[PATCH 5/7] keys: Use key_get() instead of __key_get()

[David Howells]

Switch users of __key_get() over to key_get() so that they benefit from the
future tracepointage thereof also and remove __key_get().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/security/keys/core.rst |  1 -
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c    |  6 +++---
 include/linux/key.h                  |  6 ------
 security/keys/keyring.c              |  4 ++--
 security/keys/process_keys.c         | 15 ++++++---------
 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
index 326b8a973828..0b179540d885 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
@@ -1217,7 +1217,6 @@ payload contents" for more information.
  *  Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following
     functions::
 
-	struct key *__key_get(struct key *key);
 	struct key *key_get(struct key *key);
 
     Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index afcd4d101ac5..1ea7bfd4e5d7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -267,20 +267,20 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
 			if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
 				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[2],
 							   sig->auth_ids[2]))
-					key = __key_get(trusted);
+					key = key_get(trusted);
 
 			} else if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
 				const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id;
 
 				auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1];
 				if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id))
-					key = __key_get(trusted);
+					key = key_get(trusted);
 
 			} else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[1],
 							  sig->auth_ids[1]) &&
 				   match_either_id(signer_ids,
 						   sig->auth_ids[0])) {
-				key = __key_get(trusted);
+				key = key_get(trusted);
 			}
 		} else {
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 50a19e5f9e45..80d736813b89 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -304,12 +304,6 @@ extern void key_put(struct key *key);
 extern bool key_put_tag(struct key_tag *tag);
 extern void key_remove_domain(struct key_tag *domain_tag);
 
-static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key)
-{
-	refcount_inc(&key->usage);
-	return key;
-}
-
 static inline void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref)
 {
 	key_put(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 7f02b913c560..e77d927f1d4d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		kleave(" = NULL [x]");
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	__key_get(key);
+	key_get(key);
 	kleave(" = {%d}", key->serial);
 	return make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 }
@@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 		struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
 {
-	__key_get(key);
+	key_get(key);
 	assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key));
 	assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
 	*_edit = NULL;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index b5d5333ab330..01291b2d0888 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
 		if (IS_ERR(keyring))
 			return PTR_ERR(keyring);
 	} else {
-		__key_get(keyring);
+		key_get(keyring);
 	}
 
 	/* install the keyring */
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 		}
 
 		key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
-		__key_get(key);
+		key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -658,8 +658,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			goto reget_creds;
 		}
 
-		key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
-		__key_get(key);
+		key = key_get(ctx.cred->process_keyring);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -688,8 +687,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			goto reget_creds;
 		}
 
-		key = ctx.cred->session_keyring;
-		__key_get(key);
+		key = key_get(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -717,7 +715,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 		if (!key)
 			goto error;
 
-		__key_get(key);
+		key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -732,8 +730,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			key = NULL;
 		} else {
 			rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
-			key = rka->dest_keyring;
-			__key_get(key);
+			key = key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
 		}
 		up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 		if (!key)