[RFC 0/4] Landlock: ioctl support

Mickaël Salaün mic at digikod.net
Wed Jul 12 11:38:33 UTC 2023


On 12/07/2023 13:08, Günther Noack wrote:
> Hello!
> 
> On Sat, Jun 17, 2023 at 11:47:55AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>> We should also think about batch operations on FD (see the
>>>> close_range syscall), for instance to deny all IOCTLs on inherited
>>>> or received FDs.
>>>
>>> Hm, you mean a landlock_fd_rights_limit_range() syscall to limit the
>>> rights for an entire range of FDs?
>>>
>>> I have to admit, I'm not familiar with the real-life use cases of
>>> close_range().  In most programs I work with, it's difficult to reason
>>> about their ordering once the program has really started to run. So I
>>> imagine that close_range() is mostly used to "sanitize" the open file
>>> descriptors at the start of main(), and you have a similar use case in
>>> mind for this one as well?
>>>
>>> If it's just about closing the range from 0 to 2, I'm not sure it's
>>> worth adding a custom syscall. :)
>>
>> The advantage of this kind of range is to efficiently manage all potential
>> FDs, and the main use case is to close (or change, see the flags) everything
>> *except" 0-2 (i.e. 3-~0), and then avoid a lot of (potentially useless)
>> syscalls.
>>
>> The Landlock interface doesn't need to be a syscall. We could just add a new
>> rule type which could take a FD range and restrict them when calling
>> landlock_restrict_self(). Something like this:
>> struct landlock_fd_attr {
>>      __u64 allowed_access;
>>      __u32 first;
>>      __u32 last;
>> }
> 
> FYI, regarding the idea of dropping rights on already-opened files:
> I'm starting to have doubts about how feasible this is in practice.
> 
> The "obvious" approach is to just remove the access rights from the security
> blob flags on the struct file.
> 
> But these opened "struct file"s might be shared with other processes already,
> and mutating them in place would have undesired side effects on other processes.
> 
> For example, if brltty uses ioctls on the terminal and then one of the programs
> running in that terminal drops ioctl rights on that open file, it would affect
> brltty as well, because both the Landlocked program and brltty use the same
> struct file.
> 
> It could be technically stored next to the file descriptor list, where the
> close-on-exec flag is also stored, but that seems more cumbersome than I had
> hoped.  I don't have a good approach for that idea yet, so I'll drop it for now.

Indeed, as discussed in another thread (patch v9 network support), I now 
think that file descriptors should not be touched nor restricted by 
Landlock. Even if there are file *descriptions* and file descriptors, 
Landlock should focus on what user space cannot already do (i.e. close 
file descriptors). Already acquired file descriptors should be a concern 
for user space sandboxers and the whole system/services.

> 
> Ideas are welcome. :)
> 
> —Günther
> 



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