[PATCH v5 5/6] KEYS: CA link restriction
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko at kernel.org
Mon Mar 20 18:28:22 UTC 2023
On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>
>
> > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg at oracle.com>
> >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com>
> >> ---
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >> include/crypto/public_key.h | 15 ++++++++++++
> >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> >> return ret;
> >> }
> >>
> >> +/**
> >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> >> + *
> >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> >> + *
> >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> >> + */
> >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> >> + const struct key_type *type,
> >> + const union key_payload *payload,
> >> + struct key *trust_keyring)
> >> +{
> >> + const struct public_key *pkey;
> >> +
> >> + if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> >> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >> +
> >> + pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> >> + if (!pkey)
> >> + return -ENOPKG;
> >> + if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> >> + return -ENOKEY;
> >> + if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> >> + return -ENOKEY;
> >> + if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> >> + return -ENOKEY;
> >
> > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > empty lines.
>
> Ok, I will make this change in the next round. Thanks.
Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?
BR, Jarkko
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