[PATCH] selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Mon Mar 20 15:14:16 UTC 2023
This looks great, but I cannot apply it on any of these trees: Linus's,
the LSM's next, nor the next one.
On 17/03/2023 20:56, Paul Moore wrote:
> After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
> years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
> runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation
> notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:
>
> The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
> runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If
> disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
> the system is rebooted.
>
> The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
> boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
> make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
> allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
> Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
> it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
> "__ro_after_init" feature.
>
> It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
> which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
> diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
> the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.
>
>>From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
> continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
> that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
> If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
> come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.
>
> It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
> always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
> to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
> error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.
>
> Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
> deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
> someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular
> case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
> documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
> command line) resolved the issue without problem.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
> ---
> .../sysfs-selinux-disable | 3 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ---
> security/Kconfig | 5 --
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 +-
> security/bpf/hooks.c | 4 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 4 +-
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 4 +-
> security/selinux/Kconfig | 24 --------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 57 +------------------
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 -------
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 43 ++------------
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 6 +-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
> 20 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
> rename Documentation/ABI/{obsolete => removed}/sysfs-selinux-disable (90%)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable b/Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-selinux-disable
> similarity index 90%
> rename from Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable
> rename to Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-selinux-disable
> index c340278e3cf8..dc1433bec23a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-selinux-disable
> @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ KernelVersion: 2.6.12-rc2 (predates git)
> Contact: selinux at vger.kernel.org
> Description:
>
> + REMOVAL UPDATE: The SELinux checkreqprot functionality was removed in
> + March 2023, the original deprecation notice is shown below.
> +
> The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime
> prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If disabled via this
> mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted.
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 6e156d2acffc..af87b962f5f7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1763,13 +1763,6 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
>
> -/* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
> -#define __lsm_ro_after_init
> -#else
> -#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
> -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
> -
> extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index e6db09a779b7..9009893fb3f5 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -32,11 +32,6 @@ config SECURITY
>
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> -config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
> - depends on SECURITY
> - bool
> - default n
> -
> config SECURITYFS
> bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
> help
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index d6cc4812ca53..cebba4824e60 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1209,13 +1209,13 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb
> /*
> * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
> */
> -struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
> .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
> };
>
> -static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
> @@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
> .get = param_get_aaintbool
> };
> /* Boot time disable flag */
> -static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
> +static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
> module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
>
> static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index e5971fa74fd7..cfaf1d0e6a5f 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
>
> -static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
> #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
> .lbs_task = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
> };
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5bb7d1e96277..0b3fc2f3afe7 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> -static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
> index ec6c37f04a19..13dff2a31545 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred)
> landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(dom);
> }
>
> -static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free),
> };
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index adcea0fe7e68..1c0c198f6fdb 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> -static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
>
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> index 4c5b9cd71286..8a06d6c492bf 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent)
> return task_ptrace(parent, current);
> }
>
> -static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
> };
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index 3f196d2ce4f9..0f6113528fa4 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
> #include "ptrace.h"
> #include "setup.h"
>
> -bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
> +bool landlock_initialized __ro_after_init = false;
>
> -struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security),
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index d73a281adf86..b9d773f11232 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
> }
>
> -static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index a79b985e917e..68d19632aeb7 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index cf6cc576736f..f4e45992472e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -74,14 +74,14 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
> [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
> };
>
> -struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __ro_after_init;
> static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
>
> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>
> char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __ro_after_init;
>
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> index 4ea946123255..95a186ec0fcb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> @@ -23,30 +23,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
>
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> -config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> - bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
> - depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
> - select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
> - default n
> - help
> - This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which
> - allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to the policy load.
> - SELinux will then remain disabled until the next boot.
> - This option is similar to the selinux=0 boot parameter, but is to
> - support runtime disabling of SELinux, e.g. from /sbin/init, for
> - portability across platforms where boot parameters are difficult
> - to employ.
> -
> - NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
> - kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider
> - using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
> - option.
> -
> - WARNING: this option is deprecated and will be removed in a future
> - kernel release.
> -
> - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> -
> config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
> bool "NSA SELinux Development Support"
> depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 9a58971f9a16..79b4890e9936 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6769,7 +6769,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> }
> #endif
>
> -struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> @@ -6905,7 +6905,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
> * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
> */
> -static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
> @@ -7253,7 +7253,6 @@ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
> };
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
> -
> static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
> {
> .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
> @@ -7328,56 +7327,4 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
> return 0;
> }
> __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> -static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
> -{
> - pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
> -
> - unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
> -}
> -#endif
> -
> -#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> -#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
> -#endif
> -
> #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> -int selinux_disable(void)
> -{
> - if (selinux_initialized()) {
> - /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> -
> - if (selinux_disabled()) {
> - /* Only do this once. */
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> -
> - selinux_mark_disabled();
> -
> - pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
> -
> - /*
> - * Unregister netfilter hooks.
> - * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
> - * runtime disable.
> - */
> - selinux_nf_ip_exit();
> -
> - security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
> -
> - /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
> - avc_disable();
> -
> - /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
> - exit_sel_fs();
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -#endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index 312112d214bb..8746fafeb778 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -89,9 +89,6 @@ extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
> struct selinux_policy;
>
> struct selinux_state {
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> - bool disabled;
> -#endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
> bool enforcing;
> #endif
> @@ -148,23 +145,6 @@ static inline bool checkreqprot_get(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> -static inline bool selinux_disabled(void)
> -{
> - return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.disabled);
> -}
> -
> -static inline void selinux_mark_disabled(void)
> -{
> - WRITE_ONCE(selinux_state.disabled, true);
> -}
> -#else
> -static inline bool selinux_disabled(void)
> -{
> - return false;
> -}
> -#endif
> -
> static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
> {
> struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
> @@ -404,7 +384,6 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
> extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
> extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
> extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
> -extern int selinux_disable(void);
> extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
> extern struct path selinux_null;
> extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index 68688bc84912..69a583b91fc5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -267,7 +267,6 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
> .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> };
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>
> @@ -275,16 +274,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> char *page;
> ssize_t length;
> int new_value;
> - int enforcing;
> -
> - /* NOTE: we are now officially considering runtime disable as
> - * deprecated, and using it will become increasingly painful
> - * (e.g. sleeping/blocking) as we progress through future
> - * kernel releases until eventually it is removed
> - */
> - pr_err("SELinux: Runtime disable is deprecated, use selinux=0 on the kernel cmdline.\n");
> - pr_err("SELinux: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-runtime-disable\n");
> - ssleep(15);
>
> if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -297,31 +286,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> if (IS_ERR(page))
> return PTR_ERR(page);
>
> - length = -EINVAL;
> - if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
> + if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) {
> + length = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> + }
> + length = count;
>
> if (new_value) {
> - enforcing = enforcing_enabled();
> - length = selinux_disable();
> - if (length)
> - goto out;
> - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> - "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
> - " enabled=0 old-enabled=1 lsm=selinux res=1",
> - enforcing, enforcing,
> - from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> - audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + pr_err("SELinux: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-runtime-disable\n");
> + pr_err("SELinux: Runtime disable is not supported, use selinux=0 on the kernel cmdline.\n");
> }
>
> - length = count;
> out:
> kfree(page);
> return length;
> }
> -#else
> -#define sel_write_disable NULL
> -#endif
>
> static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
> .write = sel_write_disable,
> @@ -2194,13 +2173,3 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
> }
>
> __initcall(init_sel_fs);
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> -void exit_sel_fs(void)
> -{
> - sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
> - dput(selinux_null.dentry);
> - kern_unmount(selinuxfs_mount);
> - unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
> -}
> -#endif
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index cfcbb748da25..bc3c3e553133 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4847,7 +4847,7 @@ static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> -struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
> @@ -4856,7 +4856,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> -static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index af04a7b7eb28..25006fddc964 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> return tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(sock, msg, size);
> }
>
> -struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_task = sizeof(struct tomoyo_task),
> };
>
> @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
> * registering TOMOYO.
> */
> -static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, tomoyo_cred_prepare),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, tomoyo_task_alloc),
> @@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> /* Lock for GC. */
> DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss);
>
> -int tomoyo_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
> +int tomoyo_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
>
> /**
> * tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module.
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index 06e226166aab..478be269571a 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> -static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list