[PATCH RESEND bpf-next 01/18] bpf: introduce BPF token object
Stanislav Fomichev
sdf at google.com
Tue Jun 6 16:58:45 UTC 2023
On 06/05, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 5, 2023 at 2:48 PM Stanislav Fomichev <sdf at google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 06/05, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 6:32 PM Stanislav Fomichev <sdf at google.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 06/02, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > > > > Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to to
> > > > > allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
> > > > > program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
> > > > > unprivileged process, all while have a good amount of control over which
> > > > > privileged operation could be done using provided BPF token.
> > > > >
> > > > > This patch adds new BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command to bpf() syscall, which
> > > > > allows to create a new BPF token object along with a set of allowed
> > > > > commands. Currently only BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself can be
> > > > > delegated, but other patches gradually add ability to delegate
> > > > > BPF_MAP_CREATE, BPF_BTF_LOAD, and BPF_PROG_LOAD commands.
> > > > >
> > > > > The above means that BPF token creation can be allowed by another
> > > > > existing BPF token, if original privileged creator allowed that. New
> > > > > derived BPF token cannot be more powerful than the original BPF token.
> > > > >
> > > > > BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS flag is added to allow application to do
> > > > > express "all supported BPF commands should be allowed" without worrying
> > > > > about which subset of desired commands is actually supported by
> > > > > potentially outdated kernel. Allowing this semantics doesn't seem to
> > > > > introduce any backwards compatibility issues and doesn't introduce any
> > > > > risk of abusing or misusing bit set field, but makes backwards
> > > > > compatibility story for various applications and tools much more
> > > > > straightforward, making it unnecessary to probe support for each
> > > > > individual possible bit. This is especially useful in follow up patches
> > > > > where we add BPF map types and prog types bit sets.
> > > > >
> > > > > Lastly, BPF token can be pinned in and retrieved from BPF FS, just like
> > > > > progs, maps, BTFs, and links. This allows applications (like container
> > > > > managers) to share BPF token with other applications through file system
> > > > > just like any other BPF object, and further control access to it using
> > > > > file system permissions, if desired.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii at kernel.org>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > include/linux/bpf.h | 34 +++++++++
> > > > > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 42 ++++++++++++
> > > > > kernel/bpf/Makefile | 2 +-
> > > > > kernel/bpf/inode.c | 26 +++++++
> > > > > kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > kernel/bpf/token.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 40 +++++++++++
> > > > > 7 files changed, 339 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > > create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/token.c
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> > > > > index f58895830ada..fe6d51c3a5b1 100644
> > > > > --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> > > > > +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> > > > > @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct module;
> > > > > struct bpf_func_state;
> > > > > struct ftrace_ops;
> > > > > struct cgroup;
> > > > > +struct bpf_token;
> > > > >
> > > > > extern struct idr btf_idr;
> > > > > extern spinlock_t btf_idr_lock;
> > > > > @@ -1533,6 +1534,12 @@ struct bpf_link_primer {
> > > > > u32 id;
> > > > > };
> > > > >
> > > > > +struct bpf_token {
> > > > > + struct work_struct work;
> > > > > + atomic64_t refcnt;
> > > > > + u64 allowed_cmds;
> > > > > +};
> > > > > +
> > > > > struct bpf_struct_ops_value;
> > > > > struct btf_member;
> > > > >
> > > > > @@ -2077,6 +2084,15 @@ struct file *bpf_link_new_file(struct bpf_link *link, int *reserved_fd);
> > > > > struct bpf_link *bpf_link_get_from_fd(u32 ufd);
> > > > > struct bpf_link *bpf_link_get_curr_or_next(u32 *id);
> > > > >
> > > > > +void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token);
> > > > > +void bpf_token_put(struct bpf_token *token);
> > > > > +struct bpf_token *bpf_token_alloc(void);
> > > > > +int bpf_token_new_fd(struct bpf_token *token);
> > > > > +struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap);
> > > > > +bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd);
> > > > > +
> > > > > int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, int path_fd, const char __user *pathname);
> > > > > int bpf_obj_get_user(int path_fd, const char __user *pathname, int flags);
> > > > >
> > > > > @@ -2436,6 +2452,24 @@ static inline int bpf_obj_get_user(const char __user *pathname, int flags)
> > > > > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > +static inline void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static inline void bpf_token_put(struct bpf_token *token)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static inline struct bpf_token *bpf_token_new_fd(struct bpf_token *token)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static inline struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > static inline void __dev_flush(void)
> > > > > {
> > > > > }
> > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > > index 9273c654743c..01ab79f2ad9f 100644
> > > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > > @@ -846,6 +846,16 @@ union bpf_iter_link_info {
> > > > > * Returns zero on success. On error, -1 is returned and *errno*
> > > > > * is set appropriately.
> > > > > *
> > > > > + * BPF_TOKEN_CREATE
> > > > > + * Description
> > > > > + * Create BPF token with embedded information about what
> > > > > + * BPF-related functionality is allowed. This BPF token can be
> > > > > + * passed as an extra parameter to various bpf() syscall command.
> > > > > + *
> > > > > + * Return
> > > > > + * A new file descriptor (a nonnegative integer), or -1 if an
> > > > > + * error occurred (in which case, *errno* is set appropriately).
> > > > > + *
> > > > > * NOTES
> > > > > * eBPF objects (maps and programs) can be shared between processes.
> > > > > *
> > > > > @@ -900,6 +910,7 @@ enum bpf_cmd {
> > > > > BPF_ITER_CREATE,
> > > > > BPF_LINK_DETACH,
> > > > > BPF_PROG_BIND_MAP,
> > > > > + BPF_TOKEN_CREATE,
> > > > > };
> > > > >
> > > > > enum bpf_map_type {
> > > > > @@ -1169,6 +1180,24 @@ enum bpf_link_type {
> > > > > */
> > > > > #define BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN (1U << 0)
> > > > >
> > > > > +/* BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command flags
> > > > > + */
> > > > > +enum {
> > > > > + /* Ignore unrecognized bits in token_create.allowed_cmds bit set. If
> > > > > + * this flag is set, kernel won't return -EINVAL for a bit
> > > > > + * corresponding to a non-existing command or the one that doesn't
> > > > > + * support BPF token passing. This flags allows application to request
> > > > > + * BPF token creation for a desired set of commands without worrying
> > > > > + * about older kernels not supporting some of the commands.
> > > > > + * Presumably, deployed applications will do separate feature
> > > > > + * detection and will avoid calling not-yet-supported bpf() commands,
> > > > > + * so this BPF token will work equally well both on older and newer
> > > > > + * kernels, even if some of the requested commands won't be BPF
> > > > > + * token-enabled.
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS = 1U << 0,
> > > > > +};
> > > > > +
> > > > > /* When BPF ldimm64's insn[0].src_reg != 0 then this can have
> > > > > * the following extensions:
> > > > > *
> > > > > @@ -1621,6 +1650,19 @@ union bpf_attr {
> > > > > __u32 flags; /* extra flags */
> > > > > } prog_bind_map;
> > > > >
> > > > > + struct { /* struct used by BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command */
> > > > > + __u32 flags;
> > > > > + __u32 token_fd;
> > > > > + /* a bit set of allowed bpf() syscall commands,
> > > > > + * e.g., (1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE) | (1ULL << BPF_PROG_LOAD)
> > > > > + * will allow creating derived BPF tokens and loading new BPF
> > > > > + * programs;
> > > > > + * see also BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS for its effect on
> > > > > + * validity checking of this set
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + __u64 allowed_cmds;
> > > > > + } token_create;
> > > >
> > > > Do you think this might eventually grow into something like
> > > > "allow only lookup operation for this specific map"? If yes, maybe it
> > >
> > > If it was strictly up for me, then no. I think fine-granular and
> > > highly-dynamic restrictions are more the (BPF) LSM domain. In practice
> > > I envision that users will use a combination of BPF token to specify
> > > what BPF functionality can be used by applications in "broad strokes",
> > > e.g., specifying that only networking programs and
> > > ARRAY/HASHMAP/SK_STORAGE maps can be used, but disallow most of
> > > tracing functionality. And then on top of that LSM can be utilized to
> > > provide more nuanced (and as I said, more dynamic) controls over what
> > > operations over BPF map application can perform.
> >
> > In this case, why not fully embrace lsm here?
> >
> > Maybe all we really need is:
> > - a BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command (without any granularity)
> > - a holder of the token (passed as you're suggesting, via new uapi
> > field) would be equivalent to capable(CAP_BPF)
> > - security_bpf() will provide fine-grained control
> > - extend landlock to provide coarse-grained policy (and later
> > finer granularity)
> >
> > ?
>
> That's one option, yes. But I got the feeling at LSF/MM/BPF that
> people are worried about having a BPF token that allows the entire
> bpf() syscall with no control. I think this coarse-grained control
> strikes a reasonable and pragmatic balance, but I'm open to just going
> all in. :)
Sg, let's see what the rest of the folks think.
> > Or we still want the token to carry the policy somehow? (why? because
> > of the filesystem pinning?)
>
> I think it's nice to be able to say "this application can only do
> networking programs and no fancy data structures" with purely BPF
> token, with no BPF LSM involved. Or on the other hand, "just tracing,
> no networking" for another class of programs.
>
> LSM and BPF LSM is definitely a more logistical hurdle, so if it can
> be avoided in some scenarios, that seems like a win.
Agreed, although it's pretty hard to define what networking program
really is nowadays. Our networking programs have a bunch of tracepoints
in them. That's why I'm a bit tilting towards pushing all this policy
stuff to lsm.
> > > If you look at the final set of token_create parameters, you can see
> > > that I only aim to control and restrict BPF commands that are creating
> > > new BPF objects (BTF, map, prog; we might do similar stuff for links
> > > later, perhaps) only. In that sense BPF token controls "constructors",
> > > while if users want to control operation on BPF objects that were
> > > created (maps and programs, for the most part), I see this a bit
> > > outside of BPF token scope. I also don't think we should do more
> > > fine-grained control of construction parameters. E.g., I think it's
> > > too much to enforce which attach_btf_id can be provided.
> > >
> > > It's all code, though, so we could push it in any direction we want,
> > > but in my view BPF token is about a somewhat static prescription of
> > > what bpf() functionality is accessible to the application, broadly.
> > > And LSM can complement it with more dynamic abilities.
> >
> > Are you planning to follow up with the other, non-constructing commands?
> > Somebody here recently was proposing to namespacify CAP_BPF, something
> > like a read-only-capable token should, in theory, solve it?
>
> Maybe for LINK_CREATE. Most other commands are already unprivileged
> and rely on FD (prog, map, link) availability as a proof of being able
> to work with that object. GET_FD_BY_ID is another candidate for BPF
> token, but I wanted to get real production feedback before making
> exact decisions here.
Yeah, I was mostly talking about GET_FD_BY_ID, let's follow up
separately.
>
> >
> > > > makes sense to separate token-create vs token-add-capability operations?
> > > >
> > > > BPF_TOKEN_CREATE would create a token that can't do anything. Then you
> > > > would call a bunch of BPF_TOKEN_ALLOW with maybe op=SYSCALL_CMD
> > > > value=BPF_TOKEN_CREATE.
> > > >
> > > > This will be more future-proof plus won't really depend on having a
> > > > bitmask in the uapi. Then the users will be able to handle
> > > > BPF_TOKEN_ALLOW{op=SYSCALL_CMD value=SOME_VALUE_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_KERNEL}
> > > > themselves (IOW, BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS won't be needed).
> > >
> > > So I very much intentionally wanted to keep the BPF token immutable
> > > once created. This makes it simple to reason about what BPF token
> > > allows and guarantee that it won't change after the fact. It's doable
> > > to make BPF token mutable and then "finalize" it (and BPF_MAP_FREEZE
> > > stands as a good reminder of races and complications such model
> > > introduces), creating a sort of builder pattern APIs, but that seems
> > > like an overkill and unnecessary complication.
> > >
> > > But let me address that "more future-proof" part. What about our
> > > binary bpf_attr extensible approach is not future proof? In both cases
> > > we'll have to specify as part of UAPI that there is a possibility to
> > > restrict a set of bpf() syscall commands, right? In one case you'll do
> > > it through multiple syscall invocations, while I chose a
> > > straightforward bit mask. I could have done it as a pointer to an
> > > array of `enum bpf_cmd` items, but I think it's extremely unlikely
> > > we'll get to >64, ever. But even if we do, adding `u64 allowed_cmds2`
> > > doesn't seem like a big deal to me.
> > >
> > > The main point though, both approaches are equally extensible. But
> > > making BPF token mutable adds a lot of undesirable (IMO)
> > > complications.
> > >
> > >
> > > As for BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS, I'm thinking of dropping such
> > > flags for simplicity.
> >
> > Ack, I just hope we're not inventing another landlock here. As mentioned
> > above, maybe doing simple BPF_TOKEN_CREATE + pushing the rest of the
> > policy into lsm/landlock is a good alternative, idk.
>
> The biggest blocker today is incompatibility of BPF usage with user
> namespaces. Having a simple BPF token would allow us to make progress
> here. The rest is just something to strike a balance with, yep.
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