[RFC PATCH v2 6/9] selftests/landlock: Test listening without explicit bind restriction
Mikhail Ivanov
ivanov.mikhail1 at huawei-partners.com
Tue Aug 20 13:46:17 UTC 2024
8/20/2024 4:02 PM, Günther Noack wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2024 at 11:01:48AM +0800, Mikhail Ivanov wrote:
>> Test scenarios where listen(2) call without explicit bind(2) is allowed
>> and forbidden.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1 at huawei-partners.com>
>> ---
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> index 551891b18b7a..92c042349596 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> @@ -1851,6 +1851,89 @@ TEST_F(port_specific, bind_connect_zero)
>> EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
>> }
>>
>> +TEST_F(port_specific, listen_without_bind_allowed)
>> +{
>> + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP
>> + };
>> + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_listen_zero = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP,
>> + .port = 0,
>> + };
>> + int ruleset_fd;
>> +
>> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Allow listening without explicit bind
>> + * (cf. landlock_net_port_attr).
>> + */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0,
>> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
>> + &tcp_listen_zero, 0));
>> +
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>> + }
>> + int listen_fd, connect_fd;
>> + __u64 port;
>> +
>> + listen_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
>> +
>> + connect_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, connect_fd);
>> + /*
>> + * Allow listen(2) to select a random port for the socket,
>> + * since bind(2) wasn't called.
>> + */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, listen_variant(listen_fd, backlog));
>> +
>> + /* Connects on the binded port. */
>> + port = get_binded_port(listen_fd, &variant->prot);
>
> Please rename "binded" to "bound" when you come across it.
Can I do such refactoring in the 3/9 patch?
>
>
>> + EXPECT_NE(0, port);
>> + set_port(&self->srv0, port);
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, connect_variant(connect_fd, &self->srv0));
>> +
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(connect_fd));
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(listen_fd));
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F(port_specific, listen_without_bind_denied)
>> +{
>> + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_LISTEN_TCP
>> + };
>> + int ruleset_fd;
>> +
>> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Deny listening. */
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>> + }
>> + int listen_fd, ret;
>> +
>> + listen_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Checks that listening without explicit binding is prohibited. */
>> + ret = listen_variant(listen_fd, backlog);
>> + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
>> + /* Denied by Landlock. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
>> + } else {
>> + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> TEST_F(port_specific, port_1023)
>> {
>> int bind_fd, connect_fd, ret;
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>>
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list