[PATCH v11 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to network

Konstantin Meskhidze konstantin.meskhidze at huawei.com
Mon May 15 16:13:37 UTC 2023


These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
bind() and connect() actions.

inet:
* bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
* connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
* bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
* connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
* ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
* ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
* inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets
and with port values more than U16_MAX.

port:
* inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
    - out of range ruleset attribute;
    - unhandled allowed access;
    - zero port value;
    - zero access value;
    - legitimate access values;
* bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length.
* bind_connect_unix_*_socket: Tests to make sure unix sockets' actions
are not restricted by Landlock rules applied to TCP ones.

layout1:
* with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
filesystem directory access test.

Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.8% of 934 lines according
to gcc/gcov-11.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze at huawei.com>
---

Changes since v10:
* Replaces FIXTURE_VARIANT() with struct _fixture_variant_ .
* Changes tests names socket -> inet, standalone -> port.
* Gets rid of some DEFINEs.
* Changes names and groups tests' variables.
* Changes create_socket_variant() helper name to socket_variant().
* Refactors FIXTURE_SETUP(port) logic.
* Changes TEST_F_FORK -> TEST_F since there no teardown.
* Refactors some tests' logic.
* Minor fixes.
* Refactors commit message.

Changes since v9:
* Fixes mixing code declaration and code.
* Refactors FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() with clang-format.
* Replaces struct _fixture_variant_socket with
FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
* Deletes useless condition if (variant->is_sandboxed)
in multiple locations.
* Deletes zero_size argument in bind_variant() and
connect_variant().
* Adds tests for port values exceeding U16_MAX.

Changes since v8:
* Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
* Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
* Adds address length checking tests.
* Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
* Adds invalid port values tests.
* Minor fixes.

Changes since v7:
* Squashes all selftest commits.
* Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
* Minor fixes.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config     |    4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c  |   64 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1317 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 1385 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+CONFIG_INET=y
+CONFIG_IPV6=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_NET_NS=y
 CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index b762b5419a89..9175ee8adf51 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
  */

 #define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <sched.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <sys/sendfile.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
@@ -4413,4 +4416,65 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
 	}
 }

+static const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
+const unsigned short sock_port = 15000;
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
+{
+	const struct rule rules[] = {
+		{
+			.path = dir_s1d2,
+			.access = ACCESS_RO,
+		},
+		{},
+	};
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = sock_port,
+	};
+	int sockfd, ruleset_fd, ruleset_fd_net;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+
+	addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+	addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
+	addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+	memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+	/* Creates ruleset for network access. */
+	ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_net,
+						 sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
+
+	/* Adds a network rule. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0,
+		  landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				    &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
+
+	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
+
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	/* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
+
+	sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
+
+	/* Closes bounded socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d4e219e42bba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1317 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - Network
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
+
+const short sock_port_start = 3470;
+const short sock_port_add = 10;
+
+static const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
+static const char loopback_ipv6[] = "::1";
+static const char unix_address_path[] = "/tmp/unix_addr";
+
+/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
+const short backlog = 10;
+
+/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
+const short landlock_inval_attr = 7;
+
+FIXTURE(inet)
+{
+	unsigned short port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+};
+
+/* struct _fixture_variant_inet */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(inet)
+{
+	const bool is_ipv4;
+	const bool is_sandboxed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv4) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_ipv4 = true,
+	.is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv4_sandboxed) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_ipv4 = true,
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv6) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_ipv4 = false,
+	.is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(inet, ipv6_sandboxed) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_ipv4 = false,
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+static int socket_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_inet *const variant,
+			  const int type)
+{
+	if (variant->is_ipv4)
+		return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+	else
+		return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+}
+
+static int bind_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_inet *const variant,
+			const int sockfd,
+			const struct _test_data_inet *const self,
+			const size_t index)
+{
+	if (variant->is_ipv4)
+		return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
+			    sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
+	else
+		return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
+			    sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
+}
+
+static int connect_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_inet *const variant,
+			   const int sockfd,
+			   const struct _test_data_inet *const self,
+			   const size_t index)
+{
+	if (variant->is_ipv4)
+		return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
+			       sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
+	else
+		return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
+			       sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(inet)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
+		/* Initializes socket ports . */
+		self->port[i] = sock_port_start + sock_port_add * i;
+
+		/* Initializes and IPv4 socket addresses. */
+		self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
+		self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+		self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+		memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+
+		/* Initializes IPv6 socket addresses. */
+		self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+		inet_pton(AF_INET6, loopback_ipv6, &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
+	}
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(inet)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE(port)
+{
+	unsigned short port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+};
+
+/* struct _fixture_variant_port */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(port)
+{
+	const bool is_sandboxed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(port, none_sandboxed) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(port, sandboxed) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(port)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/* Initializes socket ports . */
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++)
+		self->port[i] = sock_port_start + sock_port_add * i;
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(port)
+{
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, bind)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[1],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_denied = {
+		.allowed_access = 0,
+		.port = self->port[2],
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd, sockfd, ret;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+		 * socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+		/*
+		 * Allows connect and denies bind operations to the port[1]
+		 * socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_connect, 0));
+		/*
+		 * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in
+		 * network actions for port[2] socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&tcp_denied, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	}
+
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Binds a socket to port[0]. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Closes bounded socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Binds a socket to port[1]. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+		ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+	} else {
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Binds a socket to port[2]. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2);
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+		ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+	} else {
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, connect)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[1],
+	};
+	int accept_fd, ruleset_fd, sockfd_1, sockfd_2, status, ret;
+	pid_t child_1, child_2;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+		 * socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+		/*
+		 * Allows bind and denies connect operations to the port[1]
+		 * socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	}
+
+	/* Creates a server socket 1. */
+	sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+	/* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Makes listening socket 1. */
+	ret = listen(sockfd_1, backlog);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	child_1 = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child_1);
+	if (child_1 == 0) {
+		int child_sockfd, ret;
+
+		/* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+		/* Creates a stream client socket. */
+		child_sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+		/* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[0]. */
+		ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+		_exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Accepts connection from the child 1. */
+	accept_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, accept_fd);
+
+	/* Closes connection. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(accept_fd));
+
+	/* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child_1, waitpid(child_1, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+	/* Creates a server socket 2. */
+	sockfd_2 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+	/* Binds the socket 2 to address with port[1]. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Makes listening socket 2. */
+	ret = listen(sockfd_2, backlog);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	child_2 = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child_2);
+	if (child_2 == 0) {
+		int child_sockfd, ret;
+
+		/* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+		/* Creates a stream client socket. */
+		child_sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+		/* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[1]. */
+		ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 1);
+		if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+			ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+			ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+		} else {
+			ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+		}
+		_exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		/* Accepts connection from the child 2. */
+		accept_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, accept_fd);
+
+		/* Closes connection. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(accept_fd));
+	}
+
+	/* Closes listening socket 2 for the parent. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child_2, waitpid(child_2, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, bind_afunspec)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd_net, sockfd_unspec, ret;
+
+	if (variant->is_ipv4) {
+		self->addr4[0].sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+		self->addr4[0].sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+	}
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		/* Creates ruleset for network access. */
+		ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
+			&ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
+
+		/* Adds a network rule. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
+	}
+
+	sockfd_unspec = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
+
+	/* Binds a socket to the port[0] with INADDR_ANY address. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_unspec, self, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Closes bounded socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
+
+	if (variant->is_ipv4) {
+		/* Changes to a specific address. */
+		self->addr4[0].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(loopback_ipv4);
+
+		sockfd_unspec = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
+
+		/* Binds a socket to the port[0] with the specific address. */
+		ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_unspec, self, 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+		ASSERT_EQ(EAFNOSUPPORT, errno);
+
+		/* Closes bounded socket. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
+	}
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, connect_afunspec)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_bind = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_bind_connect = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int sockfd, ruleset_fd_1, ruleset_fd_2, status, ret;
+	struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
+	pid_t child;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+			&ruleset_attr_bind, sizeof(ruleset_attr_bind), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+		/* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+	}
+
+	/* Creates a server socket 1. */
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+	/* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
+	ret = connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+			&ruleset_attr_bind_connect,
+			sizeof(ruleset_attr_bind_connect), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+		/* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+	}
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		int ret;
+
+		/* Child tries to disconnect already connected socket. */
+		ret = connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unspec,
+			      sizeof(addr_unspec));
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+		_exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, ruleset_overlap)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd, sockfd;
+	int one = 1;
+
+	ruleset_fd =
+		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+	/* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &tcp_bind, 0));
+	/* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+	/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+
+	/* Creates a server socket. */
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket to address with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+	/* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+	/* Closes socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	/* Creates another ruleset layer. */
+	ruleset_fd =
+		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket in
+	 * the new ruleset layer.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+	/* Enforces the new ruleset. */
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+
+	/* Creates a server socket. */
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket to address with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+	/*
+	 * Forbids to connect the socket to address with port[0],
+	 * as just one ruleset layer has connect() access rule.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+	/* Closes socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, ruleset_expanding)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+	int one = 1;
+
+	const int ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+		&ruleset_attr_1, sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+	/* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &net_service_1, 0));
+
+	/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_1));
+
+	/* Creates a socket 1. */
+	sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+	/* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+	/* Closes socket 1. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+	/* Creates a socket 2. */
+	sockfd_2 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/*
+	 * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+	 * since there is no rule with bind() access for port[1].
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+	/* Expands network mask. */
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+
+	/* Adds connect() access to port[0]. */
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	/* Adds bind() access to port[1]. */
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[1],
+	};
+
+	const int ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+		&ruleset_attr_2, sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+	/* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &net_service_2, 0));
+	/* Adds rule to port[1] socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &net_service_3, 0));
+
+	/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_2));
+
+	/* Creates a socket 1. */
+	sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+	/* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+	/* Closes socket 1. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+	/* Creates a socket 2. */
+	sockfd_2 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/*
+	 * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+	 * because just one layer has bind() access rule.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+	/* Expands network mask. */
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_3 = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+
+	/* Restricts connect() access to port[0]. */
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+
+	const int ruleset_fd_3 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+		&ruleset_attr_3, sizeof(ruleset_attr_3), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_3);
+
+	/* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_3, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+				       &net_service_4, 0));
+
+	/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_3);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_3));
+
+	/* Creates a socket 1. */
+	sockfd_1 = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+	/*
+	 * Forbids to connect the socket 1 to address with port[0],
+	 * as just one layer has connect() access rule.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+	/* Closes socket 1. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+
+#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+
+/* clang-format on */
+
+TEST_F(port, inval)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP
+	};
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_inval = {
+		.handled_access_net = landlock_inval_attr
+	};
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_all = { .handled_access_net =
+								  ACCESS_ALL };
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_port_zero = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = 0,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_denied = {
+		.allowed_access = 0,
+		.port = self->port[1],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[2],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_all_rules = {};
+	__u64 access;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		/* Checks invalid ruleset attribute. */
+		const int ruleset_fd_inv = landlock_create_ruleset(
+			&ruleset_attr_inval, sizeof(ruleset_attr_inval), 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, ruleset_fd_inv);
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Gets ruleset. */
+		const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(
+			&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/* Checks unhandled allowed_access. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Checks zero port value. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&tcp_bind_port_zero, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Checks zero access value. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&tcp_denied, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+		/* Adds with legitimate values. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind, 0));
+
+		const int ruleset_fd_all = landlock_create_ruleset(
+			&ruleset_attr_all, sizeof(ruleset_attr_all), 0);
+
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_all);
+
+		/* Tests access rights for all network rules */
+		for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) {
+			tcp_all_rules.allowed_access = access;
+			tcp_all_rules.port = self->port[3];
+			ASSERT_EQ(0,
+				  landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_all,
+						    LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						    &tcp_all_rules, 0));
+		}
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_all);
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_all));
+	}
+}
+
+TEST_F(port, bind_connect_inval_addrlen)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int sockfd, ruleset_fd, ret;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+	int one = 1;
+
+	addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+	addr4.sin_port = htons(self->port[0]);
+	addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+	memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/* Allows bind/connect actions for socket with self->port[0]. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	}
+
+	/* Creates a socket 1. */
+	sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket to self->port[0] with zero addrlen. */
+	ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+	ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+	/* Connects the socket to the listening port with zero addrlen. */
+	ret = connect(sockfd, &addr4, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+	ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+	/* Binds the socket to self->port[0] with correct addrlen. */
+	ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Connects the socket to the listening port with correct addrlen. */
+	ret = connect(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Closes the connection*/
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_F(port, bind_connect_unix_stream_socket)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int sockfd, accept_fd, ruleset_fd, status, ret;
+	struct sockaddr_un addr_unix;
+	pid_t child;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+		 * socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Deletes address full path link from previous server launching
+	 * if was any.
+	 */
+	unlink(unix_address_path);
+
+	/* Creates a server stream unix socket. */
+	sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+	/* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+	memset(&addr_unix, 0, sizeof(addr_unix));
+	addr_unix.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strcpy(addr_unix.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+	/* Binds the socket to unix address */
+	ret = bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unix, SUN_LEN(&addr_unix));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Makes listening socket. */
+	ret = listen(sockfd, backlog);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		int child_sockfd, ret;
+		struct sockaddr_un connect_addr;
+
+		/* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+		/* Creates a client stream unix socket. */
+		child_sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+		/* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+		memset(&connect_addr, 0, sizeof(connect_addr));
+		connect_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+		strcpy(connect_addr.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+		/* Makes connection to the listening unix socket. */
+		ret = connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+			      SUN_LEN(&connect_addr));
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+		_exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Accepts connection from the child. */
+	accept_fd = accept(sockfd, NULL, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, accept_fd);
+
+	/* Closes connection. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(accept_fd));
+
+	/* Closes listening socket for the parent. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	/* Deletes address full path link. */
+	unlink(unix_address_path);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(port, bind_connect_unix_dgram_socket)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr tcp_bind_connect = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+		.port = self->port[0],
+	};
+	int sockfd, ruleset_fd, status, ret;
+	struct sockaddr_un addr_unix;
+	pid_t child;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Allows connect and bind operations to the self->port[0]
+		 * socket.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &tcp_bind_connect, 0));
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Deletes address full path link from previous server launching
+	 * if was any.
+	 */
+	unlink(unix_address_path);
+
+	/* Creates a server datagram unix socket. */
+	sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+	/* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+	memset(&addr_unix, 0, sizeof(addr_unix));
+	addr_unix.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strcpy(addr_unix.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+	/* Binds the socket to unix address */
+	ret = bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unix, SUN_LEN(&addr_unix));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		int child_sockfd, ret;
+		struct sockaddr_un connect_addr;
+
+		/* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+		/* Creates a client datagram unix socket. */
+		child_sockfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+		/* Sets unix socket address parameters */
+		memset(&connect_addr, 0, sizeof(connect_addr));
+		connect_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+		strcpy(connect_addr.sun_path, unix_address_path);
+
+		/* Makes connection to the server unix socket. */
+		ret = connect(child_sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&connect_addr,
+			      SUN_LEN(&connect_addr));
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+		_exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+	ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+	/* Closes socket for the parent. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	/* Deletes address full path link. */
+	unlink(unix_address_path);
+}
+
+TEST_F(inet, inval_port_format)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+		.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+				      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		/* Wrong port format. */
+		.port = htons(self->port[0]),
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		/* Correct port format. */
+		.port = self->port[1],
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = UINT16_MAX,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = UINT16_MAX + 1,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_5 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = UINT16_MAX + 2,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_6 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = UINT32_MAX + 1UL,
+	};
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_7 = {
+		.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+		.port = UINT32_MAX + 2UL,
+	};
+	int sockfd, ruleset_fd, ret;
+	bool little_endian = false;
+	unsigned int i = 1;
+	int one = 1;
+	char *c;
+
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+						     sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+		/* Allows bind action for socket with wrong port format. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &net_service_1, 0));
+
+		/* Allows bind action for socket with correct port format. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &net_service_2, 0));
+
+		/* Allows bind action for socket with port U16_MAX. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+					       LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+					       &net_service_3, 0));
+
+		/* Denies bind action for socket with port U16_MAX + 1. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&net_service_4, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Denies bind action for socket with port U16_MAX + 2. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&net_service_5, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Denies bind action for socket with port U32_MAX + 1. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&net_service_6, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Denies bind action for socket with port U32_MAX + 2. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+						LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+						&net_service_7, 0));
+		ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+		/* Enforces the ruleset. */
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	}
+
+	/* Checks endianness. */
+	c = (char *)&i;
+	if (*c)
+		little_endian = true;
+
+	/* Creates a socket. */
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket to port[0] with wrong format . */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		if (little_endian) {
+			ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+			ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+		} else {
+			/* No error for big-endinan cpu by default. */
+			ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+		}
+	} else {
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+
+	/* Closes the connection*/
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket to port[1] with correct format. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
+	if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+		if (little_endian) {
+			ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+		} else {
+			/* No error for big-endinan cpu by default. */
+			ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+		}
+	} else {
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+
+	/* Closes the connection*/
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+	if (variant->is_ipv4)
+		self->addr4[0].sin_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
+	else
+		self->addr6[0].sin6_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
+
+	/* Creates a socket. */
+	sockfd = socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+	/* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+				sizeof(one)));
+
+	/* Binds the socket to port[0] UINT16_MAX. */
+	ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Closes the connection*/
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.25.1



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