[PATCH v6 bpf-next 03/13] bpf: introduce BPF token object
Hou Tao
houtao at huaweicloud.com
Wed Oct 11 02:35:11 UTC 2023
Hi,
On 9/28/2023 6:57 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
> allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
> program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
> unprivileged process, all while have a good amount of control over which
> privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
>
> This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
> mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
> constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
> previous patch).
SNIP
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index 70bfa997e896..78692911f4a0 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -847,6 +847,37 @@ union bpf_iter_link_info {
> * Returns zero on success. On error, -1 is returned and *errno*
> * is set appropriately.
> *
> + * BPF_TOKEN_CREATE
> + * Description
> + * Create BPF token with embedded information about what
> + * BPF-related functionality it allows:
> + * - a set of allowed bpf() syscall commands;
> + * - a set of allowed BPF map types to be created with
> + * BPF_MAP_CREATE command, if BPF_MAP_CREATE itself is allowed;
> + * - a set of allowed BPF program types and BPF program attach
> + * types to be loaded with BPF_PROG_LOAD command, if
> + * BPF_PROG_LOAD itself is allowed.
> + *
> + * BPF token is created (derived) from an instance of BPF FS,
> + * assuming it has necessary delegation mount options specified.
> + * BPF FS mount is specified with openat()-style path FD + string.
> + * This BPF token can be passed as an extra parameter to various
> + * bpf() syscall commands to grant BPF subsystem functionality to
> + * unprivileged processes.
> + *
> + * When created, BPF token is "associated" with the owning
> + * user namespace of BPF FS instance (super block) that it was
> + * derived from, and subsequent BPF operations performed with
> + * BPF token would be performing capabilities checks (i.e.,
> + * CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) within
> + * that user namespace. Without BPF token, such capabilities
> + * have to be granted in init user namespace, making bpf()
> + * syscall incompatible with user namespace, for the most part.
> + *
> + * Return
> + * A new file descriptor (a nonnegative integer), or -1 if an
> + * error occurred (in which case, *errno* is set appropriately).
> + *
> * NOTES
> * eBPF objects (maps and programs) can be shared between processes.
> *
> @@ -901,6 +932,8 @@ enum bpf_cmd {
> BPF_ITER_CREATE,
> BPF_LINK_DETACH,
> BPF_PROG_BIND_MAP,
> + BPF_TOKEN_CREATE,
> + __MAX_BPF_CMD,
> };
>
> enum bpf_map_type {
> @@ -1694,6 +1727,12 @@ union bpf_attr {
> __u32 flags; /* extra flags */
> } prog_bind_map;
>
> + struct { /* struct used by BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command */
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u32 bpffs_path_fd;
> + __u64 bpffs_pathname;
Because bppfs_pathname is a string pointer, so __aligned_u64 is preferred.
> + } token_create;
> +
> } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>
> /* The description below is an attempt at providing documentation to eBPF
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
> index f526b7573e97..4ce95acfcaa7 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
> @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ cflags-nogcse-$(CONFIG_X86)$(CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC) := -fno-gcse
> endif
> CFLAGS_core.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, override-init) $(cflags-nogcse-yy)
>
> -obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += syscall.o verifier.o inode.o helpers.o tnum.o log.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += syscall.o verifier.o inode.o helpers.o tnum.o log.o token.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_iter.o map_iter.o task_iter.o prog_iter.o link_iter.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += hashtab.o arraymap.o percpu_freelist.o bpf_lru_list.o lpm_trie.o map_in_map.o bloom_filter.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += local_storage.o queue_stack_maps.o ringbuf.o
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
> index 24b3faf901f4..de1fdf396521 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
> @@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ static const struct inode_operations bpf_prog_iops = { };
> static const struct inode_operations bpf_map_iops = { };
> static const struct inode_operations bpf_link_iops = { };
>
> -static struct inode *bpf_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
> - const struct inode *dir,
> - umode_t mode)
> +struct inode *bpf_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
> + const struct inode *dir,
> + umode_t mode)
> {
> struct inode *inode;
>
> @@ -603,11 +603,13 @@ static int bpf_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
> {
> struct bpf_mount_opts *opts = root->d_sb->s_fs_info;
> umode_t mode = d_inode(root)->i_mode & S_IALLUGO & ~S_ISVTX;
> + u64 mask;
>
> if (mode != S_IRWXUGO)
> seq_printf(m, ",mode=%o", mode);
>
> - if (opts->delegate_cmds == ~0ULL)
> + mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_CMD) - 1;
> + if ((opts->delegate_cmds & mask) == mask)
> seq_printf(m, ",delegate_cmds=any");
Should we add a BUILD_BUG_ON assertion to guarantee __MAX_BPF_CMD is
less than sizeof(u64) * 8 ?
> else if (opts->delegate_cmds)
> seq_printf(m, ",delegate_cmds=0x%llx", opts->delegate_cmds);
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 7445dad01fb3..b47791a80930 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -5304,6 +5304,20 @@ static int bpf_prog_bind_map(union bpf_attr *attr)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +#define BPF_TOKEN_CREATE_LAST_FIELD token_create.bpffs_pathname
> +
> +static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
> +{
> + if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_TOKEN_CREATE))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* no flags are supported yet */
> + if (attr->token_create.flags)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return bpf_token_create(attr);
> +}
> +
> static int __sys_bpf(int cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
> {
> union bpf_attr attr;
> @@ -5437,6 +5451,9 @@ static int __sys_bpf(int cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
> case BPF_PROG_BIND_MAP:
> err = bpf_prog_bind_map(&attr);
> break;
> + case BPF_TOKEN_CREATE:
> + err = token_create(&attr);
> + break;
> default:
> err = -EINVAL;
> break;
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/token.c b/kernel/bpf/token.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..779aad5007a3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/token.c
SNIP
> +#define BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME "bpf-token"
> +
> +static const struct inode_operations bpf_token_iops = { };
> +
> +static const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = {
> + .release = bpf_token_release,
> + .show_fdinfo = bpf_token_show_fdinfo,
> +};
> +
> +int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
> +{
> + struct bpf_mount_opts *mnt_opts;
> + struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
> + struct inode *inode;
> + struct file *file;
> + struct path path;
> + umode_t mode;
> + int err, fd;
> +
> + err = user_path_at(attr->token_create.bpffs_path_fd,
> + u64_to_user_ptr(attr->token_create.bpffs_pathname),
> + LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_EMPTY, &path);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
Need to check the mount is a bpffs mount instead of other filesystem mount.
> +
> + if (path.mnt->mnt_root != path.dentry) {
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_path;
> + }
> + err = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_path;
> +
> + mode = S_IFREG | ((S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) & ~current_umask());
> + inode = bpf_get_inode(path.mnt->mnt_sb, NULL, mode);
> + if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(inode);
> + goto out_path;
> + }
> +
> + inode->i_op = &bpf_token_iops;
> + inode->i_fop = &bpf_token_fops;
> + clear_nlink(inode); /* make sure it is unlinked */
> +
> + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, path.mnt, BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME, O_RDWR, &bpf_token_fops);
> + if (IS_ERR(file)) {
> + iput(inode);
> + err = PTR_ERR(file);
> + goto out_file;
goto out_path ?
> + }
> +
> + token = bpf_token_alloc();
> + if (!token) {
> + err = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out_file;
> + }
> +
> + /* remember bpffs owning userns for future ns_capable() checks */
> + token->userns = get_user_ns(path.dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns);
> +
> + mnt_opts = path.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
> + token->allowed_cmds = mnt_opts->delegate_cmds;
> +
> + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (fd < 0) {
> + err = fd;
> + goto out_token;
> + }
> +
> + file->private_data = token;
> + fd_install(fd, file);
> +
> + path_put(&path);
> + return fd;
> +
> +out_token:
> + bpf_token_free(token);
> +out_file:
> + fput(file);
> +out_path:
> + path_put(&path);
> + return err;
> +}
> +
.
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