[PATCH v6 bpf-next 04/13] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command

Jiri Olsa olsajiri at gmail.com
Tue Oct 10 08:35:48 UTC 2023


On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 03:58:00PM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:

SNIP

> -#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_extra
> +#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_token_fd
>  /* called via syscall */
>  static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
>  {
>  	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
> +	struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
>  	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
>  	u32 map_type = attr->map_type;
>  	struct bpf_map *map;
> @@ -1157,14 +1158,32 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
>  	if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> +	if (attr->map_token_fd) {
> +		token = bpf_token_get_from_fd(attr->map_token_fd);
> +		if (IS_ERR(token))
> +			return PTR_ERR(token);
> +
> +		/* if current token doesn't grant map creation permissions,
> +		 * then we can't use this token, so ignore it and rely on
> +		 * system-wide capabilities checks
> +		 */
> +		if (!bpf_token_allow_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE) ||
> +		    !bpf_token_allow_map_type(token, attr->map_type)) {
> +			bpf_token_put(token);
> +			token = NULL;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	err = -EPERM;
> +
>  	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF map
>  	 * creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
>  	 * on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
>  	 * object creation success. Even with unprivileged BPF disabled,
>  	 * capability checks are still carried out.
>  	 */
> -	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
> -		return -EPERM;
> +	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
> +		goto put_token;
>  
>  	/* check privileged map type permissions */
>  	switch (map_type) {
> @@ -1197,25 +1216,27 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
> -		if (!bpf_capable())
> -			return -EPERM;
> +		if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
> +			goto put_token;
>  		break;
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
>  	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
> -		if (!bpf_net_capable())
> -			return -EPERM;
> +		if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> +			goto put_token;
>  		break;
>  	default:
>  		WARN(1, "unsupported map type %d", map_type);
> -		return -EPERM;
> +		goto put_token;
>  	}
>  
>  	map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
> -	if (IS_ERR(map))
> -		return PTR_ERR(map);
> +	if (IS_ERR(map)) {
> +		err = PTR_ERR(map);
> +		goto put_token;
> +	}
>  	map->ops = ops;
>  	map->map_type = map_type;
>  
> @@ -1252,7 +1273,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
>  		map->btf = btf;
>  
>  		if (attr->btf_value_type_id) {
> -			err = map_check_btf(map, btf, attr->btf_key_type_id,
> +			err = map_check_btf(map, token, btf, attr->btf_key_type_id,
>  					    attr->btf_value_type_id);
>  			if (err)
>  				goto free_map;

I might be missing something, but should we call bpf_token_put(token)
on non-error path as well? probably after bpf_map_save_memcg call

jirka

> @@ -1293,6 +1314,8 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
>  free_map:
>  	btf_put(map->btf);
>  	map->ops->map_free(map);
> +put_token:
> +	bpf_token_put(token);
>  	return err;
>  }
>  

SNIP



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