[PATCH v2] fs, security: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Tue Aug 13 15:04:13 UTC 2024
On Tue, Aug 13, 2024 at 6:05 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 06:26:58PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 1:44 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > The fcntl's F_SETOWN command sets the process that handle SIGIO/SIGURG
> > > for the related file descriptor. Before this change, the
> > > file_set_fowner LSM hook was used to store this information. However,
> > > there are three issues with this approach:
> > >
> > > - Because security_file_set_fowner() only get one argument, all hook
> > > implementations ignore the VFS logic which may not actually change the
> > > process that handles SIGIO (e.g. TUN, TTY, dnotify).
> > >
> > > - Because security_file_set_fowner() is called before f_modown() without
> > > lock (e.g. f_owner.lock), concurrent F_SETOWN commands could result to
> > > a race condition and inconsistent LSM states (e.g. SELinux's fown_sid)
> > > compared to struct fown_struct's UID/EUID.
> > >
> > > - Because the current hook implementations does not use explicit atomic
> > > operations, they may create inconsistencies. It would help to
> > > completely remove this constraint, as well as the requirements of the
> > > RCU read-side critical section for the hook.
> > >
> > > Fix these issues by replacing f_owner.uid and f_owner.euid with a new
> > > f_owner.cred [1]. This also saves memory by removing dedicated LSM
> > > blobs, and simplifies code by removing file_set_fowner hook
> > > implementations for SELinux and Smack.
> > >
> > > This changes enables to remove the smack_file_alloc_security
> > > implementation, Smack's file blob, and SELinux's
> > > file_security_struct->fown_sid field.
> > >
> > > As for the UID/EUID, f_owner.cred is not always updated. Move the
> > > file_set_fowner hook to align with the VFS semantic. This hook does not
> > > have user anymore [2].
> > >
> > > Before this change, f_owner's UID/EUID were initialized to zero
> > > (i.e. GLOBAL_ROOT_UID), but to simplify code, f_owner's cred is now
> > > initialized with the file descriptor creator's credentials (i.e.
> > > file->f_cred), which is more consistent and simplifies LSMs logic. The
> > > sigio_perm()'s semantic does not need any change because SIGIO/SIGURG
> > > are only sent when a process is explicitly set with __f_setown().
> > >
> > > Rename f_modown() to __f_setown() to simplify code.
> > >
> > > Cc: Al Viro <viro at zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> > > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
> > > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org>
> > > Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
> > > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh at google.com>
> > > Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
> > > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
> > > Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work at gmail.com>
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240809-explosionsartig-ablesen-b039dbc6ce82@brauner [1]
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHC9VhQY+H7n2zCn8ST0Vu672UA=_eiUikRDW2sUDSN3c=gVQw@mail.gmail.com [2]
> > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > Changes since v1:
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812144936.1616628-1-mic@digikod.net
> > > - Add back the file_set_fowner hook (but without user) as
> > > requested by Paul, but move it for consistency.
> > > ---
> > > fs/fcntl.c | 42 +++++++++++++++----------------
> > > fs/file_table.c | 3 +++
> > > include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
> > > security/security.c | 5 +++-
> > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++-------------
> > > security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 1 -
> > > security/smack/smack.h | 6 -----
> > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 +---------------------------
> > > 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
> > > index 300e5d9ad913..4217b66a4e99 100644
> > > --- a/fs/fcntl.c
> > > +++ b/fs/fcntl.c
> > > @@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static int setfl(int fd, struct file * filp, unsigned int arg)
> > > return error;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
> > > - int force)
> > > +void __f_setown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
> > > + int force)
> > > {
> > > write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock);
> > > if (force || !filp->f_owner.pid) {
> > > @@ -97,20 +97,15 @@ static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
> > > filp->f_owner.pid_type = type;
> > >
> > > if (pid) {
> > > - const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > > - filp->f_owner.uid = cred->uid;
> > > - filp->f_owner.euid = cred->euid;
> > > + security_file_set_fowner(filp);
> > > + put_cred(rcu_replace_pointer(
> > > + filp->f_owner.cred,
> > > + get_cred_rcu(current_cred()),
> > > + lockdep_is_held(&filp->f_owner.lock)));
> > > }
> > > }
> > > write_unlock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock);
> > > }
> >
> > Looking at this quickly, why can't we accomplish pretty much the same
> > thing by moving the security_file_set_fowner() into f_modown (as
> > you've done above) and leveraging the existing file->f_security field
> > as Smack and SELinux do today? I'm seeing a lot of churn to get a
> > cred pointer into fown_struct which doesn't seem to offer that much
> > additional value.
>
> As explained in the commit message, this patch removes related LSM
> (sub)blobs because they are duplicates of what's referenced by the new
> f_owner.cred, which is a more generic approach and saves memory.
That's not entirely correct. While yes you do remove the need for a
Smack entry in file->f_security, there is still a need for the SELinux
entry in file->f_security no matter what you do, and since the LSM
framework handles the LSM security blob allocations, on systems where
SELinux is enabled you are going to do a file->f_security allocation
regardless.
While a cred based approach may be more generic from a traditional
UID/GID/etc. perspective, file->f_security is always going to be more
generic from a LSM perspective as the LSM has more flexibility about
what is placed into that blob. Yes, the LSM can also place data into
the cred struct, but that is used across a wide variety of kernel
objects and placing file specific data in there could needlessly
increase the size of the cred struct.
> > From what I can see this seems really focused on adding a cred
> > reference when it isn't clear an additional one is needed. If a new
> > cred reference *is* needed, please provide an explanation as to why;
> > reading the commit description this isn't clear. Of course, if I'm
> > mistaken, feel free to correct me, although I'm sure all the people on
> > the Internet don't need to be told that ;)
>
> This is a more generic approach that saves memory, sticks to the VFS
> semantic, and removes code. So I'd say it's a performance improvement
Considering that additional cred gets/puts are needed I question if
there are actually any performance improvements; in some cases I
suspect the performance will actually be worse. On SELinux enabled
systems you are still going to do the file->f_security allocation and
now you are going to add the cred management operations on top of
that.
> it saves memory
With the move in linux-next to pull fown_struct out of the file
struct, I suspect this is not as important as it once may have been.
> it fixes the LSM/VFS inconsistency
Simply moving the security_file_set_fowner() inside the lock protected
region should accomplish that too. Unless you're talking about
something else?
> it guarantees
> that the VFS semantic is always visible to each LSMs thanks to the use
> of the same f_owner.cred
The existing hooks are designed to make sure that the F_SETOWN
operation is visible to the LSM.
> and it avoids LSM mistakes (except if an LSM implements the now-useless hook).
The only mistake I'm seeing is that the call into
security_file_set_fowner() is not in the lock protected region, and
that is easily corrected. Forcing the LSM framework to reuse a cred
struct has the potential to restrict LSM security models which is
something we try very hard not to do.
--
paul-moore.com
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list