[PATCH v13 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add 7 new test variants dedicated to network
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Fri Oct 20 15:40:09 UTC 2023
On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 02:41:42PM +0300, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 10/18/2023 3:32 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> > You can update the subject with:
> > "selftests/landlock: Add network tests"
>
> Ok.
> >
> > On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 09:50:28AM +0800, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> > > These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
> > > bind() and connect() actions.
> >
> > You can replace with that:
> > Add 77 test suites to check edge cases related to bind() and connect()
> > actions. They are defined with 6 fixtures and their variants:
> >
> > >
> > > protocol:
> > > * bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4, ipv6 and unix sockets.
> >
> > As you already did, you can write one paragraph per fixture, but
> > starting by explaining the fixture and its related variants, and then
> > listing the tests and explaining their specificities. For instance:
> >
> > The "protocol" fixture is extended with 12 variants defined as a matrix
> > of: sandboxed/not-sandboxed, IPv4/IPv6/unix network domain, and
> > stream/datagram socket. 4 related tests suites are defined:
> > * bind: Test bind combinations with increasingly more
> > restricting domains.
> > * connect: Test connect combinations with increasingly more
> > restricting domains.
> > ...
>
> Ok. Will be updated.
> >
> > s/ipv/IPv/g
>
> Got it. Thanks.
> >
> > > * connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4, ipv6 and unix
> > > sockets.
> > > * bind_unspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
> > > for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
> > > * connect_unspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
> > > for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
> > >
> > > ipv4:
> > > * from_unix_to_inet: Tests to make sure unix sockets' actions are not
> > > restricted by Landlock rules applied to TCP ones.
> > >
> > > tcp_layers:
> > > * ruleset_overlap.
> > > * ruleset_expand.
> > >
> > > mini:
> > > * network_access_rights: Tests with legitimate access values.
> > > * unknown_access_rights: Tests with invalid attributes, out of access range.
> > > * inval:
> > > - unhandled allowed access.
> > > - zero access value.
> > > * tcp_port_overflow: Tests with wrong port values more than U16_MAX.
> > >
> > > ipv4_tcp:
> > > * port_endianness: Tests with big/little endian port formats.
> > >
> > > port_specific:
> > > * bind_connect: Tests with specific port values.
> > >
> > > layout1:
> > > * with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
> > > filesystem directory access test.
> > >
> > > Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.5% of 932 lines according
> > > to gcc/gcov-11.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze at huawei.com>
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230920092641.832134-11-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com
> > > Co-developed-by:: Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > Changes since v12:
> > > * Renames port_zero to port_specific fixture.
> > > * Refactors port_specific test:
> > > - Adds set_port() and get_binded_port() helpers.
> > > - Adds checks for port 0, allowed by Landlock in this version.
> > > - Adds checks for port 1023.
> > > * Refactors commit message.
> > >
> >
> > > +static void set_port(struct service_fixture *const srv, in_port_t port)
> > > +{
> > > + switch (srv->protocol.domain) {
> > > + case AF_UNSPEC:
> > > + case AF_INET:
> > > + srv->ipv4_addr.sin_port = port;
> >
> > We should call htons() here, and make port a uint16_t.
>
> Done.
> >
> > > + return;
> > > +
> > > + case AF_INET6:
> > > + srv->ipv6_addr.sin6_port = port;
> > > + return;
> > > +
> > > + default:
> > > + return;
> > > + }
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static in_port_t get_binded_port(int socket_fd,
> >
> > The returned type should be uint16_t (i.e. host endianess).
>
> Done.
> >
> > > + const struct protocol_variant *const prot)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sockaddr_in ipv4_addr;
> > > + struct sockaddr_in6 ipv6_addr;
> > > + socklen_t ipv4_addr_len, ipv6_addr_len;
> > > +
> > > + /* Gets binded port. */
> > > + switch (prot->domain) {
> > > + case AF_UNSPEC:
> > > + case AF_INET:
> > > + ipv4_addr_len = sizeof(ipv4_addr);
> > > + getsockname(socket_fd, &ipv4_addr, &ipv4_addr_len);
> > > + return ntohs(ipv4_addr.sin_port);
> > > +
> > > + case AF_INET6:
> > > + ipv6_addr_len = sizeof(ipv6_addr);
> > > + getsockname(socket_fd, &ipv6_addr, &ipv6_addr_len);
> > > + return ntohs(ipv6_addr.sin6_port);
> > > +
> > > + default:
> > > + return 0;
> > > + }
> > > +}
> >
> > These are good helpers!
> >
> >
> > > +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(ipv4)
> > > +{
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +// Kernel FIXME: tcp_sandbox_with_tcp and tcp_sandbox_with_udp
> >
> > No FIXME should remain.
>
> Ok. Deleted.
> >
> > > +TEST_F(ipv4, from_unix_to_inet)
> >
> > > +TEST_F(mini, network_access_rights)
> > > +{
> > > + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> > > + .handled_access_net = ACCESS_ALL,
> > > + };
> > > + struct landlock_net_port_attr net_service = {
> >
> > Please rename to "net_port" everywhere.
>
> Done.
> >
> > > +TEST_F(port_specific, bind_connect)
> > > +{
> > > + int socket_fd, ret;
> > > +
> > > + /* Adds the first rule layer with bind and connect actions. */
> > > + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
> > > + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> > > + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> > > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
> > > + };
> > > + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_connect_zero = {
> > > + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> > > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> > > + .port = htons(0),
> >
> > We don't need any htons() calls anymore. It doesn't change the 0 value
> > in this case but this is not correct.
>
> Yep. We call htons(port) in landlock_append_net_rule().
> Thanks.
> >
> > > + };
> > > +
> >
> > Useless new line.
>
> Ok. Thanks.
> >
> > > + int ruleset_fd;
> > > +
> > > + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
> > > + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> > > + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> > > +
> > > + /* Checks zero port value on bind and connect actions. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0,
> > > + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
> > > + &tcp_bind_connect_zero, 0));
> > > +
> > > + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + socket_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
> > > + ASSERT_LE(0, socket_fd);
> > > +
> > > + /* Sets address port to 0 for both protocol families. */
> > > + set_port(&self->srv0, htons(0));
> >
> > ditto
> >
> > > +
> > > + /* Binds on port 0. */
> > > + ret = bind_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> > > + /* Binds to a random port within ip_local_port_range. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + /* Binds to a random port within ip_local_port_range. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> >
> > If the results are the same, no need to add an if block.
>
> Right. Updated.
> >
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* Connects on port 0. */
> > > + ret = connect_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(-ECONNREFUSED, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(-ECONNREFUSED, ret);
> > > + }
> >
> > ditto
> >
> Updated.
> > > +
> > > + /* Binds on port 0. */
> >
> > Please close sockets once they are used, and recreate one for another
> > bind/connect to avoid wrong checks.
>
> Ok. But I can reuse socket_fd after closeing a socket. Correct?
It would be clearer to have one variable for the client socket
(connect_fd) and another variable for the server socket (bind_fd).
But once the socket is closed, you can reuse the same variable by
storing a new socket in it. You then only need two variables for sockets
in this test.
> >
> > > + ret = bind_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> > > + /* Binds to a random port within ip_local_port_range. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + /* Binds to a random port within ip_local_port_range. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + }
> >
> > Why this second bind() block? Furthermore, it is using the same
> > socket_fd.
Is this block useful?
>
> I will refactor the code this way - sockets will be recreated for each
> bind/connect, and I prefer to use self-connected sockets (use one socket
> descriptor) in these tests to make code simpler; testing logic remains the
> same way as if we have 2 sockets.
>
> What do you think???
I find it confusing to use self-connected sockets, it's not clear at all
what is going on, and AFAIK it doesn't reflect real use cases. Please
don't do that.
Using the same variable for both bind and connect socket will lead to
issues difficult to debug, and leaked FDs. For instance with the bind +
get_binded_port + connect test you should use one variable per socket.
To make it easier to read, please follow this rule everywhere (the only
case when this is done seems to be with the port_specific.bind_connect
test).
>
> >
> > > +
> > > + /* Sets binded port for both protocol families. */
> > > + set_port(&self->srv0,
> > > + htons(get_binded_port(socket_fd, &variant->prot)));
> >
> > Ditto, these two endianess translations are useless.
>
> Updated. Thanks.
> >
> > You can also add this to make sure the returned port is not 0:
> > port = get_binded_port(socket_fd, &variant->prot);
> > EXPECT_NE(0, port);
> > set_port(&self->srv0, port);
>
> Ok. Thanks for the tip.
> >
> > > +
> > > + /* Connects on the binded port. */
> > > + ret = connect_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> > > + /* Denied by Landlock. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(socket_fd));
> > > +
> >
> >
> >
> > > + /* Adds the second rule layer with just bind action. */
> >
> > There is not only bind actions here.
>
> Right.
> >
> > This second part of the tests should be in a dedicated
> > TEST_F(port_specific, bind_1023).
>
> Got it.
> >
> > > + if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
> > > + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> > > + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> > > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
> > > + };
> > > +
> > > + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_zero = {
> > > + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> > > + .port = htons(0),
> > > + };
> > > +
> >
> > Useless new lines.
>
> Got it.
> >
> > > + /* A rule with port value less than 1024. */
> > > + const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_lower_range = {
> > > + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> > > + .port = htons(1023),
> > > + };
> > > +
> >
> > Useless new line.
>
> Got it.
> >
> > > + int ruleset_fd;
> > > +
> > > + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
> > > + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> > > + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> > > +
> > > + ASSERT_EQ(0,
> > > + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
> > > + &tcp_bind_lower_range, 0));
> > > + ASSERT_EQ(0,
> > > + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
> > > + &tcp_bind_zero, 0));
> > > +
> > > + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + socket_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
> >
> > We must have one socket FD dedicated to bind an another dedicated to
> > connect, e.g. bind_fd and connect_fd, an close them after each use,
> > otherwise tests might be inconsistent.
>
> Why can't we use self-connected sockets here? Why tests might be
> inconsistent? Tests will be working the same way as if we have 2 sockets,
> plus the code is simpler.
AFAIK it doesn't reflect real use cases of sockets, and I find it really
confusing. Where did you see this kind of usage?
Test might be inconsistent for instance if you change the port from 1023
to 1024 and you adjust the (denied by system) EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret),
you'll get a new error in the following block, which doesn't make sense
at first, but then you realize it is because the socket is already
binded. To avoid this kind of issues, and avoid leaking FDs, please use
a socket per usage and close them before testing something else.
> >
> > > + ASSERT_LE(0, socket_fd);
> > > +
> > > + /* Sets address port to 1023 for both protocol families. */
> > > + set_port(&self->srv0, htons(1023));
> > > +
> > > + /* Binds on port 1023. */
> > > + ret = bind_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> >
> > No need to add this check if the result is the same for sandboxed and
> > not sandboxed tests.
>
> Ok. Thanks.
> >
> > Instead, use set_cap(_metadata, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) and clear_cap()
> > around this bind_variant() to make this test useful.
> >
> > You will also need to patch common.h like this:
> > @@ -112,10 +112,13 @@ static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
> > cap_t cap_p;
> > /* Only these three capabilities are useful for the tests. */
> > const cap_value_t caps[] = {
> > + /* clang-format off */
> > CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
> > CAP_MKNOD,
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> > CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
> > + CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
> > + /* clang-format on */
> > };
>
> OK. Thanks.
> >
> > > + /* Denied by the system. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + /* Denied by the system. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
> > > + }
> > > +
> >
> > I don't see why the following part is useful. Why did you add it?
> Binding to ports < 1024 are forbidden by the system, not by Landlock.
> I added a rule with port 1023 to make sure it works as expected.
Landlock, as any LSM, can only add more restrictions. That's why it
would make more sense to test with CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, to make sure
Landlock rules work the same with this kind of privileged ports, but you
can test both cases (all within the same TEST_F though, and without
other tests).
>
> > Why tcp_bind_zero?
> Beacause it's a bind action with port zero rule.
Yes but I don't see why it's relevant to test that here, because it was
tested just before.
>
> >
> > The other parts are good though!
> >
> > > + /* Sets address port to 0 for both protocol families. */
> > > + set_port(&self->srv0, htons(0));
> > > +
> > > + /* Binds on port 0. */
> > > + ret = bind_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> > > + /* Binds to a random port within ip_local_port_range. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + /* Binds to a random port within ip_local_port_range. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* Sets binded port for both protocol families. */
> > > + set_port(&self->srv0,
> > > + htons(get_binded_port(socket_fd, &variant->prot)));
> > > +
> > > + /* Connects on the binded port. */
> > > + ret = connect_variant(socket_fd, &self->srv0);
> > > + if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
> > > + /* Denied by Landlock. */
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
> > > + } else {
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(socket_fd));
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
> > > --
> > > 2.25.1
> > >
> > .
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