[PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add tests for bpf_get_dentry_xattr

Song Liu songliubraving at meta.com
Tue Aug 20 05:42:58 UTC 2024


Hi Christian, 

> On Aug 19, 2024, at 1:25 PM, Song Liu <songliubraving at fb.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Christian, 

[...]

> If you provide a bpf_get_parent() api for userspace to consume you'll
>> end up providing them with an api that is extremly easy to misuse.
> 
> Does this make sense to have higher level API that walks up the path, 
> so that it takes mounts into account. It can probably be something like:
> 
> int bpf_get_parent_path(struct path *p) {
> again:
>    if (p->dentry == p->mnt.mnt_root) {
>        follow_up(p);
>        goto again;
>    }
>    if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(p->dentry))) {
>        return PARENT_WALK_DONE;  
>    }
>    parent_dentry = dget_parent(p->dentry);
>    dput(p->dentry);
>    p->dentry = parent_dentry;
>    return PARENT_WALK_NEXT; 
> }
> 
> This will handle the mount. However, we cannot guarantee deny-by-default
> policies like LandLock does, because this is just a building block of 
> some security policies. 

I guess the above is not really clear. Here is a prototype I got. 
With the kernel diff attached below, we are able to do something
like:

SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
{
	/* ... */

        bpf_for_each(dentry, dentry, &f->f_path, BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_ROOT) {
                ret = bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, "user.kfunc", &value_ptr);
		/* do work with the xattr in value_ptr */
        }

	/* ... */
}

With this helper, the user cannot walk the tree randomly. Instead, 
the walk has to follow some pattern, namely, TO_ROOT, TO_MNT_ROOT, 
etc. And helper makes sure the walk is safe. 

Does this solution make sense to you? 

Thanks,
Song



The kernel diff below. 
============================== 8< ===============================


diff --git c/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c w/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
index 3fe9f59ef867..4b1400dec984 100644
--- c/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
+++ w/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>

 __bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
@@ -154,13 +155,91 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,

 __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();

+struct bpf_iter_dentry {
+       __u64 __opaque[3];
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern {
+       struct path path;
+       unsigned int flags;
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+enum {
+       /* all the parent paths, until root (/) */
+       BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_ROOT,
+       /* all the parent paths, until mnt root */
+       BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_MNT_ROOT,
+};
+
+__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_dentry_new(struct bpf_iter_dentry *it,
+                                        struct path *path, unsigned int flags)
+{
+       struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern *kit = (void*)it;
+
+       BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern) >
+                    sizeof(struct bpf_iter_dentry));
+       BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern) !=
+                    __alignof__(struct bpf_iter_dentry));
+
+       if (flags)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       switch (flags) {
+       case BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_ROOT:
+       case BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_MNT_ROOT:
+               break;
+       default:
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+       kit->path = *path;
+       path_get(&kit->path);
+       kit->flags = flags;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc struct dentry *bpf_iter_dentry_next(struct bpf_iter_dentry *it)
+{
+       struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern *kit = (void*)it;
+       struct dentry *parent_dentry;
+
+       if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(kit->path.dentry)))
+               return NULL;
+
+jump_up:
+       if (kit->path.dentry == kit->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
+               if (kit->flags == BPF_DENTRY_ITER_TO_MNT_ROOT)
+                       return NULL;
+               if (follow_up(&kit->path)) {
+                       goto jump_up;
+               }
+       }
+       parent_dentry = dget_parent(kit->path.dentry);
+       dput(kit->path.dentry);
+       kit->path.dentry = parent_dentry;
+       return parent_dentry;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_dentry_destroy(struct bpf_iter_dentry *it)
+{
+       struct bpf_iter_dentry_kern *kit = (void*)it;
+
+       path_put(&kit->path);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
+
 BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_task_exe_file,
             KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_RET_NULL)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_put_file, KF_RELEASE)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_path_d_path, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
-BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)    /* Will fix this later */
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_file_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dentry_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dentry_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dentry_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY)
 BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)

 static int bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)




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