystem
> functionality from privileged system-wide daemon (e.g., systemd or any other
> container manager) through special mount options for userns-bound BPF FS to
> a *trusted* unprivileged application. Trust is the key here. This
> functionality is not about allowing unconditional unprivileged BPF usage.
> Establishing trust, though, is completely up to the discretion of respective
> privileged application that would create and mount a BPF FS instance with
> delegation enabled, as different production setups can and do achieve it
> through a combination of different means (signing, LSM, code reviews, etc),
> and it's undesirable and infeasible for kernel to enforce any particular way
> of validating trustworthiness of particular process.
>
> The main motivation for this work is a desire to enable containerized BPF
> applications to be used together with user namespaces. This is currently
> impossible, as CAP_BPF, required for BPF subsystem usage, cannot be namespaced
> or sandboxed, as a general rule. E.g., tracing BPF programs, thanks to BPF
> helpers like bpf_probe_read_kernel() and bpf_probe_read_user() can safely read
> arbitrary memory, and it's impossible to ensure that they only read memory of
> processes belonging to any given namespace. This means that it's impossible to
> have a mechanically verifiable namespace-aware CAP_BPF capability, and as such
> another mechanism to allow safe usage of BPF functionality is necessary.
>
> BPF FS delegation mount options and BPF token derived from such BPF FS instance
> is such a mechanism. Kernel makes no assumption about what "trusted"
> constitutes in any particular case, and it's up to specific privileged
> applications and their surrounding infrastructure to decide that. What kernel
> provides is a set of APIs to setup and mount special BPF FS instance and
> derive BPF tokens from it. BPF FS and BPF token are both bound to its owning
> userns and in such a way are constrained inside intended container. Users can
> then pass BPF token FD to privileged bpf() syscall commands, like BPF map
> creation and BPF program loading, to perform such operations without having
> init userns privileges.
>
> This version incorporates feedback and suggestions ([4]) received on earlier
> iterations of BPF token approach, and instead of allowing to create BPF tokens
> directly assuming capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), we instead enhance BPF FS to accept
> a few new delegation mount options. If these options are used and BPF FS itself
> is properly created, set up, and mounted inside the user namespaced container,
> user application is able to derive a BPF token object from BPF FS instance, and
> pass that token to bpf() syscall. As explained in patch #3, BPF token itself
> doesn't grant access to BPF functionality, but instead allows kernel to do
> namespaced capabilities checks (ns_capable() vs capable()) for CAP_BPF,
> CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, and CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as applicable. So it forms one
> half of a puzzle and allows container managers and sys admins to have safe and
> flexible configuration options: determining which containers get delegation of
> BPF functionality through BPF FS, and then which applications within such
> containers are allowed to perform bpf() commands, based on namespaces
> capabilities.
>
> Previous attempt at addressing this very same problem ([5]) attempted to
> utilize authoritative LSM approach, but was conclusively rejected by upstream
> LSM maintainers. BPF token concept is not changing anything about LSM
> approach, but can be combined with LSM hooks for very fine-grained security
> policy. Some ideas about making BPF token more convenient to use with LSM (in
> particular custom BPF LSM programs) was briefly described in recent LSF/MM/BPF
> 2023 presentation ([6]). E.g., an ability to specify user-provided data
> (context), which in combination with BPF LSM would allow implementing a very
> dynamic and fine-granular custom security policies on top of BPF token. In the
> interest of minimizing API surface area and discussions this was relegated to
> follow up patches, as it's not essential to the fundamental concept of
> delegatable BPF token.
>
> It should be noted that BPF token is conceptually quite similar to the idea of
> /dev/bpf device file, proposed by Song a while ago ([7]). The biggest
> difference is the idea of using virtual anon_inode file to hold BPF token and
> allowing multiple independent instances of them, each (potentially) with its
> own set of restrictions. And also, crucially, BPF token approach is not using
> any special stateful task-scoped flags. Instead, bpf() syscall accepts
> token_fd parameters explicitly for each relevant BPF command. This addresses
> main concerns brought up during the /dev/bpf discussion, and fits better with
> overall BPF subsystem design.
>
> Second part of this patch set adds full support for BPF token in libbpf's BPF
> object high-level API. Good chunk of the changes rework libbpf feature
> detection internals, which are the most affected by BPF token presence.
>
> Besides internal refactorings, libbpf allows to pass location of BPF FS from
> which BPF token should be created by libbpf. This can be done explicitly though
> a new bpf_object_open_opts.bpf_token_path field. But we also add implicit BPF
> token creation logic to BPF object load step, even without any explicit
> involvement of the user. If the environment is setup properly, BPF token will
> be created transparently and used implicitly. This allows for all existing
> application to gain BPF token support by just linking with latest version of
> libbpf library. No source code modifications are required. All that under
> assumption that privileged container management agent properly set up default
> BPF FS instance at /sys/bpf/fs to allow BPF token creation.
>
> libbpf adds support to override default BPF FS location for BPF token creation
> through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar knowledge. This allows admins or container
> managers to mount BPF token-enabled BPF FS at non-standard location without the
> need to coordinate with applications. LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH can also be used
> to disable BPF token implicit creation by setting it to an empty value.
>
> [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=805707&state=*
> [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=810260&state=*
> [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=809800&state=*
> [3] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231219053150.336991-1-andrii@kernel.org/
> [4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
> [5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230412043300.360803-1-andrii@kernel.org/
> [6] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/Trusted_unprivileged_BPF_LSFMM2023.pdf
> [7] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20190627201923.2589391-2-songliubraving@fb.com/
>
> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast at kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii at kernel.org>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Andrii Nakryiko (30):
> bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach
> bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS
> bpf: introduce BPF token object
> bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command
> bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command
> bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command
> bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos
> bpf: consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic
> bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks
> bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free LSM hooks
> bpf,lsm: add BPF token LSM hooks
> libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API
> libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API
> libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API
> libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API
> selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests
> bpf,selinux: allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token
> bpf: fail BPF_TOKEN_CREATE if no delegation option was set on BPF FS
> bpf: support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options
> selftests/bpf: utilize string values for delegate_xxx mount options
> libbpf: split feature detectors definitions from cached results
> libbpf: further decouple feature checking logic from bpf_object
> libbpf: move feature detection code into its own file
> libbpf: wire up token_fd into feature probing logic
> libbpf: wire up BPF token support at BPF object level
> selftests/bpf: add BPF object loading tests with explicit token passing
> selftests/bpf: add tests for BPF object load with implicit token
> libbpf: support BPF token path setting through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar
> selftests/bpf: add tests for LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar
> selftests/bpf: incorporate LSM policy to token-based tests
>
> drivers/media/rc/bpf-lirc.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/bpf.h | 85 +-
> include/linux/filter.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 15 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 43 +-
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 54 +
> kernel/bpf/Makefile | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 15 +-
> kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 6 +-
> kernel/bpf/core.c | 3 +-
> kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 6 +-
> kernel/bpf/inode.c | 276 ++++-
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 228 +++--
> kernel/bpf/token.c | 278 ++++++
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 13 +-
> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
> net/core/filter.c | 36 +-
> net/ipv4/bpf_tcp_ca.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_bpf_link.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 101 +-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 47 +-
> tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 54 +
> tools/lib/bpf/Build | 2 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c | 41 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h | 37 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/btf.c | 10 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/elf.c | 2 -
> tools/lib/bpf/features.c | 503 ++++++++++
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 557 ++---------
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h | 21 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map | 1 +
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h | 36 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c | 11 +-
> tools/lib/bpf/str_error.h | 3 +
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_probes.c | 4 +
> .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c | 6 +
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c | 1052 ++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/priv_map.c | 13 +
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/priv_prog.c | 13 +
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/token_lsm.c | 32 +
> 41 files changed, 2977 insertions(+), 641 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/token.c
> create mode 100644 tools/lib/bpf/features.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/priv_map.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/priv_prog.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/token_lsm.c
>
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