[RFC PATCH -mm 0/4] mm, security, bpf: Fine-grained control over memory policy adjustments with lsm bpf

[Yafang Shao]

On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 5:33 PM Yafang Shao <laoar.shao at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 4:45 PM Michal Hocko <mhocko at suse.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed 15-11-23 09:52:38, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 12:58 AM Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 11/14/2023 3:59 AM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Nov 14, 2023 at 6:15 PM Michal Hocko <mhocko at suse.com> wrote:
> > > > >> On Mon 13-11-23 11:15:06, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > > > >>> On Mon, Nov 13, 2023 at 12:45 AM Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> > > > >>>> On 11/11/2023 11:34 PM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > > > >>>>> Background
> > > > >>>>> ==========
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> In our containerized environment, we've identified unexpected OOM events
> > > > >>>>> where the OOM-killer terminates tasks despite having ample free memory.
> > > > >>>>> This anomaly is traced back to tasks within a container using mbind(2) to
> > > > >>>>> bind memory to a specific NUMA node. When the allocated memory on this node
> > > > >>>>> is exhausted, the OOM-killer, prioritizing tasks based on oom_score,
> > > > >>>>> indiscriminately kills tasks. This becomes more critical with guaranteed
> > > > >>>>> tasks (oom_score_adj: -998) aggravating the issue.
> > > > >>>> Is there some reason why you can't fix the callers of mbind(2)?
> > > > >>>> This looks like an user space configuration error rather than a
> > > > >>>> system security issue.
> > > > >>> It appears my initial description may have caused confusion. In this
> > > > >>> scenario, the caller is an unprivileged user lacking any capabilities.
> > > > >>> While a privileged user, such as root, experiencing this issue might
> > > > >>> indicate a user space configuration error, the concerning aspect is
> > > > >>> the potential for an unprivileged user to disrupt the system easily.
> > > > >>> If this is perceived as a misconfiguration, the question arises: What
> > > > >>> is the correct configuration to prevent an unprivileged user from
> > > > >>> utilizing mbind(2)?"
> > > > >> How is this any different than a non NUMA (mbind) situation?
> > > > > In a UMA system, each gigabyte of memory carries the same cost.
> > > > > Conversely, in a NUMA architecture, opting to confine processes within
> > > > > a specific NUMA node incurs additional costs. In the worst-case
> > > > > scenario, if all containers opt to bind their memory exclusively to
> > > > > specific nodes, it will result in significant memory wastage.
> > > >
> > > > That still sounds like you've misconfigured your containers such
> > > > that they expect to get more memory than is available, and that
> > > > they have more control over it than they really do.
> > >
> > > And again: What configuration method is suitable to limit user control
> > > over memory policy adjustments, besides the heavyweight seccomp
> > > approach?
> >
> > This really depends on the workloads. What is the reason mbind is used
> > in the first place?
>
> It can improve their performance.
>
> > Is it acceptable to partition the system so that
> > there is a numa node reserved for NUMA aware workloads?
>
> As highlighted in the commit log, our preference is to configure this
> memory policy through kubelet using cpuset.mems in the cpuset
> controller, rather than allowing individual users to set it
> independently.
>
> > If not, have you
> > considered (already proposed numa=off)?
>
> The challenge at hand isn't solely about whether users should bind to
> a memory node or the deployment of workloads. What we're genuinely
> dealing with is the fact that users can bind to a specific node
> without our explicit agreement or authorization.

BYW, the same principle should also apply to sched_setaffinity(2).
While there's already a security_task_setscheduler() in place, it's
undeniable that we should also consider adding a
security_set_mempolicy() for consistency.

-- 
Regards
Yafang