[RFC V2] IMA Log Snapshotting Design Proposal

Paul Moore paul at paul-moore.com
Sat Jan 6 23:44:45 UTC 2024


On Wed, Dec 20, 2023 at 5:14 PM Ken Goldman <kgold at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> I'm still struggling with the "new root of trust" concept.
>
> Something - a user space agent, a third party, etc. - has to
> retain the entire log from event 0, because a new verifier
> needs all measurements.

[NOTE: a gentle reminder to please refrain from top-posting on Linux
kernel mailing lists, it is generally frowned upon and makes it
difficult to manage long running threads]

This is one of the reasons I have pushed to manage the snapshot, both
the trigger and the handling of the trimmed data, outside of the
kernel.  Setting aside the obvious limitations of kernel I/O, handling
the snapshot in userspace provides for a much richer set of options
when it comes to managing the snapshot and the
verification/attestation of the system.

> Therefore, the snapshot aggregate seems redundant.  It has to
> be verified to match the snapshotted events.

I can see a perspective where the snapshot_aggregate is theoretically
redundant, but I can also see at least one practical perspective where
a snapshot_aggregate could be used to simplify a remote attestation
with a sufficiently stateful attestation service.

> A redundancy is an attack surface.

Now that is an overly broad generalization, if we are going that
route, *everything* is an attack surface (and this arguably true
regardless, although a bit of an extreme statement).

> A badly written verifier
> might not do that verification, and this permits snapshotted
> events to be forged. No aggregate means the verifier can't
> make a mistake.

I would ask that you read your own comment again.  A poorly written
verifier is subject to any number of pitfalls and vulnerabilities,
regardless of a snapshot aggregate.  As a reminder, the snapshotting
mechanism has always been proposed as an opt-in mechanism, if one has
not implemented a proper snapshot-aware attestation mechanism then
they can simply refrain from taking a snapshot and reject all
attestation attempts using a snapshot.

> On 11/22/2023 9:22 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > I believe the intent is to only pause the measurements while the
> > snapshot_aggregate is generated, not for the duration of the entire
> > snapshot process.  The purpose of the snapshot_aggregate is to
> > establish a new root of trust, similar to the boot_aggregate, to help
> > improve attestation performance.

-- 
paul-moore.com



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