[GIT PULL] security changes for v6.9-rc3

[Paul Moore]

On Tue, Apr 2, 2024 at 3:39 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds at linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>

...

> But if we really want to do this ("if mknod creates a positive dentry,
> I won't see it in lookup, so I want to appraise it now"), then we
> should just deal with this in the generic layer with some hack like
> this:
>
>   --- a/security/security.c
>   +++ b/security/security.c
>   @@ -1801,7 +1801,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
>     */
>    void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
>    {
>   -     if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
>   +     struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
>   +     if (unlikely(!inode || IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
>                 return;
>         call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
>    }

Other than your snippet wrapping both the inode/NULL and
inode/IS_PRIVATE checks with an unlikely(), that's what Roberto
submitted (his patch only wrapped the inode/IS_PRIVATE with unlikely).

-- 
paul-moore.com