[PATCH v6 19/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
Roberto Sassu
roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
Tue Nov 21 08:02:42 UTC 2023
On Mon, 2023-11-20 at 18:33 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>
> Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
> various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
> new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
> 'integrity').
>
> Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
> which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
> respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Conditionally register
> ima_post_path_mknod() if CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is enabled, otherwise the
> path_post_mknod hook won't be available.
>
> Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA (renamed to
> ima_kernel_module_request()), and conditionally register it as
> implementation of the kernel_module_request LSM hook (if
> CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled).
>
> Define the 'ima' LSM, and initialize it with init_ima_lsm(). Consequently,
> assign the LSM_ID_IMA ID to IMA in include/uapi/linux/lsm.h.
>
> Still rely on the existing 'integrity' subsystem to be enabled and to
> manage integrity metadata.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever at oracle.com>
> ---
> fs/file_table.c | 2 -
> fs/namei.c | 6 --
> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 --
> fs/open.c | 1 -
> include/linux/ima.h | 94 ---------------------
> include/linux/integrity.h | 13 ---
> include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 +
> security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 22 -----
> security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
> security/keys/key.c | 9 +--
> security/security.c | 63 +++------------
> 14 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 225 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
> index c72dc75f2bd3..0401ac98281c 100644
> --- a/fs/file_table.c
> +++ b/fs/file_table.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
> #include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> #include <linux/task_work.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/swap.h>
> #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
>
> @@ -386,7 +385,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
> locks_remove_file(file);
>
> security_file_release(file);
> - ima_file_free(file);
> if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
> if (file->f_op->fasync)
> file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index adb3ab27951a..37cc0988308f 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
> #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> @@ -3622,8 +3621,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
> error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
> if (!error)
> error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
> - if (!error)
> - error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
> if (!error && do_truncate)
> error = handle_truncate(idmap, file);
> if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
> @@ -3687,7 +3684,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> }
> security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
> - ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -4036,8 +4032,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
> case 0: case S_IFREG:
> error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
> dentry, mode, true);
> - if (!error)
> - ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry);
> break;
> case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
> error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> index b0c3f07a8bba..e491392a1243 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
> #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
> #include <linux/xattr.h>
> #include <linux/jhash.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> @@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
> - if (host_err) {
> - fput(file);
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
> file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
> else
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 02dc608d40d8..c8bb9bd5259f 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> #include <linux/falloc.h>
> #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/dnotify.h>
> #include <linux/compat.h>
> #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 31ef6c3c3207..23ae24b60ecf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
> -extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> -extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
> -extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - struct inode *inode);
> -extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
> -extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
> -extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> - unsigned long prot);
> -extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
> -extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
> -extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> - bool contents);
> -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> -extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - struct dentry *dentry);
> extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
> extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
> extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
> @@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
> return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
> }
>
> -static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - struct inode *inode)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
> -{
> - return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> - unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_load_data_id id,
> - char *description)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> - bool contents)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - struct dentry *dentry)
> -{
> - return;
> -}
> -
> static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> @@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
> {}
> #endif
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> -extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
> - struct key *key,
> - const void *payload, size_t plen,
> - unsigned long flags, bool create);
> -#else
> -static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
> - struct key *key,
> - const void *payload,
> - size_t plen,
> - unsigned long flags,
> - bool create) {}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
> extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
> extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> -
> -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> -
> -#else
> -
> -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> -
> #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> index f0386880a78e..ee7d034255a9 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
> @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx {
> #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN 108
> #define LSM_ID_BPF 109
> #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110
> +#define LSM_ID_IMA 111
>
> /*
> * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> index 895f4b9ce8c6..4d11c622fabd 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> @@ -133,25 +133,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
> return ret;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
> - * @kmod_name: kernel module name
> - *
> - * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
> - * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
> - * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
> - * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
> - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
> - * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
> - *
> - * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
> - * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
> - * also signed with digsig.
> - */
> -int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index d4419a2a1e24..6cbf2aa5540e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
> 0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
> return 0;
> }
> +
> DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
> .name = "integrity",
> .init = integrity_iintcache_init,
> .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
> };
>
> -
> /*
> * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
> *
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
> static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
> #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
> + const void *payload, size_t plen,
> + unsigned long flags, bool create);
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
> * platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 02021ee467d3..af213bece9b8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> *
> * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
> */
> -void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
> +static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
> {
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> +static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
> {
> u32 secid;
> int ret;
> @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> *
> * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
> */
> -int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> - unsigned long prot)
> +static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> + unsigned long prot)
> {
> struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
> struct file *file;
> @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> int ret;
> u32 secid;
> @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> +static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> {
> u32 secid;
>
> @@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
> MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
>
> static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
> size_t buf_size)
> @@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
> * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
> * tmpfiles are in policy.
> */
> -void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - struct inode *inode)
> +static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> + struct inode *inode)
> +
> {
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> int must_appraise;
> @@ -717,8 +717,8 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
> * file data can be written later.
> */
> -void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> - struct dentry *dentry)
> +static void __maybe_unused
> +ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> @@ -753,8 +753,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> *
> * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
> - bool contents)
> +static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
> + bool contents)
> {
> enum ima_hooks func;
> u32 secid;
> @@ -803,8 +803,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> +static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> enum ima_hooks func;
> u32 secid;
> @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> *
> * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> +static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> {
> bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
>
> @@ -891,9 +891,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
> - char *description)
> +static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
> + char *description)
> {
> if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
> if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> @@ -1122,4 +1122,72 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
> return error;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * ima_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
> + * @kmod_name: kernel module name
> + *
> + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
> + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
> + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
> + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
> + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
> + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
> + *
> + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
> + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
> + * also signed with digsig.
> + */
> +static int __maybe_unused ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
> +#endif
> +};
> +
> +static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
> + .name = "ima",
> + .id = LSM_ID_IMA,
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Since with the LSM_ORDER_LAST there is no guarantee about the ordering
> + * within the .lsm_info.init section, ensure that IMA hooks are before EVM
> + * ones, by letting the 'integrity' LSM call init_ima_lsm() to initialize the
> + * 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs in this sequence.
> + */
Sorry, leftover from the previous version (also for EVM).
> +int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
Will make this as static (reported by kernel robot).
Roberto
> +{
> + security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
> + .name = "ima",
> + .init = init_ima_lsm,
> + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
> +};
> +
> late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #include <crypto/hash.h>
> #include <linux/key.h>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>
> /* iint action cache flags */
> #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
> diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
> index f75fe66c2f03..80fc2f203a0c 100644
> --- a/security/keys/key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/key.c
> @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
> #include <linux/random.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/err.h>
> #include "internal.h"
>
> @@ -937,8 +936,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
>
> security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
> true);
> - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
> - flags, true);
>
> key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
>
> @@ -970,13 +967,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
>
> key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
>
> - if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
> + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
> security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
> flags, false);
> - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
> - payload, plen,
> - flags, false);
> - }
>
> goto error_free_prep;
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 423d53092604..e18953ee4a97 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
> (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
> (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
> (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
> - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
>
> /*
> * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
> @@ -1182,12 +1183,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
> */
> int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
> + return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2883,13 +2879,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> - unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
> + return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
> + flags);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2918,12 +2909,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> unsigned long prot)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> + return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -3232,12 +3218,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
> */
> int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -3253,12 +3234,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> bool contents)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
>
> @@ -3278,12 +3254,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
> int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
>
> @@ -3298,12 +3269,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
> */
> int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_load_data(id, contents);
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
>
> @@ -3325,13 +3291,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_load_data_id id,
> char *description)
> {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
> - description);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
> + description);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
>
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