[PATCH v8 bpf-next 17/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests

Jiri Olsa olsajiri at gmail.com
Tue Oct 17 11:02:12 UTC 2023


On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 11:02:19AM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> Add a selftest that attempts to conceptually replicate intended BPF
> token use cases inside user namespaced container.
> 
> Child process is forked. It is then put into its own userns and mountns.
> Child creates BPF FS context object and sets it up as desired. This
> ensures child userns is captures as owning userns for this instance of
> BPF FS.
> 
> This context is passed back to privileged parent process through Unix
> socket, where parent creates and mounts it as a detached mount. This
> mount FD is passed back to the child to be used for BPF token creation,
> which allows otherwise privileged BPF operations to succeed inside
> userns.
> 
> We validate that all of token-enabled privileged commands (BPF_BTF_LOAD,
> BPF_MAP_CREATE, and BPF_PROG_LOAD) work as intended. They should only
> succeed inside the userns if a) BPF token is provided with proper
> allowed sets of commands and types; and b) namespaces CAP_BPF and other
> privileges are set. Lacking a) or b) should lead to -EPERM failures.
> 
> Based on suggested workflow by Christian Brauner ([0]).
> 
>   [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii at kernel.org>
> ---
>  .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c  | 629 ++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 629 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
> 
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..41cee6b4731e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include <test_progs.h>
> +#include <bpf/btf.h>
> +#include "cap_helpers.h"
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <sched.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <linux/filter.h>
> +#include <linux/unistd.h>
> +#include <sys/mount.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <sys/syscall.h>
> +#include <sys/un.h>
> +
> +/* copied from include/uapi/linux/mount.h, as including it conflicts with
> + * sys/mount.h include
> + */
> +enum fsconfig_command {
> +	FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG       = 0,    /* Set parameter, supplying no value */
> +	FSCONFIG_SET_STRING     = 1,    /* Set parameter, supplying a string value */
> +	FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY     = 2,    /* Set parameter, supplying a binary blob value */
> +	FSCONFIG_SET_PATH       = 3,    /* Set parameter, supplying an object by path */
> +	FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY = 4,    /* Set parameter, supplying an object by (empty) path */
> +	FSCONFIG_SET_FD         = 5,    /* Set parameter, supplying an object by fd */
> +	FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE     = 6,    /* Invoke superblock creation */
> +	FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE = 7,   /* Invoke superblock reconfiguration */
> +};

I'm getting compilation fail, because fsconfig_command seems to be
included through the sys/mount.h include, but CI is green hum :-\

when I get -E output I can see:

	...
	# 16 "./cap_helpers.h"
	int cap_enable_effective(__u64 caps, __u64 *old_caps);
	int cap_disable_effective(__u64 caps, __u64 *old_caps);
	# 7 "/home/jolsa/kernel/linux-qemu/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c" 2

	# 1 "/usr/include/sys/mount.h" 1 3 4
	# 27 "/usr/include/sys/mount.h" 3 4
	# 1 "/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/13/include/stddef.h" 1 3 4
	# 28 "/usr/include/sys/mount.h" 2 3 4

	# 1 "/home/jolsa/kernel/linux-qemu/tools/include/uapi/linux/mount.h" 1 3 4
	# 96 "/home/jolsa/kernel/linux-qemu/tools/include/uapi/linux/mount.h" 3 4

	# 96 "/home/jolsa/kernel/linux-qemu/tools/include/uapi/linux/mount.h" 3 4
	enum fsconfig_command {
	 FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG = 0,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_STRING = 1,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY = 2,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_PATH = 3,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY = 4,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_FD = 5,
	 FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE = 6,
	 FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE = 7,
	};


	...


	# 21 "/home/jolsa/kernel/linux-qemu/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c"
	enum fsconfig_command {
	 FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG = 0,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_STRING = 1,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY = 2,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_PATH = 3,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY = 4,
	 FSCONFIG_SET_FD = 5,
	 FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE = 6,
	 FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE = 7,
	};


it's probably included through this bit in the /usr/include/sys/mount.h:

	#ifdef __has_include
	# if __has_include ("linux/mount.h")
	#  include "linux/mount.h"
	# endif
	#endif

which was added 'recently' in https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=774058d72942249f71d74e7f2b639f77184160a6

maybe you use older glibs headers? or perhaps it might be my build setup

jirka


> +
> +static inline int sys_fsopen(const char *fsname, unsigned flags)
> +{
> +	return syscall(__NR_fsopen, fsname, flags);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int sys_fsconfig(int fs_fd, unsigned cmd, const char *key, const void *val, int aux)
> +{
> +	return syscall(__NR_fsconfig, fs_fd, cmd, key, val, aux);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int sys_fsmount(int fs_fd, unsigned flags, unsigned ms_flags)
> +{
> +	return syscall(__NR_fsmount, fs_fd, flags, ms_flags);
> +}
> +
> +static int drop_priv_caps(__u64 *old_caps)
> +{
> +	return cap_disable_effective((1ULL << CAP_BPF) |
> +				     (1ULL << CAP_PERFMON) |
> +				     (1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN) |
> +				     (1ULL << CAP_SYS_ADMIN), old_caps);
> +}
> +
> +static int restore_priv_caps(__u64 old_caps)
> +{
> +	return cap_enable_effective(old_caps, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static int set_delegate_mask(int fs_fd, const char *key, __u64 mask)
> +{
> +	char buf[32];
> +	int err;
> +
> +	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0x%llx", (unsigned long long)mask);
> +	err = sys_fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, key,
> +			   mask == ~0ULL ? "any" : buf, 0);
> +	if (err < 0)
> +		err = -errno;
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +#define zclose(fd) do { if (fd >= 0) close(fd); fd = -1; } while (0)
> +
> +struct bpffs_opts {
> +	__u64 cmds;
> +	__u64 maps;
> +	__u64 progs;
> +	__u64 attachs;
> +};
> +
> +static int setup_bpffs_fd(struct bpffs_opts *opts)
> +{
> +	int fs_fd = -1, err;
> +
> +	/* create VFS context */
> +	fs_fd = sys_fsopen("bpf", 0);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GE(fs_fd, 0, "fs_fd"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* set up token delegation mount options */
> +	err = set_delegate_mask(fs_fd, "delegate_cmds", opts->cmds);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "fs_cfg_cmds"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	err = set_delegate_mask(fs_fd, "delegate_maps", opts->maps);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "fs_cfg_maps"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	err = set_delegate_mask(fs_fd, "delegate_progs", opts->progs);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "fs_cfg_progs"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	err = set_delegate_mask(fs_fd, "delegate_attachs", opts->attachs);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "fs_cfg_attachs"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	return fs_fd;
> +cleanup:
> +	zclose(fs_fd);
> +	return -1;
> +}
> +
> +static int materialize_bpffs_fd(int fs_fd)
> +{
> +	int mnt_fd, err;
> +
> +	/* instantiate FS object */
> +	err = sys_fsconfig(fs_fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
> +	if (err < 0)
> +		return -errno;
> +
> +	/* create O_PATH fd for detached mount */
> +	mnt_fd = sys_fsmount(fs_fd, 0, 0);
> +	if (err < 0)
> +		return -errno;
> +
> +	return mnt_fd;
> +}
> +
> +/* send FD over Unix domain (AF_UNIX) socket */
> +static int sendfd(int sockfd, int fd)
> +{
> +	struct msghdr msg = {};
> +	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> +	int fds[1] = { fd }, err;
> +	char iobuf[1];
> +	struct iovec io = {
> +		.iov_base = iobuf,
> +		.iov_len = sizeof(iobuf),
> +	};
> +	union {
> +		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fds))];
> +		struct cmsghdr align;
> +	} u;
> +
> +	msg.msg_iov = &io;
> +	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +	msg.msg_control = u.buf;
> +	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(u.buf);
> +	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> +	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> +	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> +	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(fds));
> +	memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), fds, sizeof(fds));
> +
> +	err = sendmsg(sockfd, &msg, 0);
> +	if (err < 0)
> +		err = -errno;
> +	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 1, "sendmsg"))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* receive FD over Unix domain (AF_UNIX) socket */
> +static int recvfd(int sockfd, int *fd)
> +{
> +	struct msghdr msg = {};
> +	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> +	int fds[1], err;
> +	char iobuf[1];
> +	struct iovec io = {
> +		.iov_base = iobuf,
> +		.iov_len = sizeof(iobuf),
> +	};
> +	union {
> +		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(fds))];
> +		struct cmsghdr align;
> +	} u;
> +
> +	msg.msg_iov = &io;
> +	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +	msg.msg_control = u.buf;
> +	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(u.buf);
> +
> +	err = recvmsg(sockfd, &msg, 0);
> +	if (err < 0)
> +		err = -errno;
> +	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 1, "recvmsg"))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(cmsg, "cmsg_null") ||
> +	    !ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_len, CMSG_LEN(sizeof(fds)), "cmsg_len") ||
> +	    !ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_level, SOL_SOCKET, "cmsg_level") ||
> +	    !ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_type, SCM_RIGHTS, "cmsg_type"))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	memcpy(fds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(fds));
> +	*fd = fds[0];
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static ssize_t write_nointr(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
> +{
> +	ssize_t ret;
> +
> +	do {
> +		ret = write(fd, buf, count);
> +	} while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int write_file(const char *path, const void *buf, size_t count)
> +{
> +	int fd;
> +	ssize_t ret;
> +
> +	fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW);
> +	if (fd < 0)
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	ret = write_nointr(fd, buf, count);
> +	close(fd);
> +	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret != count)
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int create_and_enter_userns(void)
> +{
> +	uid_t uid;
> +	gid_t gid;
> +	char map[100];
> +
> +	uid = getuid();
> +	gid = getgid();
> +
> +	if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	if (write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny", sizeof("deny") - 1) &&
> +	    errno != ENOENT)
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %d 1", uid);
> +	if (write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", map, strlen(map)))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +
> +	snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %d 1", gid);
> +	if (write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", map, strlen(map)))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	if (setgid(0))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	if (setuid(0))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +typedef int (*child_callback_fn)(int);
> +
> +static void child(int sock_fd, struct bpffs_opts *bpffs_opts, child_callback_fn callback)
> +{
> +	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_map_create_opts, map_opts);
> +	int mnt_fd = -1, fs_fd = -1, err = 0;
> +
> +	/* setup userns with root mappings */
> +	err = create_and_enter_userns();
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "create_and_enter_userns"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* setup mountns to allow creating BPF FS (fsopen("bpf")) from unpriv process */
> +	err = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "create_mountns"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	err = mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, 0);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "remount_root"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	fs_fd = setup_bpffs_fd(bpffs_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GE(fs_fd, 0, "setup_bpffs")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* pass BPF FS context object to parent */
> +	err = sendfd(sock_fd, fs_fd);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "send_fs_fd"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* avoid mucking around with mount namespaces and mounting at
> +	 * well-known path, just get detach-mounted BPF FS fd back from parent
> +	 */
> +	err = recvfd(sock_fd, &mnt_fd);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv_mnt_fd"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* do custom test logic with customly set up BPF FS instance */
> +	err = callback(mnt_fd);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "test_callback"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	err = 0;
> +cleanup:
> +	zclose(sock_fd);
> +	zclose(mnt_fd);
> +
> +	exit(-err);
> +}
> +
> +static int wait_for_pid(pid_t pid)
> +{
> +	int status, ret;
> +
> +again:
> +	ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
> +	if (ret == -1) {
> +		if (errno == EINTR)
> +			goto again;
> +
> +		return -1;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	return WEXITSTATUS(status);
> +}
> +
> +static void parent(int child_pid, int sock_fd)
> +{
> +	int fs_fd = -1, mnt_fd = -1, err;
> +
> +	err = recvfd(sock_fd, &fs_fd);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv_bpffs_fd"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	mnt_fd = materialize_bpffs_fd(fs_fd);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GE(mnt_fd, 0, "materialize_bpffs_fd")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +	zclose(fs_fd);
> +
> +	/* pass BPF FS context object to parent */
> +	err = sendfd(sock_fd, mnt_fd);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "send_mnt_fd"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	zclose(mnt_fd);
> +
> +	err = wait_for_pid(child_pid);
> +	ASSERT_OK(err, "waitpid_child");
> +
> +cleanup:
> +	zclose(sock_fd);
> +	zclose(fs_fd);
> +	zclose(mnt_fd);
> +
> +	if (child_pid > 0)
> +		(void)kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
> +}
> +
> +static void subtest_userns(struct bpffs_opts *bpffs_opts, child_callback_fn cb)
> +{
> +	int sock_fds[2] = { -1, -1 };
> +	int child_pid = 0, err;
> +
> +	err = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sock_fds);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "socketpair"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	child_pid = fork();
> +	if (!ASSERT_GE(child_pid, 0, "fork"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	if (child_pid == 0) {
> +		zclose(sock_fds[0]);
> +		return child(sock_fds[1], bpffs_opts, cb);
> +
> +	} else {
> +		zclose(sock_fds[1]);
> +		return parent(child_pid, sock_fds[0]);
> +	}
> +
> +cleanup:
> +	zclose(sock_fds[0]);
> +	zclose(sock_fds[1]);
> +	if (child_pid > 0)
> +		(void)kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
> +}
> +
> +static int userns_map_create(int mnt_fd)
> +{
> +	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_map_create_opts, map_opts);
> +	int err, token_fd = -1, map_fd = -1;
> +	__u64 old_caps = 0;
> +
> +	/* create BPF token from BPF FS mount */
> +	token_fd = bpf_token_create(mnt_fd, "", NULL);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GT(token_fd, 0, "token_create")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* while inside non-init userns, we need both a BPF token *and*
> +	 * CAP_BPF inside current userns to create privileged map; let's test
> +	 * that neither BPF token alone nor namespaced CAP_BPF is sufficient
> +	 */
> +	err = drop_priv_caps(&old_caps);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "drop_caps"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* no token, no CAP_BPF -> fail */
> +	map_opts.token_fd = 0;
> +	map_fd = bpf_map_create(BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, "wo_token_wo_bpf", 0, 8, 1, &map_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_LT(map_fd, 0, "stack_map_wo_token_wo_cap_bpf_should_fail")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* token without CAP_BPF -> fail */
> +	map_opts.token_fd = token_fd;
> +	map_fd = bpf_map_create(BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, "w_token_wo_bpf", 0, 8, 1, &map_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_LT(map_fd, 0, "stack_map_w_token_wo_cap_bpf_should_fail")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* get back effective local CAP_BPF (and CAP_SYS_ADMIN) */
> +	err = restore_priv_caps(old_caps);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "restore_caps"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* CAP_BPF without token -> fail */
> +	map_opts.token_fd = 0;
> +	map_fd = bpf_map_create(BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, "wo_token_w_bpf", 0, 8, 1, &map_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_LT(map_fd, 0, "stack_map_wo_token_w_cap_bpf_should_fail")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* finally, namespaced CAP_BPF + token -> success */
> +	map_opts.token_fd = token_fd;
> +	map_fd = bpf_map_create(BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, "w_token_w_bpf", 0, 8, 1, &map_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GT(map_fd, 0, "stack_map_w_token_w_cap_bpf")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +cleanup:
> +	zclose(token_fd);
> +	zclose(map_fd);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int userns_btf_load(int mnt_fd)
> +{
> +	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_btf_load_opts, btf_opts);
> +	int err, token_fd = -1, btf_fd = -1;
> +	const void *raw_btf_data;
> +	struct btf *btf = NULL;
> +	__u32 raw_btf_size;
> +	__u64 old_caps = 0;
> +
> +	/* create BPF token from BPF FS mount */
> +	token_fd = bpf_token_create(mnt_fd, "", NULL);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GT(token_fd, 0, "token_create")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* while inside non-init userns, we need both a BPF token *and*
> +	 * CAP_BPF inside current userns to create privileged map; let's test
> +	 * that neither BPF token alone nor namespaced CAP_BPF is sufficient
> +	 */
> +	err = drop_priv_caps(&old_caps);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "drop_caps"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* setup a trivial BTF data to load to the kernel */
> +	btf = btf__new_empty();
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(btf, "empty_btf"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	ASSERT_GT(btf__add_int(btf, "int", 4, 0), 0, "int_type");
> +
> +	raw_btf_data = btf__raw_data(btf, &raw_btf_size);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(raw_btf_data, "raw_btf_data"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* no token + no CAP_BPF -> failure */
> +	btf_opts.token_fd = 0;
> +	btf_fd = bpf_btf_load(raw_btf_data, raw_btf_size, &btf_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_LT(btf_fd, 0, "no_token_no_cap_should_fail"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* token + no CAP_BPF -> failure */
> +	btf_opts.token_fd = token_fd;
> +	btf_fd = bpf_btf_load(raw_btf_data, raw_btf_size, &btf_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_LT(btf_fd, 0, "token_no_cap_should_fail"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* get back effective local CAP_BPF (and CAP_SYS_ADMIN) */
> +	err = restore_priv_caps(old_caps);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "restore_caps"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* token + CAP_BPF -> success */
> +	btf_opts.token_fd = token_fd;
> +	btf_fd = bpf_btf_load(raw_btf_data, raw_btf_size, &btf_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GT(btf_fd, 0, "token_and_cap_success"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	err = 0;
> +cleanup:
> +	btf__free(btf);
> +	zclose(btf_fd);
> +	zclose(token_fd);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int userns_prog_load(int mnt_fd)
> +{
> +	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_load_opts, prog_opts);
> +	int err, token_fd = -1, prog_fd = -1;
> +	struct bpf_insn insns[] = {
> +		/* bpf_jiffies64() requires CAP_BPF */
> +		BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_jiffies64),
> +		/* bpf_get_current_task() requires CAP_PERFMON */
> +		BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_get_current_task),
> +		/* r0 = 0; exit; */
> +		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
> +		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
> +	};
> +	size_t insn_cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insns);
> +	__u64 old_caps = 0;
> +
> +	/* create BPF token from BPF FS mount */
> +	token_fd = bpf_token_create(mnt_fd, "", NULL);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GT(token_fd, 0, "token_create")) {
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* validate we can successfully load BPF program with token; this
> +	 * being XDP program (CAP_NET_ADMIN) using bpf_jiffies64() (CAP_BPF)
> +	 * and bpf_get_current_task() (CAP_PERFMON) helpers validates we have
> +	 * BPF token wired properly in a bunch of places in the kernel
> +	 */
> +	prog_opts.token_fd = token_fd;
> +	prog_opts.expected_attach_type = BPF_XDP;
> +	prog_fd = bpf_prog_load(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, "token_prog", "GPL",
> +				insns, insn_cnt, &prog_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_GT(prog_fd, 0, "prog_fd")) {
> +		err = -EPERM;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* no token + caps -> failure */
> +	prog_opts.token_fd = 0;
> +	prog_fd = bpf_prog_load(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, "token_prog", "GPL",
> +				insns, insn_cnt, &prog_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_EQ(prog_fd, -EPERM, "prog_fd_eperm")) {
> +		err = -EPERM;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = drop_priv_caps(&old_caps);
> +	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "drop_caps"))
> +		goto cleanup;
> +
> +	/* no caps + token -> failure */
> +	prog_opts.token_fd = token_fd;
> +	prog_fd = bpf_prog_load(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, "token_prog", "GPL",
> +				insns, insn_cnt, &prog_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_EQ(prog_fd, -EPERM, "prog_fd_eperm")) {
> +		err = -EPERM;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* no caps + no token -> definitely a failure */
> +	prog_opts.token_fd = 0;
> +	prog_fd = bpf_prog_load(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, "token_prog", "GPL",
> +				insns, insn_cnt, &prog_opts);
> +	if (!ASSERT_EQ(prog_fd, -EPERM, "prog_fd_eperm")) {
> +		err = -EPERM;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = 0;
> +cleanup:
> +	zclose(prog_fd);
> +	zclose(token_fd);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +void test_token(void)
> +{
> +	if (test__start_subtest("map_token")) {
> +		struct bpffs_opts opts = {
> +			.cmds = 1ULL << BPF_MAP_CREATE,
> +			.maps = 1ULL << BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK,
> +		};
> +
> +		subtest_userns(&opts, userns_map_create);
> +	}
> +	if (test__start_subtest("btf_token")) {
> +		struct bpffs_opts opts = {
> +			.cmds = 1ULL << BPF_BTF_LOAD,
> +		};
> +
> +		subtest_userns(&opts, userns_btf_load);
> +	}
> +	if (test__start_subtest("prog_token")) {
> +		struct bpffs_opts opts = {
> +			.cmds = 1ULL << BPF_PROG_LOAD,
> +			.progs = 1ULL << BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
> +			.attachs = 1ULL << BPF_XDP,
> +		};
> +
> +		subtest_userns(&opts, userns_prog_load);
> +	}
> +}
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 
> 



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