[RFC][PATCH v2 7/9] ima: Use digest caches for measurement
Roberto Sassu
roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
Mon Apr 15 16:10:42 UTC 2024
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
Introduce a new measurement style using digest caches, which can be
performed exclusively on non-standard PCRs, to avoid ambiguity.
While a measurement on the standard PCR means that a file was accessed and
had the measured data, a measurement with the digest cache means only that
the calculated file digest was not found in any of the measured digest
lists (any digest list used for the search must be measured, otherwise IMA
wouldn't use it).
The new measurement style does not tell: whether or not the file was
actually accessed (since its measurement is skipped even if it was); in
which sequence files were accessed. So, one has to guess that the system
might have possibly accessed any of the files whose digest is in the
measured digest lists, in any order.
However, it has the following benefits: the IMA measurement list can be
much shorter, system performance can be much better due to less PCR extend
operations (see the performance evaluation in the digest_cache LSM
documentation); the PCR can be predictable as long as the set of measured
digest lists does not change (which obviously happens during software
updates).
The PCR can be predictable because the digest_cache LSM has a prefetching
mechanism that reads digest lists in a deterministic order, until it
finds the digest list containing the digest calculated by IMA from an
accessed file. If IMA measures digest lists, the PCR is extended in a
deterministic order too.
Predictable PCR means that a TPM key can be made dependent on specific PCR
values (or a OR of them, depending on the key policy). Accessing a file
with an unknown digest immediately makes that TPM key unusable, requiring a
reboot to use it again.
This mechanism can be used for the so called implicit remote attestation,
where the ability of a system to respond to challenges based on the private
part of the TPM key means that the system has the expected PCR values
(which would mean that the integrity of the system is ok). This is opposed
to the explicit remote attestation, where a system has to send all its
measurements, to prove to a remote party about its integrity.
If the IMA policy allows the usage of digest caches for the current file
access (except for DIGEST_LIST_CHECK hook, not supported), call the newly
introduced function ima_digest_cache_update_allowed_usage(), to make a
final decision on whether or not a digest cache can be used for measurement
and/or appraisal.
First, call digest_cache_get() to get a digest cache from the file being
accessed. Second, perform a lookup of the calculated file digest in the
digest cache. Third, retrieve the allowed usage from the integrity metadata
flags of the digest list and AND it with the allowed usage from the policy.
If any of the previous step fails, set the allowed usage to zero.
Finally, pass the allowed usage to ima_store_measurement() and, if it has
the IMA_DIGEST_CACHE_MEASURE_DATA flag set, behave as if the file was
successfully added to the IMA measurement list (i.e. set the IMA_MEASURED
flag and the PCR flag from the value specified in the matching policy
rule), but actually don't do it.
Finally, release the digest cache reference acquired with
digest_cache_get(), by calling digest_cache_put().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 15 +++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.h | 9 +++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++++-
5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 337b3b76b28d..865137dfcf22 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -381,7 +381,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc,
+ u64 allowed_usage);
int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f0a1ce10afe8..0bbe19e33584 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc,
+ u64 allowed_usage)
{
static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
@@ -369,6 +370,18 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)
return;
+ /*
+ * If digest cache usage was authorized with the IMA policy, the digest
+ * list the digest cache was populated from was measured, and the file
+ * digest was found in the digest cache, mark the file as successfully
+ * measured.
+ */
+ if (allowed_usage & IMA_DIGEST_CACHE_MEASURE_DATA) {
+ iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
+ iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
+ return;
+ }
+
result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
if (result < 0) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.c
index 0b0fd26cc0d7..013c69f265d8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.c
@@ -43,3 +43,50 @@ void ima_digest_cache_store_allowed_usage(struct file *file,
pr_debug("Cannot set verification mask for %s, ret: %d, ignoring\n",
file_dentry(file)->d_name.name, rc);
}
+
+/**
+ * ima_digest_cache_update_allowed_usage - Update digest cache allowed usage
+ * @file: Digest list file descriptor
+ * @iint: Inode integrity metadata
+ * @allowed_usage: Digest cache allowed usage to update
+ *
+ * Update the digest cache allowed usage obtained from the IMA policy. First,
+ * retrieve the digest cache for the passed inode, and do a lookup of the
+ * calculated digest. If the digest is found, update the digest cache allowed
+ * usage with the allowed usage from integrity metadata flags, previously stored
+ * in the digest cache itself with ima_digest_cache_store_allowed_usage().
+ */
+void ima_digest_cache_update_allowed_usage(struct file *file,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ u64 *allowed_usage)
+{
+ struct digest_cache *digest_cache, *found_cache;
+ u64 *iint_allowed_usage;
+ digest_cache_found_t found;
+
+ digest_cache = digest_cache_get(file_dentry(file));
+ if (!digest_cache) {
+ *allowed_usage = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ found = digest_cache_lookup(file_dentry(file), digest_cache,
+ iint->ima_hash->digest,
+ iint->ima_hash->algo);
+ if (!found) {
+ *allowed_usage = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* AND what is allowed by the policy, and what IMA verified. */
+ found_cache = digest_cache_from_found_t(found);
+ iint_allowed_usage = digest_cache_verif_get(found_cache, "ima");
+ if (!iint_allowed_usage) {
+ *allowed_usage = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *allowed_usage &= *iint_allowed_usage;
+out:
+ digest_cache_put(digest_cache);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.h
index f2534a01bb18..cb47c15e975d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_cache.h
@@ -12,10 +12,19 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DIGEST_CACHE
void ima_digest_cache_store_allowed_usage(struct file *file,
struct ima_iint_cache *iint);
+void ima_digest_cache_update_allowed_usage(struct file *file,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ u64 *allowed_usage);
#else
static inline void
ima_digest_cache_store_allowed_usage(struct file *file,
struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
{ }
+static inline void
+ima_digest_cache_update_allowed_usage(struct file *file,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ u64 *allowed_usage)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_DIGEST_CACHE */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 7c968cdb5678..0ff5de9bef70 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
+ u64 digest_cache_usage = 0;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -233,7 +234,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
- &allowed_algos, NULL);
+ &allowed_algos, &digest_cache_usage);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
@@ -364,10 +365,19 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
+ /*
+ * For now we don't support nested verification with digest caches.
+ * Since we allow IMA policy rules without func=, we have to enforce
+ * this restriction here.
+ */
+ if (rc == 0 && digest_cache_usage && func != DIGEST_LIST_CHECK)
+ ima_digest_cache_update_allowed_usage(file, iint,
+ &digest_cache_usage);
+
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
- template_desc);
+ template_desc, digest_cache_usage);
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
if (rc != -EPERM) {
--
2.34.1
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