[PATCH] lsm: fix a number of misspellings

Casey Schaufler casey at schaufler-ca.com
Thu May 25 17:13:36 UTC 2023


On 5/24/2023 8:19 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> A random collection of spelling fixes for source files in the LSM
> layer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>

Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>  security/commoncap.c     | 20 ++++++++++----------
>  security/device_cgroup.c |  2 +-
>  security/lsm_audit.c     |  2 +-
>  security/security.c      |  4 ++--
>  4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 0b3fc2f3afe7..ab5742ab4362 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
>   * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
>   * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
>   * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
> - * performed on the raw inode simply passs @nop_mnt_idmap.
> + * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
>   *
>   * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
>   */
> @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
>   * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
>   * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
>   * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
> - * performed on the raw inode simply passs @nop_mnt_idmap.
> + * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
>   *
>   * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
>   */
> @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
>   * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then
>   * take care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking
>   * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
> - * performed on the raw inode simply passs @nop_mnt_idmap.
> + * performed on the raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap.
>   */
>  int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			   const struct dentry *dentry,
> @@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
>  		break;
>  
>  	case LSM_SETID_FS:
> -		/* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
> +		/* juggle the capabilities to follow FSUID changes, unless
>  		 * otherwise suppressed
>  		 *
>  		 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
> @@ -1184,10 +1184,10 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
> + * cap_task_setscheduler - Determine if scheduler policy change is permitted
>   * @p: The task to affect
>   *
> - * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
> + * Determine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
>   * specified task.
>   *
>   * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
> @@ -1198,11 +1198,11 @@ int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * cap_task_setioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
> + * cap_task_setioprio - Determine if I/O priority change is permitted
>   * @p: The task to affect
>   * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
>   *
> - * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
> + * Determine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
>   * task.
>   *
>   * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
> @@ -1213,11 +1213,11 @@ int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * cap_task_setnice - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
> + * cap_task_setnice - Determine if task priority change is permitted
>   * @p: The task to affect
>   * @nice: The nice value to set
>   *
> - * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
> + * Determine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
>   * specified task.
>   *
>   * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
> diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
> index 7507d14eacc7..41fca6487ca3 100644
> --- a/security/device_cgroup.c
> +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
> @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static bool verify_new_ex(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
>  		} else {
>  			/*
>  			 * new exception in the child will add more devices
> -			 * that can be acessed, so it can't match any of
> +			 * that can be accessed, so it can't match any of
>  			 * parent's exceptions, even slightly
>  			 */ 
>  			match = match_exception_partial(&dev_cgroup->exceptions,
> diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
> index 368e77ca43c4..849e832719e2 100644
> --- a/security/lsm_audit.c
> +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
> @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
>  	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they
> +	 * To keep stack sizes in check force programmers to notice if they
>  	 * start making this union too large!  See struct lsm_network_audit
>  	 * as an example of how to deal with large data.
>  	 */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d5ff7ff45b77..ee4f1cc4902e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2491,7 +2491,7 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
>  	/*
>  	 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
>  	 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
> -	 * any other error code incase of an error.
> +	 * any other error code in case of an error.
>  	 */
>  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
>  			     &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
> @@ -4676,7 +4676,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
>   * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port
>   * @pkey: IB pkey
>   *
> - * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP.
> + * Check permission to access a pkey when modifying a QP.
>   *
>   * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
>   */



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