[RFC PATCH v13 17/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider

[Fan Wu]

On 2/29/2024 11:42 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 10:59:21AM -0800, Fan Wu wrote:
>>>
>>> So IPE is interested in whether a file has an fsverity builtin signature, but it
>>> doesn't care what the signature is or whether it has been checked.  What is the
>>> point?
>>>
>>> - Eric
>>
>> It does make sure the signature is checked. This hook call can only be
>> triggered after fsverity_verify_signature() succeed. Therefore, for files
>> that are marked with the security blob inode_sec->fs_verity_sign as true,
>> they must successfully pass the fsverity_verify_signature() check.
>>
>> Regarding the other question, the current version does not support defining
>> policies to trust files based on the inner content of their signatures
>> because the current patch set is already too large.
>>
>> We plan to introduce new policy grammars to enable the policy to define
>> which certificate of the signature can be trusted after this version is
>> accepted.
> 
> Ah, I see, you're relying on the fact that fsverity_verify_signature() verifies
> the signature (if present) even if fs.verity.require_signatures hasn't been set.
> That does happen to be its behavior, but this isn't clearly documented since
> there previously wasn't really a use case for the builtin signatures without
> setting fs.verity.require_signatures.  Can you please make sure this behavior is
> documented properly in Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst and in function
> comments?  Otherwise I worry that it could get changed and break your code.
> 
> - Eric

Thanks for the suggestion. I will add this info in the next version.
-Fan