[PATCH v13 08/12] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
konstantin.meskhidze at huawei.com
Thu Oct 26 02:02:15 UTC 2023
10/25/2023 2:29 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 12:12:01PM +0300, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>
>>
>> 10/24/2023 12:03 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>> > On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 06:18:54AM +0300, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > 10/20/2023 12:49 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>> > > > On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 07:08:33AM +0300, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>> > > > > > > > > 10/18/2023 3:29 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>> > > > > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 09:50:26AM +0800, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> >
>> > > > > > > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h
>> > > > > > > new file mode 100644
>> > > > > > > index 000000000000..588a49fd6907
>> > > > > > > --- /dev/null
>> > > > > > > +++ b/security/landlock/net.h
>> > > > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
>> > > > > > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
>> > > > > > > +/*
>> > > > > > > + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
>> > > > > > > + *
>> > > > > > > + * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
>> > > > > > > + */
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
>> > > > > > > +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +#include "common.h"
>> > > > > > > +#include "ruleset.h"
>> > > > > > > +#include "setup.h"
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> > > > > > > +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void);
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> > > > > > > + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights);
>> > > > > > > +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> > > > > > > +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
>> > > > > > > +{
>> > > > > > > +}
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +static inline int
>> > > > > > > +landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, const u16 port,
>> > > > > > > + access_mask_t access_rights);
>> > > > > > > +{
>> > > > > > > + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>> > > > > > > +}
>> > > > > > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */
>> > > > > > > diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> > > > > > > index 4c209acee01e..1fe4298ff4a7 100644
>> > > > > > > --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> > > > > > > +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> > > > > > > @@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
>> > > > > > > refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
>> > > > > > > mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
>> > > > > > > new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> > > > > > > + new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
>> > > > > > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> > > > > > > +
>> > > > > > > new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
>> > > > > > > /*
>> > > > > > > * hierarchy = NULL
>> > > > > > > @@ -46,16 +51,21 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
>> > > > > > > }
>> > > > > > > > > struct landlock_ruleset *
>> > > > > > > -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask)
>> > > > > > > +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
>> > > > > > > + const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
>> > > > > > > {
>> > > > > > > struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
>> > > > > > > > > /* Informs about useless ruleset. */
>> > > > > > > - if (!fs_access_mask)
>> > > > > > > + if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
>> > > > > > > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
>> > > > > > > new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
>> > > > > > > - if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
>> > > > > > > + if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
>> > > > > > > + return new_ruleset;
>> > > > > > > + if (fs_access_mask)
>> > > > > > > landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
>> > > > > > > + if (net_access_mask)
>> > > > > > > + landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
>> > > > > > > This is good, but it is not tested: we need to add a test that
>> > > > > both
>> > > > > > handle FS and net restrictions. You can add one in net.c, just handling
>> > > > > > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP, add one
>> > > > > > rule with path_beneath (e.g. /dev) and another with net_port, and check
>> > > > > > that open("/") is denied, open("/dev") is allowed, and and only the
>> > > > > > allowed port is allowed with bind(). This test should be simple and can
>> > > > > > only check against an IPv4 socket, i.e. using ipv4_tcp fixture, just
>> > > > > > after port_endianness. fcntl.h should then be included by net.c
>> > > > > > > Ok.
>> > > > > > > I guess that was the purpose of layout1.with_net (in fs_test.c)
>> > > > > but it
>> > > > > > > Yep. I added this kind of nest in fs_test.c to test both
>> > > fs and network
>> > > > > rules together.
>> > > > > > is not complete. You can revamp this test and move it to net.c
>> > > > > > following the above suggestions, keeping it consistent with other tests
>> > > > > > in net.c . You don't need the test_open() nor create_ruleset() helpers.
>> > > > > > > This test must failed if we change
>> > > > > "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |="
>> > > > > > to "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] =" in
>> > > > > > landlock_add_fs_access_mask() or landlock_add_net_access_mask().
>> > > > > > > Do you want to change it? Why?
>> > > > > The kernel code is correct and must not be changed. However, if
>> > > by
>> > > > mistake we change it and remove the OR, a test should catch that. We
>> > > > need a test to assert this assumption.
>> > > > > > Fs and network masks are ORed to not intersect with each
>> > > other.
>> > > > > Yes, they are ORed, and we need a test to check that. Noting is
>> > > > currently testing this OR (and the different rule type consistency).
>> > > > I'm suggesting to revamp the layout1.with_net test into
>> > > > ipv4_tcp.with_fs and make it check ruleset->access_masks[] and rule
>> > > > addition of different types.
>> >
>> > > From the other email:
>> > > Thinking about this test. We don't need to add any additional ASSERT here.
>> > > Anyway if we accidentally change "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=" to
>> > > "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] =" we will fail either in opening
>> > > directory or in port binding, cause adding a second rule (fs or net) will
>> > > overwrite a first one's mask. it does not matter which one goes first. I
>> > > will check it and send you a message.
>> > > What do you think?
>> >
>> > >
>> > > About my previous comment.
>> > >
>> > > Checking the code we can notice that adding fs mask goes first:
>> > >
>> > > ...
>> > > if (fs_access_mask)
>> > > landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
>> > > if (net_access_mask)
>> > > landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
>> > > ....
>> > >
>> > > So with we change "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |="
>> > > >> > to "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] =" in
>> > > landlock_add_fs_access_mask() nothing bad will happen.
>> > > But if we do that in landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>> > > fs mask will be overwritten and adding fs rule will fail
>> > > (as unhandled allowed_accesss).
>> >
>> > Right. What is the conclusion here? Are you OK with my test proposal?
>>
>> So we just check if landlock_add_net_access_mask() would be changed by
>> mistake?
>
> With the current kernel code, yes.
>
>> Changing landlock_add_fs_access_mask() does not break the logic. Am
>> I correct here?
>
> Yes, only landlock_add_net_access_mask() changes would be detected with
> the current kernel code, but the test checks the whole semantic, so even
> the following code with a buggy landlock_add_fs_access_mask() would be
> detected:
>
> if (net_access_mask)
> landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
> if (fs_access_mask)
> landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
I agree. Thanks for the explanation.
> .
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